Editing Richard Helms (section)

==Nixon presidency==
[[File:Richard M. Nixon, ca. 1935 - 1982 - NARA - 530679.jpg|thumb|Richard Nixon, White House photo]]

In the 1968 presidential election, the Republican nominee [[Richard M. Nixon]] triumphed over the Democrat, Vice President [[Hubert Humphrey]]. Shortly after the election, President [[Lyndon Baines Johnson|Johnson]] invited President-Elect Nixon to his [[LBJ Ranch]] in Texas for a discussion of current events. There Johnson introduced Nixon to a few members of his inner circle: [[Dean Rusk]] at State, [[Clark Clifford]] at Defense, Gen. [[Earle Wheeler]], and DCI Richard Helms. Later Johnson in private told Helms that he had represented him to Nixon as a political neutral, "a merit appointment", a career federal official who was good at his job.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 375–376.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 223–224, 228 (a slightly different version). The Helms' first meeting with Nixon was in 1956 regarding Hungary (p. 229).</ref>

Nixon then invited Helms to his pre-inauguration headquarters in New York City, where Nixon told Helms that he and [[J. Edgar Hoover]] at [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] would be retained as "appointments out of the political arena". Helms expressed his assent that the DCI was a non-partisan position. Evidently, already Nixon had made his plans when chief executive to sharply downgrade the importance of the CIA in his administration, in which case Nixon himself would interact very little with his DCI, e.g., at security meetings.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 377.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 482–483 (appointment), 538–539 (Nixon's policy change for CIA).</ref>

===Role of agency===
The ease of access to the president that Helms enjoyed in the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Administration|Johnson Administration]] changed dramatically with the arrival of President Richard Nixon and Nixon's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]] [[Henry Kissinger]]. In order to dominate policy, "Nixon insisted on isolating himself" from the Washington bureaucracy he did not trust. His primary gatekeepers were [[H.R. Haldeman]] and [[John Ehrlichman]]; they screened Nixon from "the face-to-face confrontations he so disliked and dreaded." While thus pushing away even top officials, Nixon started to build policy-making functions inside the White House. From a secure distance he would direct the government and deal with "the outside world, including cabinet members".<ref>[[Henry Kissinger]], ''The White House Years'' (Boston 1979) pp. 47–48, "isolation" and "confrontation" quotes at 48; 74–75.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 484 ("outside world" quote).</ref> Regarding intelligence matters, Nixon appointed Kissinger and his team to convey his instructions to the CIA and sister services. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger understood that "they alone would conceive, command, and control clandestine operations. Covert action and espionage could be tools fitted for their personal use. Nixon used them to build a political fortress at the White House."<ref>Weiner (2007) at 293.</ref>

In his memoirs, Helms writes of his early meeting with Kissinger. "Henry spoke first, advising me of Nixon's edict that effective immediately all intelligence briefings, oral or otherwise, were to come through Kissinger. All intelligence reports? I asked. Yes."<ref>Helms at (2003) p. 382.</ref> A Senate historian of the CIA observes that "it was Kissinger rather than the DCIs who served as Nixon's senior intelligence advisor. Under Kissinger's direction the NSC became an intelligence and policy staff."<ref>Karalekas (1976) p. 83.</ref><ref>Even the [[President's Daily Brief]] by CIA was apparently superseded by the "morning News Summary, an extremely thorough compilation of media reportage prepared overnight by an efficient team of White House aides." Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) p. 694.</ref> Under Nixon's initial plan, Helms was to be excluded even from the policy discussions at the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] (NSC) meetings.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 384.</ref><ref>Turner (2005); 125.</ref><ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) p. 8 (Helms excluded from full NSC meetings for first six weeks).</ref>

[[File:Henry Kissinger.png|thumb|[[Henry Kissinger]], Nixon advisor]]

<blockquote>Very early in the Nixon administration it became clear that the President wanted Henry Kissinger to run intelligence for him and that the National Security Council staff in the White House, under Kissinger, would control the intelligence community. This was the beginning of a shift of power away from the CIA to a new center: the National Security Council staff.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 500 (quote).</ref></blockquote>

[[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI 1977–1981) describes Nixon as basically being hostile to the CIA, questioning its utility and practical value, based on his low evaluation of the quality of its information. Turner, who served under President Carter, opines that Nixon considered the CIA to be full of elite "liberals" and hence contrary to his policy direction.<ref>Turner (2005) pp. 122–126. Turner quotes Gen. [[Brent Scowcroft]] as saying that Nixon had an "inferiority complex" to [[Ivy League]] graduates, and that Nixon believed such graduates to be dominant at the Agency (at 123).</ref><ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) at 36: "Nixon considered CIA a refuge of Ivy League intellectuals opposed to him."</ref> Helms agreed regarding Nixon's hostility toward the CIA, also saying in a 1988 interview that "Nixon never trusted anybody."<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 291 (Nixon as anti-CIA), p. 292 (Helms' "never trusted" quote).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (2007) re Nixon: p. 483 ("Georgetown types"), pp. 484–485 ("personal anger about the CIA"), p. 501 ("liberal Georgetown set").</ref> Yet Helms later wrote:

<blockquote>Whatever Nixon's views of the Agency, it was my opinion that he was the best prepared to be President of any of those under whom I served—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. ... Nixon had the best grasp of foreign affairs and domestic politics. His years as Vice President had served him well.<ref>Helms (2007) pp. 382–383, quote at 383.</ref></blockquote>

When Nixon attended [[United States National Security Council|NSC]] meetings, he would often direct his personal animosity and ire directly at Helms, who led an agency Nixon considered overrated, whose proffered intelligence Nixon thought of little use or value, and which had a history of aiding his political enemies, according to Nixon. Helms found it difficult to establish a cordial working relationship with the new president.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) pp. 8–13 (Helms per Nixon and Kissinger). Helms, interviewed in 1982, spoke about his service under Nixon:<blockquote>It was bound to be a rocky period with Richard Nixon as President, given the fact that he held the Agency responsible for his defeat in 1960. ... He would constantly, in N.S.C. meetings, pick on the Agency for not having properly judged what the Soviets were going to do ..." Helms concludes: "Dealing with him was tough, it seems to me that the fact that I ended up with my head on my shoulders after four years of working with him is not the least achievement of my life" (at 10).</blockquote></ref><ref>Cf., Helms (2003) pp. 382–383; at 386, 387.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 501: "During National Security Council meetings Helms had to deal with a host of put-downs from Nixon himself."</ref><ref>Turner (2005) p. 126: "During his briefings of the NSC, Helms caught the brunt of Nixon's contempt. The president often interrupted him, corrected him, or badgered him with as much condescension as possible. This happened regularly, not just on particular issues."</ref> [[Ray Cline]], former Deputy Director of Intelligence at CIA, wrote how he saw the agency under Helms during the Nixon years:

<blockquote>Nixon and his principal assistant, Dr. Kissinger, disregarded analytical intelligence except for what was convenient for use by Kissinger's own small personal staff in support of Nixon-Kissinger policies. Incoming intelligence was closely monitored and its distribution controlled by Kissinger's staff to keep it from embarrassing the White House... . " They employed "Helms and the CIA primarily as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes" and did not seem "to understand or care about the carefully structured functions of central intelligence as a whole. ... I doubt that anyone could have done better than Helms in these circumstances.<ref>Cline (1976) p. 216.</ref></blockquote>

Under the changed policies of the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger in effect displaced the DCI and became "the President's chief intelligence officer".<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 540 (quote).</ref> Kissinger writes that, in addition, Nixon "felt ill at ease with Helms personally."<ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1979) p. 36. Yet Kissinger (p. 37) presents his rather positive appraisal of Helms.</ref>

===Domestic Chaos===
[[File:Hammer and Sickle Red Star with Glow.svg|thumb|[[Operation CHAOS]] was begun largely due to mistaken suspicions of Soviet funding of the U.S. peace movement.]]

Under both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the CIA was tasked with domestic surveillance of protest movements, particularly anti-war activities, which efforts later became called [[Operation CHAOS]].<ref>The effort was renamed Chaos in July 1968. Powers (1979) p. 384.</ref> Investigations were opened on various Americans and their organizations based on the theory that they were funded and/or influenced by foreign actors, especially the [[Soviet Union]] and other communist states. The CIA clandestinely gathered information on [[Ramparts (magazine)|''Ramparts'' magazine]], many anti-war groups, and others, eventually building thousands of clandestine files on American citizens.<ref name="Ranelagh 1986 p. 534">Ranelagh (1986) p. 534.</ref><ref>E.g., an April 1966 article in ''Ramparts'' had claimed that at a university the CIA ran a front doing work related to the Vietnam War. ''Time'' magazine for its Feb. 24, 1967 issue put Richard Helms on its cover for its piece "The CIA and the students".</ref> These CIA activities, if not outright illegal (the declared opinion of critics),<ref>E.g., Jeffreys-Jones (1989) pp. 197–198. On December 22, 1974, journalist [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote on the front page of the ''New York Times'':<blockquote >"The CIA, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against anti-war movement and other dissent groups in the United States.</blockquote></ref><ref>Cf., Turner (2005) p. 118, "illegal".</ref> were at the margin of legality as the CIA was ostensibly forbidden from domestic spying.<ref>Cf., Senate [Church], ''Final Report, Book I'' (1976) pp. 135–139, containing remarks about the CIA and "Domestic Activities" that pertained to its statutory authority under the [[National Security Act of 1947]], which established the Agency (the Senate then referring to Title 50 of the [[United States Code]]).</ref> Later in 1974, the Chaos operation became national news, which created a storm of media attention.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 333–334, e.g., the Hersh article in the ''New York Times'' of December 22, 1974.</ref>

With the sudden rise in the United States during the mid-1960s of the [[opposition to the Vietnam War]], President Johnson had become suspicious, surmising that foreign communists must be supplying various protest groups with both money and organization skills. Johnson figured an investigation would bring this to light, a project in which the CIA would partner with the FBI. When in 1967 he instructed Helms to investigate, Helms remarked that such activity would involve some risk, as his agency generally was not permitted to conduct such surveillance activity within the national borders.<ref>Colby (1978) p. 315. "Helms was acutely conscious of the danger of seeming to involve CIA in a domestic intelligence activity." The press would likely misinterpret ''Chaos'' "as an Agency effort directed against the antiwar movement, rather than its foreign contacts."</ref> In reply to Helms Johnson said, "I'm quite aware of that." The President then explained that the main focus was to remain foreign. Helms understood the reasons for the president's orders, and the assumed foreign connection.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 279–280 (quote).</ref><ref>Tuner (2005) at 118 (quote). "Johnson assumed that the antiwar protesters and inner-city rioters were funded by overseas Communist sources."</ref> Later apparently, both the [[United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States|Rockefeller Commission]] and the [[Church Committee]] found the initial investigation to be within the CIA's legislative charter, although at the margin.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 535–536 and note *; cf., 590–591 and note *.</ref><ref>Yet "the momentum of the operation carried it beyond" initial instruction given by Helms, according to the Rockefeller Commission. Colby (1978) p. 315.</ref>

As a prerequisite to conducting foreign espionage, the CIA was first to secretly develop leads and contacts within the domestic anti-war movement. In the process its [[Entryism|infiltrating]] agents would acquire anti-war ''bona fides'' that would provide them with some amount of [[Non-official cover|cover]] when overseas. On that rationale, the CIA commenced activity, which continued for almost seven years. Helms kept the operation hidden, from nearly all agency personnel, in [[James Angleton|Angleton]]'s counterintelligence office.<ref>Colby (1978) p. 314. Helms also "kept it free of the normal process of review."</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 283–284. Helms created the Special Operations Group (SOG), housed in counterintelligence.</ref><ref>Helms (2003) p. 280; cf., p. 285.</ref>

[[File:Vietnam War protest in Washington DC April 1971.jpg|thumb|Civil protest against Vietnam war, Washington, DC, April 24, 1971]]

<blockquote>Eleven CIA officers grew long hair, learned the jargon of the [[New Left]], and went off to infiltrate peace groups in the United States and Europe. The agency compiled a computer index of 300,000 names of American people and organizations, and extensive files on 7,200 citizens. It began working secretly with police departments all over America. Unable to draw a clear distinction between the far left and the mainstream opposition to the war, it spied on every major organization in the peace movement. At the president's command, transmitted through Helms and the secretary of defense, the [[National Security Agency]] turned its immense eavesdropping powers on American citizens.<ref name="Ranelagh 1986 p. 534"/><ref>Weiner (2007) at 285–286.</ref></blockquote>

The CIA found no substantial foreign sources of money or influence. When Helms reported these findings to the President, the reaction was hostile. "LBJ simply could not believe that American youth would on their own be moved to riot in protest against U. S. foreign policy," Helms later wrote.<ref name="Helms 2003 p. 279">Helms (2003) p. 279.</ref> Accordingly, Johnson instructed Helms to continue the search with increased diligence. The Nixon presidency later would act to extend the reach and scope of ''Chaos'' and like domestic surveillance activity.<ref name="Ranelagh 1986 pp. 534–535">Ranelagh (1986) pp. 534–535.</ref> In 1969 intra-agency opposition to ''Chaos'' arose. Helms worked to finesse his critics. Lawrence Houston, the CIA [[general counsel]], became involved, and Helms wrote an office memorandum to justify the ''Chaos'' operation to CIA officers and agents.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 285–286.</ref><ref name="Ranelagh 1986 pp. 534–535"/>

Meanwhile, the FBI was reporting a steady stream of data on domestic anti-war and other 'subversive' activity, but the FBI obstinately refused to provide any context or analysis. For the CIA to do such FBI work was considered a clear violation of its charter.<ref>Powers (1978) pp. 276, 277–278 (FBI refusal); p. 285 (violate CIA charter).</ref> Nixon, however, "remained convinced that the domestic dissidence was initiated and nurtured from abroad."<ref name="Helms 2003 p. 279"/>  A young lawyer, Tom Charles Huston, was then selected by Nixon in 1970 to manage a marked increase in the surveillance of domestic dissenters and protesters: a multi-agency investigative effort, more thorough and wider in scope. Called the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (ICI), included were the FBI, the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]], the [[National Security Agency]], and the CIA. It would be "a wholesale assault on the peace and radical movements," according to intelligence writer [[Thomas Powers]].<ref>Powers (1978) pp. 285, 286–288.</ref> The new scheme was delayed, and then the Watergate scandal 'intervened'. In late 1974, the news media discovered a terminated ''Operation Chaos''.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 371–373.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) re Chaos: p. 317 ("process of dismantling"), p. 335 ("remnants"),  390 ("terminated" by December 1974).</ref>

===Soviet missiles===
The Soviet Union developed a new series of long-range missiles, called the [[SS-9 Scarp|SS-9]] (NATO codename ''Scarp''). A question developed concerning the extent of their capability to carry nuclear weapons; at issue was whether the missile was a [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]] (MIRV) or not. The CIA information was that these missiles were not 'MIRVed' but [[United States Department of Defense|Defense]] intelligence considered that they were of the more potent kind. If so, the Soviet Union was possibly aiming at a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike nuclear capacity]]. The Nixon administration, desiring to employ the existence of such a Soviet threat to justify a new American [[antiballistic missile]] system, publicly endorsed the Defense point of view. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, asked Helms to review the CIA's finding, yet Helms initially stood by his analysts at the CIA. Eventually, however, Helms compromised.<ref>Helms (2002) pp. 384–388, 390.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 490–499.</ref>

[[File:Minuteman III MIRV path.svg|thumb|right|upright=0.8|American [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRV]]: sequence of [[LGM-30 Minuteman|Minuteman III]]: 1 missile, 3 targets]]
[[Melvin Laird]], Nixon's Secretary of Defense, had told Helms that the CIA was intruding outside its area, with the result that it 'subverted administration policy'. Helms, in part, saw this MIRV conflict as part of bureaucratic maneuvering over extremely difficult-to-determine issues, in which the CIA had to find its strategic location within the new Nixon administration. Helms later remembered:

<blockquote>I realized that there was no convincing evidence in the Agency or at [[the Pentagon]] which would prove either position. Both positions were estimates—speculation—based on identical fragments of data. My decision to remove the contested paragraph was based on the fact that the Agency's estimate—that the USSR was not attempting to create a first-strike capability – as originally stated in the earlier detailed National Estimate would remain the Agency position.<ref>Helms (2002) at 387 (quote).</ref></blockquote>

One CIA analyst, Abbott Smith, viewed this flip-flop not only as "a cave-in on a matter of high principle", according to author [[John Ranelagh]], "but also as a public slap in the face from his director, a vote of no confidence in his work." Another analyst at the United States Department of State, however, had reinserted the "contested paragraph" into the intelligence report. When a few years later the nature of the Soviet SS-9 missiles became better understood, the analysts at the CIA and at State were vindicated. "The consensus among agency analysts was that Dick Helms had not covered himself with glory this time."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 497 (quote), p. 498 (quote).</ref>

===Vietnamization===
Nixon pursued what he called "peace with honor", yet critics called its aim a "[[decent interval]]".<ref>[[Tran Ngoc Chau]], ''Vietnam Labyrinth'' (2013) pp. 328–329. "On the face of it, the premise for Vietnamization appeared plausible," according to this Vietnamese politician. Yet he then "believed the Nixon administration's primary interest would be to contain the Vietnam military and political situation long enough (the "decent interval") to withdraw without the appearance of having been defeated."</ref> The policy was called [[Vietnamization]].<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', pp. 474–475: article "Vietnamization".</ref><ref>Buttinger, ''Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy'' (1977) 107–112, at 111: "the failure of Vietnamization was [due to] the corruption among the army leadership" of [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]].</ref> To end the war favorably he focused on the peace negotiations in Paris. There Henry Kissinger played the major role in bargaining with the North Vietnamese. Achieving peace proved difficult; in the meantime, casualties mounted. Although withdrawing great numbers of American troops, Nixon simultaneously escalated the air war. He increased the [[Operation Linebacker|heavy bombing]] of Vietnam, also of Laos and Cambodia, and widened the scope of the conflict by [[Cambodian Campaign|invading Cambodia]]. While these actions sought to gain bargaining power at the Paris conference table, they also drew a "firestorm" of college protests in America.<ref>David Halberstam, ''The Best and the Brightest'' (New York: Random House 1972; reprint Penguin 1983) pp. 806–807.</ref><ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' at 306–307, quote at 307.</ref> Kissinger describes a debate over the [[naval mines|mining]] of [[Haiphong]] harbor, in which he criticizes Helms at CIA for his disapproval of the plan. In Kissinger's telling, here Helms' opposition reflected the bias of CIA analysts, "the most liberal school of thought in the government."<ref>Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1997) pp. 1180–1181, 1181 (quote).</ref>

When contemplating his administration's inheritance of the Vietnam War, Nixon understood the struggle in the context of the [[Cold War (1962–79)|cold war]]. He viewed Vietnam as critically important. Helms recalled him as saying, "There's only one number one problem hereabouts and that's Vietnam—get on with it."<ref>Helms (2003) p. 309.</ref> Nixon saw that the ongoing [[Sino-Soviet split]] presented America with an opportunity to triangulate [[History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)|Soviet Russia]] by opening relations with the [[History of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976)|People's Republic of China]]. It might also drive a wedge between the two major supporters of [[North Vietnam]].<ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (Boston: Little, Brown 1997) pp. 1049–1096 (Nixon's trip to China). Vietnam discussed at 1086, 1987, cf., 694–697. Nixon also went to the ''détente'' [[Moscow Summit (1972)|summit in Moscow]] the following May (pp. 1202–1275).</ref> While here appreciating the CIA reports Helms supplied him on China, Nixon nonetheless kept his diplomatic travel preparations within the White House and under wraps.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 505 (Helms' reports), p. 540 (within White House).</ref> To prepare for [[1972 Nixon visit to China|Nixon's 1972 trip to China]], Kissinger ordered that CIA covert operations there, including [[Protests and uprisings in Tibet since 1950|Tibet]],<ref>Cf., Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) pp. 101–104.</ref> come to a halt.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 301–302.</ref>

In the meantime, ''Vietnamization'' signified the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, while the brunt of the fighting was shifted to [[ARVN|South Vietnamese armed forces]]. This affected all CIA operations across the political-military landscape. Accordingly, DCI Helms wound down many CIA activities, e.g., civic projects and paramilitary operations in Vietnam, and the "secret war" in Laos. The ''Phoenix'' program once under Colby (1967–1971) was also turned over to Vietnamese direction and control.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 261–262 (Laos), 338 (Phoenix).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 240, 290.</ref> The 1973 [[Paris Peace Accords]], however, came after Helms had left the CIA.

To sustain the existence of the South Vietnam regime, Nixon massively increased American military aid. In 1975, the [[Fall of Saigon|regime's army quickly collapsed]] when regular army units of the [[People's Army of Vietnam|Communist forces]] attacked.<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', p. 450 re article "Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975"; p. 475 re "Vietnamization": as a result of American refusal to provide further support to the south, "the accomplishments of Vietnamization were squandered."</ref> "Moral disintegration alone can explain why an army three times the size and possessing more than five times the equipment of the enemy could be as rapidly defeated as the [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]] was between March 10 and April 30, 1975," commented [[Joseph Buttinger]].<ref>Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (1977) pp. 112–116, 136–137, 148–152; quote at 148.</ref> American military deaths from the war were over 47,000, with 153,000 wounded. South Vietnamese military losses (using low figures) were about 110,000 killed and 500,000 wounded. Communist Vietnamese military losses were later announced: 1,100,000 killed and 600,000 wounded. Hanoi also estimated that total civilian deaths from the war, 1954 to 1975, were 2,000,000. According to [[Spencer C. Tucker]], "The number of civilians killed in the war will never be known with any accuracy; estimates vary widely, but the lowest figure given is 415,000."<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', p. 64 (with quote): article "Casualties" by Tucker.</ref>

===Chile: Allende===
[[Image:Prats Schneider Cheyre-2.jpg|thumb|Commander-in-Chief of the [[Chilean Army]], the constitutionalist [[René Schneider]] (1913–1970), was killed by rogue fellow officers, who were met by CIA, but cut adrift before the shooting.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 269–273. Powers opines (at 273) that the General's assassins "would have done nothing at all without American encouragement to move. If the CIA did not actually shoot General Schneider, it is probably fair to say that he would not have been shot without the CIA."</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 310–311, 312–313.</ref>]]

Helms engaged in efforts to block the [[socialism|socialist]] programs of [[Salvador Allende]] of Chile, actions done at President Nixon's behest. The operation was code-named [[Project Fubelt]]. After Allende's victory in the 1970 election, CIA jumped into action with a series of sharp and divisive maneuvers. Nonetheless, Allende was inaugurated as president of Chile. Thereafter, the CIA's efforts declined in intensity, though softer tactics continued. Three years later (11 Sept. 1973) the [[Chilean coup of 1973|military coup]] led by [[Augusto Pinochet]] violently ended the democratically elected regime of President Allende.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 251–273.</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 306–317.</ref><ref>Turner (2005) pp. 128–130.</ref>

During the [[1970 Chilean presidential election]], the USG had sent financial and other assistance to the two candidates opposing Allende, who won anyway.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 260–262.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) p. 302. Colby, DCI 1973–1976, notes that the CIA often funded foreign "center democrats", e.g., in Italy during the 1950s (cf., 108–140).</ref><ref>Cf., [[Anthony Sampson]], [[The Sovereign State of ITT]] (New York: Stein and Day 1973, reprint Fawcett Crest 1974). [[John McCone]], then on the board of directors at [[ITT Corporation]] and former DCI, had met with Helms twice, and Kissinger, in early 1970 to discuss stopping Allende's candidacy (p. 263, 268). ITT owned and operated the telephone system in Chile (p. 256), which in 1972 President Allende moved to nationalize (pp. 258–259, 280).</ref> Helms states that then, on Sept. 15, 1970, he met with President Nixon who [[U.S. intervention in Chile|ordered the CIA to support an army coup]] to prevent an already elected Allende from being confirmed as president; it was to be kept secret. "He wanted something done and he didn't care how," Helms later characterized the order.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 403–407, quote at 404. Only Kissinger, the Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell|John Mitchell]], and Helms were to know about Nixon's secret order to enlist the Chilean Army to stage a ''coup''. Helms (2003) p. 405. Thus [[Edward Korry]] the Ambassador to Chile remained out of the loop. Helms writes (at 404) that he tried to caution Nixon but to no avail.</ref><ref>Regarding Ambassador Korry, see Powers (1979) pp. 256–271.</ref> The secret, illegal (in Chile) activity ordered by Nixon was termed "track II" to distinguish it from the CIA's covert funding of Chilean "democrats" here called "track I".<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 303–304. Nixon directed that "Track II" be kept secret from everybody, including the State Department and its ambassador in Chile, Defense, and the [[Forty Committee|interdepartmental oversight committee]]. "However unusual, this order was fully within the President's authority to order covert action."</ref><ref>Senate [Church Committee] (1975) pp. 229–232.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 315–317.</ref> Accordingly, the CIA took assorted covert steps, including actions to badger a law-abiding Chilean army to seize power. CIA agents were once in communication, but soon broke off such contact, with rogue elements of the country's military who later assassinated the "[[Chilean Constitution of 1980|constitutionally minded]]" General René Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief. Following this criminal violence, the Chilean army's support swung firmly behind Allende, whom the Congress confirmed as president of Chile on November 3, 1970.<ref name="Powers 1979 p. 273">Powers (1979) p. 273.</ref><ref>Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 72–73. The Soviet [[KGB]] claimed some small credit for Allende's election, having sent him campaign contributions through the [[Communist Party of Chile]].</ref> CIA did not intend the killing. "At all times, however, Helms made it plain that assassination was not an option."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 517 (quote).</ref><ref>Senate [Church Committee], ''Alleged Assassination Plots'' (1975) pp. 228; cf., 226.</ref> Nixon and Kissinger blamed Helms for Allende's presidency.<ref name="Powers 1979 p. 273"/><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 520.</ref>

Thereafter, the CIA funneled millions of dollars to opposition groups, e.g., political parties, the media, and striking truck drivers, in a continuing, long-term effort to destabilize [[Economy of Chile|Chile's economy]] and so subvert the Allende administration. Nixon's initial, memorable phrase for such actions had been "to make the Chilean economy ''scream''".<ref>Turner (2005) p. 129.</ref> Even so, according to DCI Helms, "In my remaining months in office, Allende continued his determined march to the left, but there was no further effort to instigate a coup in Chile." Helms here appears to parse between providing funds for Allende's political opposition ("track I") versus actually supporting a military overthrow ("track II").<ref>Helms (2003) p. 407.</ref> Although in policy disagreement with Nixon, Helms assumed the role of the "good soldier" in following his presidential instructions.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 124, 270–271.</ref> Helms left office at the CIA on February 2, 1973, seven months before the [[coup d'etat]] in Chile.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 412.</ref>

Another account of CIA activity in Chile, however, states that during this period 1970–1973 the CIA worked diligently to propagandize the military into countenancing a ''coup'', e.g., the CIA supported and cultivated rightists in the formerly "constitutionally minded" army to start thinking 'outside the box', i.e., to consider a ''coup d'etat''. Thus, writes author [[Tim Weiner]], while not per se orchestrating the 1973 ''coup'', the CIA worked for years, employing economic and other means, to seduce the army into doing so.<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 315.</ref> Allende's own actions may have caused relations with his army to become uneasy.<ref>Allende was counselled by the Soviets to set up a new and separate security force independent of the army, yet Allende only mustered forces sufficient to antagonize the army but not enough to provide himself with protection. Cf., Andrew and Mitrokhin (2007) p. 82.</ref> The CIA sowed "political and economic chaos in Chile" which set the stage for a successful ''coup'', Weiner concludes.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 315–316, states that American actions after 1970 reveal the persistent goal of having an army ''coup'' overthrow Allende. During the next year, 1971, the new CIA station chief in Santiago "built a web of military men and political saboteurs who sought to shift the Chilean military off its constitutional foundation." Yet Weiner also notes how Allende made his own trouble with the army.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 519–520. CIA's 1970 efforts continued against Allende until the 1973 coup.</ref><ref>U.S. Senate (Church), ''Alleged Assassination Plots'' (1975) p. 254. The CIA understood that their 1970 efforts were to be "replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile." Former DDP [[Thomas Karamessines]] testified that CIA actions in Chile continued, and that "the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973."</ref> Hence, Helms's careful parsing appears off the mark. Views and opinions differ, e.g., Kissinger contests,<ref>[[Henry Kissinger]], ''White House Years'' (Boston: Little, Brown 1979) pp. 652–683. "[I]t was not American economic pressure but Allende's own policies that brought him down," writes Kissinger (at 682) about Allende's failures in managing the Chilean economy during 1970–1973. Kissinger notes that USG foreign aid and assistance to Chile did not altogether stop during Allende's presidency (at 681–682, cf. 1486–1487). About the 1970 "''coup'' strategy", Kissinger understood Nixon's initial 'go ahead' to Helms differently (at 673–674), but states that after first contacting the Viaux group of assassins, the CIA had called them off five days before their killing of General René Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Chile (at 676–677). Kissinger decades later wrote the "Foreword" to Helms' memoirs, published in 2003.</ref> what William Colby in part acknowledges.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 305–306. Although "track II" coup plotting ceased in 1970, Nixon's "hostility" toward Allende continued. American policy included "the administration's attempts to rally private capital against Chile, the State Department's efforts to cut off its international credits, and the American military's continued warm contacts with the Chilean military." Yet Colby protests making the CIA the "scapegoat" for the evils of the military ''coup'' in Chile.</ref>

After Helms' departure from the CIA in early 1973, Nixon continued to work directly against the Allende regime.<ref>On August 22, 1973, a hostile congress passed (by 81 to 47) its resolution condemning Allende's extra-constitutional actions. In reply Allende coolly noted that they failed to get the two-thirds required for impeachment, and their own resolution seemed to invite a ''coup d'etat''. Paul E. Sigmund, ''The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964–1976'' (University of Pittsburgh 1980) pp. 232–234. In the weeks before the ''coup'' Chilean society seemed locked in an unsustainable polarization; also an immediate, palpable tension gripped Chile, due to shortages and strikes. Sigmund (1980) pp. 238–239</ref> Although [[1970 Chilean presidential election|elected]] with 36.3% of the vote (to 34.9% for runner-up in a three-way contest), [[Chile under Allende|Allende as President]] reportedly ignored the [[Chilean Constitution of 1925|Constitución de 1925]] in pursuit of his socialist policies, namely, ineffective projects which proved very unpopular and polarizing.<ref>The Soviets apparently thought that "economic mismanagement by the Allende regime almost certainly did far more damage than the CIA." Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 73–74.</ref> The military junta's successful [[Chilean coup of 1973|September 1973 ''coup d'etat'']] was unconstitutional. Thousands of citizens were eventually killed and tens of thousands were held as political prisoners, many being tortured.<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 316 (3200 killed). The then CIA task force chief in Chile later said the Agency was not able to finely orchestrate such covert actions, such as the ''coup'' initiated by the Chilean Army, so as to be able to "start" and then "stop" the violence. The CIA later admitted that after the ''coup'' it dealt with Chilean military officers complicit in "serious human rights abuses".</ref><ref>Cf., Christopher Hitchens, ''The Trial of Henry Kissinger'' (London: Verso 2001) p. 67: a contemporary USG document put the number of summary executions during the coup's first 19 days at 320.</ref><ref>When civilian rule returned after 1990, an official commission documented "a total of 3,197 extra-judicial executions, deaths under torture, and 'disappearances' during the Pinochet era." Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) p. 87.</ref><ref>Cf., Paul W. Drake, "Chile" at 126–128, in ''The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World'' (2d ed., 2001), edited by Joel Krieger.</ref><ref>Air Force General [[Alberto Bachelet|Alberto Bachelet Martínez]] opposed the ''coup d'etat''. He was arrested for treason and for months tortured; he died in prison. His wife and daughter [[Michelle Bachelet]] were blindfolded and tortured, and held for half a year. From 1975 to 1979 they went into exile, living in the [[German Democratic Republic]] where she studied medicine. In 2005 she was [[2005–06 Chilean presidential election|elected president of Chile]]. Cf., Richard Worth, ''Michelle Bachelet'' (Chelsea House 2007).</ref> The civil violence of the military coup provoked widespread international censure.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 316–317.</ref><ref>Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 86–88. "For the KGB, Pinochet represented an almost a perfect villain, an ideal counterpoint to the martyred Allende."</ref>

===Watergate===
{{watergate|Intelligence}}
[[File:Vernon A Walters.jpg|thumb|left|Gen. [[Vernon Walters|Walters]], Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency<ref>[[Vernon Walters|Lt. Gen. Vernon "Dick" Walters]] (1917–2002), at CIA only six weeks when the Watergate break-in occurred, before had served in military intelligence and since 1958 as a foreign language interpreter for Nixon. Helms wondered if Nixon considered Walters "his man at CIA", but the Democratic [[The Wise Men (book)|"Wise Man"]] [[Averell Harriman]] had told Helms that, notwithstanding any political differences, Walters was "reliable". After fielding repeated requests for cover and funds from Nixon's team, Walters told Helms he would volunteer to take the fall in order to satisfy their demands, then retire. Helms writes in his memoirs that he then carefully and pointedly told Walters: <blockquote>CIA's reputation depends on straightforward, honest relations with both the executive branch and the Congress. There's no way that the deputy DCI could have furnished secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency.</blockquote>In the event, when Helms instructed Walters "to refuse their demands", Walters did so without incident. Later in 1973, although Walters was ''de jure'' the acting DCI for 16 weeks, he co-operated fully with William Colby. Helms (2003) p. 8 (Walters' career, Harriman), pp. 10–11 (Nixon's man?), p. 13 (Helms' CIA quote), p. 283 (Walters refuses their demands), p. 424 (acting DCI); Wiener (2007) p. 630. In 1989–1991 Walters served as American Ambassador to the United Nations, and then to the [[Federal Republic of Germany|Fed. Rep. of Germany]] during reunification.</ref>]]

After first learning of the [[Watergate scandal]] on June 17, 1972, Helms developed a general strategy to distance the CIA from it altogether, including any third-party investigations of Nixon's role in the precipitating break-in.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 288–289; at 296, 298, 299 ("distance the CIA").</ref><ref>Colby (1978) p. 321 ("Just stay away from the whole damn thing"), p. 328 ("Helms' careful distancing of the Agency from Watergate").</ref> The scandal created a flurry of media interest during the 1972 presidential election, but only reached its full intensity in the following years. Among those initially arrested (the "plumbers") were former CIA employees; there were loose ends with the agency.<ref>Cf., generally ''[[United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States|Rockefeller Report]]'' (1975) chapter 14, pp. 172–207: "Involvement of the CIA in Improper Activities for the White House," e.g., [[E. Howard Hunt]] at 173–182, 193–199; operations against [[Daniel Ellsberg]] pp. 182–190. The Report (p. 199) found "no evidence either that the CIA was a participant in the planning or execution of the Watergate break-in or that it had advance knowledge of it."</ref> Helms and DDCI [[Vernon Walters]] became convinced that CIA top officials had no culpable role in the break-in. It soon became apparent, however, that it was "impossible to prove anything to an inflamed national press corps already in full cry" while "daily leaks to the press kept pointing at CIA". Only later did Helms conclude that "the leaks were coming directly from the White House" and that "President Nixon was personally manipulating the administration's efforts to contain the scandal".<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 3–7, quotes at 6, 7.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 277–278, 289–297; at 297 (quoting Helms that CIA did not run the break-in); p. 303 (Walters learned from Colby that CIA was not involved in the break-in, and no reason to block the FBI).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 323–324.</ref>

On June 23, 1972, Nixon and Haldeman discussed the progress the FBI was making in their investigation and an inability to control it.<ref name=":1">'The smoking gun' tape.  Source: Nixon Library. Watergate Tapes. Recording available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oe3OgU8W0s</ref> In discussing how to ask Helms for his assistance to seek a "hold" on the FBI investigation, Nixon said "well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things".<ref name=":1" /> Nixon's team (chiefly [[H.R. Haldeman|Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman|Ehrlichman]], and [[John Dean|Dean]]) then asked Helms in effect to assert a phony national security reason for the break-in and, under that rationale, to interfere with the ongoing FBI investigation of the Watergate burglaries. Such a course would also involve the CIA in posting bail for the arrested suspects. Initially Helms made some superficial accommodation that stalled for several weeks the FBI's progress. At several meetings attended by Helms and Walters, Nixon's team referred to the Cuban [[Bay of Pigs]] fiasco, using it as if a talisman of dark secrets, as an implied threat against the integrity of CIA. Immediately, sharply, Helms turned aside this gambit.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 9–10 (Bay of Pigs), pp. 11–12 (bail), p. 283 (Nixon's team members). The White House specifically requested Helms to bring DDCI Walters with him to meetings (p. 8).</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 297–311.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 520–530.</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) p. 630 (investigation stalled for "sixteen days at most").</ref>

By claiming then a [[State secrets privilege|secrecy privilege for national security]], Helms could have stopped the FBI investigation, but he decisively refused the President's repeated request for cover. [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI under Carter) called this "perhaps the best and most courageous decision of his career". Nixon's fundamental displeasure with Helms and the CIA increased. Yet "CIA professionals remember" that Helms "stood up to the president when asked to employ the CIA in a cover-up."<ref>Turner (2005) p. 133 (quote), p. 134 (quote).</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 282–283, 395.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) at 328.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) at 528–529 (the FBI chief's request to Walters, and Helms' orders to Walters).</ref><ref>''Rockefeller Report'' (1975) at 202, which states that it "found no evidence" that "officers of the Agency actively joined in the cover-up conspiracy formed by the White House staff in June 1972. There is no evidence that the Agency sought to block the FBI investigation."</ref>

[[John Dean]], Nixon's [[White House Counsel]], reportedly asked for $1 million to buy the silence of the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms in a 1988 interview stated:

<blockquote>"We could get the money. ... We didn't need to launder money—ever." But "the end result would have been the end of the agency. Not only would I have gone to jail if I had gone along with what the White House wanted us to do, but the agency's credibility would have been ruined forever."<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 321 (quote), pp. 321–322: on July 6 Helms then in Southeast Asia instructed Walters to refuse the request by [[L. Patrick Gray|Gray]] at FBI to ''put in writing'' the CIA's national security claim, thus permitting FBI to proceed with its investigation.</ref></blockquote>

For the time being, however, Helms had succeeded in distancing the CIA as far as possible from the scandal.<ref>Helms was accordingly faulted by the ''Rockefeller Report'' (1975) p. 202, which criticized "the Director's opinion that since the Agency was not involved in Watergate, it should not become involved in the Watergate investigation."</ref> Yet the Watergate scandal became a major factor (among others: the Vietnam war) in the great shift of American public opinion about the federal government: their suspicions aroused, many voters turned critical. Hence, the political role of the Central Intelligence Agency also became a subject of controversy.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 298 ("undermined the consensus of trust in Washington" and "ended the congressional acquiescence to the special intimacy between the CIA and the President" so that "Watergate in short made the CIA fair game"); pp. 330–333.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 530–533.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 327–328.</ref>

===Helms dismissed===
[[File:H R Haldeman, 1971 portrait.png|thumb|left|[[H.R. Haldeman|Haldeman]]]]

Immediately after Nixon's re-election in 1972, he called for all appointed officials in his administration to resign; Nixon here sought to gain more personal control over the federal government. Helms did not consider his position at CIA to be a political job, which was the traditional view within the Agency, and so did not resign as DCI. Previously, on election day Helms had lunch with General [[Alexander Haig]], a top Nixon security advisor; Haig didn't know Nixon's mind on the future at CIA. Evidently neither did Henry Kissinger, Helms discovered later. On November 20, Helms came to [[Camp David]] to an interview with Nixon about what he thought was a "budgetary matter". Nixon's chief of staff H.R. Haldeman also attended. Helms was informed by Nixon that his services in the new administration would not be required.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 409–412.</ref> On Helms' dismissal William Colby (DCI Sept. 1973 to Jan. 1976) later commented that "Dick Helms paid the price for that 'No' [to the White House over Watergate]."<ref>Colby (1978) p. 328 (quote).</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 545 (Colby quote with brackets).</ref>

In the course of this discussion, Nixon learned or was reminded that Helms was a career civil servant, not a political appointee. Apparently spontaneously, Nixon then offered him the ambassadorship to the Soviet Union. After shortly considering it, Helms declined, wary of the potential consequences of the offer, considering his career in intelligence. "I'm not sure how the Russians might interpret my being sent across the lines as an ambassador," Helms remembers telling Nixon. Instead Helms proposed being sent to Iran.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 411–412 (quote).</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 322–323.</ref> Nixon assented. Among other things Nixon perhaps figured Helms, after managing CIA's long involvement in Iranian affairs, would be capable in addressing issues arising out of Nixon's recent policy decision conferring on the shah his new role as "policeman of the [[Persian Gulf|Gulf]]".<ref>Cf., William Shawcross, ''The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally; (New York: Simon and Schuster 1988) pp. 155–165, regarding Nixon's 1972 visit to Tehran to see the Shah, and increased American arms sales to him (role quote at 168); and p. 266, re CIA's presence in Iran to gather intelligence on the Soviet military.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 309–312, speculates about Nixon. Although angry that Helms in June had refused him cover over Watergate, by December Nixon looked like he would escape the scandal. Yet Nixon sensed that Helms could still help or hurt him. So Nixon offered him an ambassadorship to get him out of town while not making him a permanent enemy (p. 312).</ref>

Helms also suggested that since he could retire when he turned 60, he might voluntarily do so at the end of March. So it was agreed, apparently. But instead the event came without warning as Helms was abruptly dismissed when [[James R. Schlesinger]] was named the new DCI on February 2, 1973.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) at 546.</ref>

<blockquote>The timing caught me by surprise. I had barely enough time to get my things out of the office and to assemble as many colleagues of all ranks as possible for a farewell. ...

A few days later, I encountered Haldeman. "What happened to our understanding that my exit would be postponed for a few weeks?" I asked. "Oh, I guess we forgot," he said with the faint trace of a smile.

And so it was over."<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 411, 412 (quote).</ref></blockquote>