Editing Speech act (section)

==In computer science==

In 1991, computational speech act models of [[Human–computer interaction|human–computer conversation]] were developed,<ref>{{cite conference|location=Hartford, CT|conference=Bioengineering Conference, 1991., Proceedings of the 1991 IEEE Seventeenth Annual Northeast|pages=263–264|title=A computational speech-act model of human-computer conversations|author1=R. A. Morelli|author2= J. D. Bronzino |author3=J. W. Goethe|doi=10.1109/NEBC.1991.154675|year=1991}}</ref> and in 2004 speech act theory has been used to model [[conversation]]s for automated classification and retrieval.<ref>{{cite conference|url=http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/~aakhus/lap/Twitchell%20et%20al%20-%20SAT%20for%20classification.pdf|title=Using Speech Act Theory to Model Conversations for Automated Classification and Retrieval|author1=Douglas P. Twitchell|author2=Mark Adkins|author3=Jay F. Nunamaker Jr.|author4=Judee K. Burgoon|conference=Proceedings of the 9th International Working Conference on the Language-Action Perspective on Communication Modelling (LAP 2004)|year=2004|access-date=2008-08-08|archive-date=2007-03-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070330035357/http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/~aakhus/lap/Twitchell%20et%20al%20-%20SAT%20for%20classification.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== ''Conversation for action'' ===
{{original research|section|date=January 2022}}
Another highly-influential view of Speech Acts has been in the ''conversation for action'' developed by [[Terry Winograd]] and [[Fernando Flores]] in their 1986 text "Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design".<ref name="win">{{Cite book |last=Winograd |first=Terry |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11727403 |title=Understanding computers and cognition : a new foundation for design |year=1986 |isbn=0-89391-050-3 |location=Norwood, NJ |oclc=11727403}}</ref> Arguably the most important part of their analysis lies in a state-transition diagram in Chapter 5, that Winograd and Flores claim underlies the significant illocutionary (speech act) claims of two parties attempting to coordinate action with one another, no matter whether the agents involved might be human–human, human–computer, or computer–computer.

A key part of this analysis is the contention that one dimension of the social domain-tracking the illocutionary status of the transaction (whether individual participants claim that their interests have been met, or not) is very readily conferred to a computer process, regardless of whether the computer has the means to adequately represent the real world issues underlying that claim. Thus a computer instantiating the conversation for action has the useful ability to model the status of the current social reality independent of any external reality on which social claims may be based.

This transactional view of speech acts has significant applications in many areas in which (human) individuals have had different roles, for instance, a patient and a physician might meet in an encounter in which the patient makes a request for treatment, the physician responds with a counter-offer involving a treatment they feel is appropriate, and the patient might respond, etc. Such a conversation for action can describe a situation in which an external observer (such as a computer or health information system) may be able to track the ''illocutionary'' (or speech act) ''status'' of negotiations between the patient and physician participants even in the absence of any adequate model of the illness or proposed treatments. The key insight provided by Winograd and Flores is that the state-transition diagram representing the ''social'' (Illocutionary) negotiation of the two parties involved is generally much, much simpler than any model representing the world in which those parties are making claims; in short, the system tracking the status of the conversation for action need not be concerned with modeling all of the realities of the external world. A conversation for action is critically dependent upon certain stereotypical ''claims'' about the status of the world made by the two parties. Thus a conversation for action can be readily tracked and facilitated by a device with little or no ability to model circumstances in the real world other than the ability to register claims by specific agents about a domain.

===Rules===
In the past, philosophy has discussed rules for when expressions are used. The two rules are ''constitutive'' and ''regulative rules''.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Searle|first1=John|title=What is a Speech Act?|url=https://faculty.unlv.edu/jwood/unlv/Articles/SearleWhatIsASpeechAct.pdf}}</ref>

The concept of [[John Searle#Speech acts|constitutive rules]] finds its origin in [[Wittgenstein]] and [[John Rawls]],<ref>John Rawls: ''Two Concepts of Rules'' (1955)</ref> and has been elaborated by [[G.C.J. Midgley]],<ref>G.C.J. Midgley: ''Linguistic Rules'' (1959)</ref> [[Max Black]],<ref>Max Black: ''Models and Metaphors'' (1962)</ref> [[G.H. von Wright]],<ref>G.H. von Wright: ''Norm and Action'' (1963)</ref> [[David Shwayder]],<ref>David Schwayder: ''The Stratification of Behaviour'' (1965)</ref> and [[John Searle]].<ref>Searle: ''Speech Acts'' (1969)</ref>

Whereas ''regulative rules'' are prescriptions that regulate a pre-existing activity (whose existence is logically independent of the rules), ''constitutive rules'' constitute an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules.

For example: traffic rules are ''regulative rules'' that prescribe certain behaviour in order to regulate the traffic. Without these rules however, the traffic would not cease to be. In contrast: the rules of chess are ''constitutive rules'' that constitute the game. Without these rules chess would not exist, since the game is logically dependent on the rules.<ref>Kathrin Glüer and Peter Pagin: ''Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning'' (1998)</ref>

=== In multiagent universes ===

[[Multi-agent system]]s sometimes use speech act labels to express the intent of an agent when it sends a message to another agent. For example, the intent "inform" in the message "inform(content)" may be interpreted as a request that the receiving agent adds the item "content" to its knowledge-base; this is in contrast to the message "query(content)", which may be interpreted (depending on the semantics employed) as a request to see if the item content is currently in the receiving agents knowledge base. There are at least two standardisations of speech act labelled messaging [[KQML]] and [[Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents|FIPA]].

KQML and FIPA are based on the Searlian, that is, psychological semantics of speech acts. [[Munindar P. Singh]] has long advocated moving away from the psychological to a social semantics of speech acts—one that would be in tune with Austin's conception.<ref>{{cite web|title=Social and Psychological Commitments in Multiagent Systems|url=http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/mpsingh/papers/mas/fall-symp-91-longer.pdf|access-date=24 April 2013}}</ref> Andrew Jones<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/staff/ajijones/| title = Andrew J. I. Jones}}</ref> has also been a critic of the psychological conception. A recent collection of manifestos by researchers in agent communication reflects a growing recognition in the multiagent systems community of the benefits of a social semantics.<ref>{{cite web|title=Research Directions in Agent Communication|url=http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/mpsingh/papers/mas/TIST-13-AC-manifestos.pdf}}</ref>

=== Other uses in technology ===

* An office can be seen as a system of speech acts. The abbreviation SAMPO stands for '''S'''peech-'''A'''ct-based office '''Mo'''deling a'''p'''pr'''o'''ach, which "studies office activities as a series of speech acts creating, maintaining, modifying, reporting, and terminating commitments".<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Auramäki |first1=Esa |last2=Lehtinen |first2=Erkki |last3=Lyytinen |first3=Kalle |date=1988-04-01 |title=A speech-act-based office modeling approach |journal=[[ACM Transactions on Information Systems]] |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=126–152 |doi=10.1145/45941.214328 |s2cid=16952302 |issn=1046-8188|doi-access=free }}</ref>
* Speech act profiling has been used to detect deception in synchronous [[computer-mediated communication]].<ref>{{cite web| url = http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=16895416| title = Detecting deception in synchronous computer-mediated communication using speech act profiling}}</ref>