Editing Rationality (section)

=== Conservatism and foundationalism ===
Rationality is usually understood as conservative in the sense that rational agents do not start from zero but already possess many beliefs and intentions. Reasoning takes place on the background of these pre-existing mental states and tries to improve them. This way, the original beliefs and intentions are privileged: one keeps them unless a reason to doubt them is encountered. Some forms of epistemic [[foundationalism]] reject this approach. According to them, the whole system of beliefs is to be justified by self-evident beliefs. Examples of such self-evident beliefs may include immediate experiences as well as simple logical and mathematical [[axiom]]s.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Hasan2000"/><ref name="Christensen1994"/>

An important difference between conservatism and foundationalism concerns their differing conceptions of the [[Burden of proof (philosophy)|burden of proof]]. According to conservativism, the burden of proof is always in favor of already established belief: in the absence of new evidence, it is rational to keep the mental states one already has. According to foundationalism, the burden of proof is always in favor of suspending mental states. For example, the agent reflects on their pre-existing belief that the [[Taj Mahal]] is in [[Agra]] but is unable to access any reason for or against this belief. In this case, conservatives think it is rational to keep this belief while foundationalists reject it as irrational due to the lack of reasons. In this regard, conservatism is much closer to the ordinary conception of rationality. One problem for foundationalism is that very few beliefs, if any, would remain if this approach was carried out meticulously. Another is that enormous mental resources would be required to constantly keep track of all the justificatory relations connecting non-fundamental beliefs to fundamental ones.<ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Hasan2000"/><ref name="Christensen1994"/>