Editing Vannevar Bush (section)

== Post-war years ==
=== Memex concept ===
Bush introduced the concept of the [[memex]] during the 1930s, which he imagined as a form of memory augmentation involving a [[microfilm]]-based "device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory."<ref name="As We May Think" /> He wanted the memex to emulate the way the brain links data by association rather than by indexes and traditional, hierarchical storage paradigms, and be easily accessed as "a future device for individual use ... a sort of mechanized private file and library" in the shape of a desk.<ref name="As We May Think" /> The memex was also intended as a tool to study the brain itself.<ref name="As We May Think" /> The structure of memex is considered a precursor to the World Wide Web.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Huhtamo |first1=Erkki |title=Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications |last2=Parikka |first2=Jussi |publisher=University of California Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-520-26273-7 |location=Berkeley, CA |pages=189 |language=en}}</ref>

[[File:Sistema hipertextual.jpg|thumb|Bush conceived the encyclopedia of the future as having a mesh of associative trails running through it, akin to [[hyperlinks]], stored in a [[memex]] system.]]

After thinking about the potential of augmented memory for several years, Bush set out his thoughts at length in "[[As We May Think]]", predicting that "wholly new forms of encyclopedias will appear, ready made with a mesh of associative trails running through them, ready to be dropped into the memex and there amplified".<ref name="As We May Think" /> "As We May Think" was published in the July 1945 issue of ''[[The Atlantic]]''. A few months later, [[Life (magazine)|''Life'' magazine]] published a condensed version of "As We May Think", accompanied by several illustrations showing the possible appearance of a memex machine and its companion devices.<ref>{{cite news |magazine=[[Life (magazine)|Life]] |date=September 10, 1945 |title=As We May Think |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uUkEAAAAMBAJ&q=As+We+May+Think |pages=112–124 |last=Bush |first=Vannevar |access-date=April 20, 2012}}</ref>

Shortly after "As We May Think" was originally published, [[Douglas Engelbart]] read it, and with Bush's visions in mind, commenced work that would later lead to the invention of the [[Mouse (computing)|mouse]].<ref name="Engelbart">{{cite web |url=http://www.dougengelbart.org/history/engelbart.html |title=A Lifetime Pursuit |access-date=April 25, 2012 |publisher=Doug Engelbart Institute}}</ref> [[Ted Nelson]], who coined the terms "[[hypertext]]" and "[[hypermedia]]", was also greatly influenced by Bush's essay.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dougengelbart.org/firsts/hypertext.html |title=Hypertext |access-date=April 25, 2012 |publisher=Doug Engelbart Institute}}</ref>{{sfn|Crawford|1996|p=671}}

"As We May Think" has turned out to be a visionary and influential essay.{{sfn|Buckland|1992|p=284}} In their introduction to a paper discussing information literacy as a discipline, Bill Johnston and Sheila Webber wrote in 2005 that:
{{blockquote|Bush's paper might be regarded as describing a microcosm of  the information society, with the boundaries tightly drawn by the interests and experiences of a major scientist of the time, rather than the more open knowledge spaces of the 21st&nbsp;century. Bush provides a core vision of the importance of information to industrial / scientific society, using the image of an "information explosion" arising from the unprecedented demands on scientific production and technological application of World War&nbsp;II. He outlines a version of information science as a key discipline within the practice of scientific and technical knowledge domains. His view encompasses the problems of information overload and the need to devise efficient mechanisms to control and channel information for use.{{sfn|Johnston|Webber|2006|p=109}} }}

Bush was concerned that [[information overload]] might inhibit the research efforts of scientists. Looking to the future, he predicted a time when "there is a growing mountain of research. But there is increased evidence that we are being bogged down today as specialization extends. The investigator is staggered by the findings and conclusions of thousands of other workers."<ref name="As We May Think" />

=== National Science Foundation ===
The OSRD continued to function actively until some time after the end of hostilities, but by 1946–1947 it had been reduced to a minimal staff charged with finishing work remaining from the war period; Bush was calling for its closure even before the war had ended. During the war, the  OSRD had issued contracts as it had seen fit, with just eight organizations accounting for half of its spending. MIT was the largest to receive funds, with its obvious ties to Bush and his close associates. Efforts to obtain legislation exempting the OSRD from the usual government [[conflict of interest]] regulations failed, leaving Bush and other OSRD principals open to prosecution. Bush therefore pressed for OSRD to be wound up as soon as possible.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=246–249}}

With its dissolution, Bush and others had hoped that an equivalent peacetime government research and development agency would replace the OSRD. Bush felt that basic research was important to  national survival for both military and commercial reasons, requiring continued government support for science and technology; technical superiority could be a [[Deterrence theory|deterrent]] to future enemy aggression. In ''Science, The Endless Frontier'', a July 1945 report to the president, Bush maintained that basic research was "the pacemaker of technological progress". "New products and new processes do not appear full-grown," Bush wrote in the report. "They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science!"<ref>{{cite web |title=Science the Endless Frontier: A Report to the President by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development |date=July 1945 |access-date=April 22, 2012 |publisher=[[National Science Foundation]] |url=https://www.nsf.gov/about/history/vbush1945.htm}}</ref> In Bush's view, the "purest realms" were the physical and medical sciences; he did not propose funding the [[social science]]s.{{sfn|Greenberg|2001|pp=44–45}} In ''Science, The Endless Frontier'', science historian [[Daniel Kevles]] later wrote, Bush "insisted upon the principle of Federal patronage for the advancement of knowledge in the United States, a departure that came to govern Federal science policy after World War&nbsp;II."{{sfn|Greenberg|2001|p=52}}

[[File:Truman, Bush and Conant.jpg|thumb|left|Bush (left) with [[Harry S. Truman]] (center) and [[James B. Conant]] (right)|alt=three men in suits. The one on the right is wearing a medal.]]
In July 1945, the Kilgore bill was introduced in Congress, proposing the appointment and removal of a single science administrator by the president, with emphasis on applied research, and a patent clause favoring a government monopoly. In contrast, the competing Magnuson bill was similar to Bush's proposal to vest control in a panel of top scientists and civilian administrators with the executive director appointed by them. The Magnuson bill emphasized basic research and protected private patent rights.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=253–256}} A compromise Kilgore–Magnuson bill of February 1946 passed the Senate but expired in the House because Bush favored a competing bill that was a virtual duplicate of Magnuson's original bill.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=328}} A Senate bill was introduced in February 1947 to create the National Science Foundation (NSF) to replace the OSRD. This bill favored most of the features advocated by Bush, including the controversial administration by an autonomous scientific board. The bill passed the Senate and the House, but was [[pocket veto]]ed by Truman on August 6, on the grounds that the administrative officers were not properly responsible to either the president or Congress.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=332}} The OSRD was abolished without a successor organization on December 31, 1947.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/227.html |publisher=[[National Archives and Records Administration]] |title=Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) |access-date=May 21, 2012}}</ref>

Without a [[National Science Foundation]], the military stepped in, with the [[Office of Naval Research]] (ONR) filling the gap. The war had accustomed many scientists to working without the budgetary constraints imposed by pre-war universities.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=397}} Bush helped create the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) of the Army and Navy, of which he was chairman. With passage of the [[National Security Act of 1947|National Security Act]] on July 26, 1947, the JRDB became the Research and Development Board (RDB). Its role was to promote research through the military until a bill creating the National Science Foundation finally became law.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=318–323}} By 1953, the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] was spending $1.6&nbsp;billion a year on research; physicists were spending 70&nbsp;percent of their time on defense related research, and 98&nbsp;percent of the money spent on physics came from either the Department of Defense or the [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] (AEC), which took over from the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947.{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|pp=305–309}} Legislation to create the [[National Science Foundation]] finally passed through Congress and was signed into law by Truman in 1950.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=368–369}}

The authority that Bush had as chairman of the RDB was much different from the power and influence he enjoyed as director of OSRD and would have enjoyed in the agency he had hoped would be independent of the Executive branch and Congress. He was never happy with the position and resigned as chairman of the RDB after a year, but remained on the oversight committee.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=336–345}} He continued to be skeptical about rockets and missiles, writing in his 1949 book, ''Modern Arms and Free Men'', that [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s would not be technically feasible "for a long time to come ... if ever".{{sfn|Hershberg|1993|p=393}}

=== Panels and boards ===
[[File:Atomic Pioneers Awards Washington DC (7649993674).jpg|thumb|From left to right in a November 1969 photo, [[Glenn Seaborg]], President [[Richard Nixon]], and the three awardees of the [[Atomic Pioneers Award]]: Vannevar Bush, [[James B. Conant]], and Gen. [[Leslie Groves]].]]
With Truman as president, men like [[John R. Steelman]], who was appointed chairman of the President's Scientific Research Board in October 1946, came to prominence.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=330–331}} Bush's authority, both among scientists and politicians, suffered a rapid decline, though he remained a revered figure.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=346–347}} In September 1949, he was appointed to head a scientific panel that included Oppenheimer to review the evidence that the Soviet Union had [[RDS-1|tested its first atomic bomb]]. The panel concluded that it had, and this finding was relayed to Truman, who made the public announcement.{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=348–349}} During 1952 Bush was one of five members of the [[State Department Panel of Consultants on Disarmament]], and led the panel in urging that the United States postpone its planned first test of the [[hydrogen bomb]] and seek a test ban with the Soviet Union, on the grounds that avoiding a test might forestall development of a catastrophic new weapon and open the way for new arms agreements between the two nations.<ref name="bernstein"/> The panel lacked political allies in Washington, however, and the [[Ivy Mike]] shot went ahead as scheduled.<ref name="bernstein">{{cite journal | title=Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb? | author-first=Barton J. | author-last=Bernstein | journal=International Security | volume=14 | issue=2 | date=Fall 1987 | pages=139–142, 145–149 | doi=10.2307/2538857 | jstor=2538857 | s2cid=154778522 }}</ref> Bush was outraged when [[Oppenheimer security hearing|a security hearing]] stripped Oppenheimer of his security clearance in 1954; he issued a strident attack on Oppenheimer's accusers in ''The New York Times''. [[Alfred Friendly]] summed up the feeling of many scientists in declaring that Bush had become "the Grand Old Man of American science".{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=377–378}}

Bush continued to serve on the NACA through 1948 and expressed annoyance with aircraft companies for delaying development of a [[turbojet]] engine because of the huge expense of research and development as well as retooling from older piston engines.{{sfn|Dawson|1991|p=80}} He was similarly disappointed with the automobile industry, which showed no interest in his proposals for more fuel-efficient engines. [[General Motors]] told him that "even if it were a better engine, [General Motors] would not be interested in it."{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=387}} Bush likewise deplored trends in advertising. "Madison Avenue believes", he said, "that if you tell the public something absurd, but do it enough times, the public will ultimately register it in its stock of accepted verities."{{sfn|Zachary|1997|p=386}}

From 1947 to 1962, Bush was on the board of directors for [[American Telephone and Telegraph]]. He retired as president of the Carnegie Institution and returned to Massachusetts in 1955,{{sfn|Zachary|1997|pp=377–378}} but remained a director of Metals and Controls Corporation from 1952 to 1959, and of [[Merck & Co.]] 1949–1962.{{sfn|Wiesner|1979|p=108}} Bush became chairman of the board at Merck following the death of [[George W. Merck]], serving until 1962. He worked closely with the company's president, [[Max Tishler]], although Bush was concerned about Tishler's reluctance to delegate responsibility. Bush distrusted the company's sales organization, but supported Tishler's research and development efforts.{{sfn|Werth|1994|p=132}} He was a trustee of Tufts College 1943–1962, of Johns Hopkins University 1943–1955, of the Carnegie Corporation of New York 1939–1950, the Carnegie Institution of Washington 1958–1974, and the George Putnam Fund of Boston 1956–1972, and was a regent of the [[Smithsonian Institution]] 1943–1955.{{sfn|Wiesner|1979|p=107}}