Editing Space Race (section)

=== US reaction to Sputnik ===
{{Main|Sputnik crisis}}

==== CIA assessment ====
At the latest, the successful start of [[Sputnik 2]] with the satellite weighing more than 500&nbsp;kg proved that the USSR had achieved a leading advantage in rocket technology. The CIA, initially astonished, estimated the launch weight of the rocket at 500 metric tons, requiring an initial thrust exceeding 1,000 tons, and assumed the use of a three-stage rocket. In a classified report, the agency described the event as a "stupendous scientific achievement" and concluded that the USSR had likely perfected an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of accurately targeting any location.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000124270.pdf |title=Analysis of Soviet Earth Satellite and Launching Device |access-date=2022-12-01 |date=1957-11-09 }}</ref> In reality, the launch weight of the Soviet rocket was 267 metric tons with an initial thrust of 410 tons with one and a half stages. The CIA's misjudgement was caused by extrapolating the parameters of the US [[SM-65 Atlas|Atlas]] rocket developed at the same time (launch weight 82 tons, initial thrust 135 tones, maximum payload of 70&nbsp;kg for [[low Earth orbit]]).<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |author=Mark Wade |url=http://www.astronautix.com/a/atlasa.html |title=Atlas A |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Astronautica |access-date=2022-11-01}}</ref> In part, the favourable data of the Soviet launcher was based on concepts proposed by the German rocket scientists headed by [[Helmut Gröttrup]] on [[Gorodomlya Island]], such as, among other things, the rigorous weight saving, the control of the residual fuel quantities and a reduced thrust to weight relation of 1.4 instead of usual factor 2.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Gröttrup |first=Helmut |title=Aus den Arbeiten des deutschen Raketen-Kollektivs in der Sowjet-Union. |date=April 1958 |publisher=Deutsche Gesellschaft für Raketentechnik und Raumfahrt |series=Raketentechnik und Raumfahrtforschung |pages=58–62 |language=de |trans-title=About the work of the German rocketry collective in the Soviet Union |quote=Towards the end of the war the general opinion was that a starting acceleration of 2 g was optimal. We have carried out detailed studies on this point, taking into account the increase in engine weights and the weights of the components used to transmit thrust. It turned out that a starting acceleration of a considerably smaller value can be optimal. One of our projects was designed for a starting acceleration of 1.4 g.}}</ref> The CIA had heard about such details already in January 1954 when it interrogated Göttrup after his return from the USSR but did not take him seriously.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP80-00810A003300530005-2 |title=Development of guided missiles at Bleicherode and Institut 88 |work=[[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA Historical Collections]] |date=1954-01-22 |access-date=2022-09-30 |quote=It was generally held up to now that the ratio thrust/take-off weights should be approximately two. [Gröttrup] discovered … that values as low as 1.2 for this ratio could give optimum results under certain conditions.}} Remark: The designations R-12 und R-14 are related to the internal project names (also known as G-2 und G-4), not to the rockets installed during the Cuban Missile Crisis</ref>

==== US reactions ====
The Soviet success raised a great deal of concern in the United States. For example, economist Bernard Baruch wrote in an open letter titled "The Lessons of Defeat" to the ''[[New York Herald Tribune]]'': "While we devote our industrial and technological power to producing new model automobiles and more gadgets, the Soviet Union is conquering space. ... It is Russia, not the United States, who has had the imagination to hitch its wagon to the stars and the skill to reach for the moon and all but grasp it. America is worried. It should be."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Crompton|first1=Samuel|title=Sputnik/Explorer I: The Race to Conquer Space|year= 2007|publisher=Chelsea House Publications|location=New York City|isbn=978-0-7910-9357-3|page=4}}</ref>

Eisenhower ordered project Vanguard to move up its timetable and launch its satellite much sooner than originally planned.{{sfn|Brzezinski|2007|pp=254–67}} The December 6, 1957 [[Vanguard TV3|Project Vanguard launch failure]] occurred at [[Cape Canaveral Air Force Station]] in Florida. It was a monumental failure, exploding a few seconds after launch, and it became an international joke. The satellite appeared in newspapers under the names Flopnik, Stayputnik, Kaputnik,<ref name="O'Neill, Terry 2002">O'Neill, Terry. The Nuclear Age. San Diego: Greenhaven, Inc., 2002.(146)</ref> and Dudnik.<ref>Knapp, Brian. Journey into Space. Danbury: Grolier, 2004.(17)</ref> In the United Nations, the Soviet delegate offered the US representative aid "under the Soviet program of technical assistance to backwards nations."<ref name="O'Neill, Terry 2002"/> Only in the wake of this very public failure did von Braun's Redstone team get the go-ahead to launch their Jupiter-C rocket as soon as they could. In Britain, the US's Western Cold War ally, the reaction was mixed: some celebrated the fact that the Soviets had reached space first, while others feared the destructive potential that military uses of spacecraft might bring.<ref>Barnett, Nicholas. '"Russia Wins Space Race": The British Press and the Sputnik Moment', ''Media History'', (2013) 19:2, 182–95.</ref> The ''[[Daily Express]]'' predicted that the US would catch up to and pass the USSR in space; "never doubt for a moment that America would be successful".<ref name="time19571014">{{Cite web |date=1957-10-14 |title=THE NATION: Red Moon Over the U.S. |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,862748,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090506101411/http://www.time.com:80/time/magazine/article/0,9171,862748,00.html |archive-date=2009-05-06 |access-date=2016-02-24 |publisher=TIME}}</ref>