Editing Rambouillet Agreement (section)

==Negotiations==
===Rambouillet===
On 23 February 1999, the co-chairmen [[Robin Cook]] and [[Hubert Védrine]] of the negotiation process put out a statement saying that the negotiations "have led to a consensus" on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of members of national communities; and for the establishment of a fair judicial system". They went on to say that "a political framework is now in place" leaving the further work of finalizing "the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560 |title=Contact Group Statement – Rambouillet, 23 February 1999 |publisher=Office of the High Representative |date=23 February 1999 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926234216/http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560 |archive-date=26 September 2007}}</ref>
However, this assessment was at best overly optimistic, and at worst absolutely ignored the divergence of interests between the two major parties. The Albanians were unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo as part of Serbia, while the Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and they were implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province, including the offer of a face-saving measure wherein blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping troops would be used instead of NATO troops.<ref name = "Judah 323">{{Harvnb|Judah|2009|p=323}}.</ref> To add to the problem, the NATO Contact Group countries were desperate to avoid having to make good on their threat of force—Greece and Italy were opposed to the idea. Consequently, when the talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of 19 February, they were extended by another month.

===Paris===
In the end, on 18 March 1999, the Kosovo Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became known as the 'Rambouillet Accords'<ref>{{cite web |url=https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html |title=Rambouillet Agreement -Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo |publisher=US State Department |date=March 1999}}</ref> while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous region within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. In addition, NATO forces would have the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges, as well as the right to use the electromagnetic spectrum without payment. NATO would also have the right to requisition public facilities for its use free of cost. NATO forces would have the right to hire local personnel who upon employment with NATO would be exempt from local laws in respect to acts performed in their official capacity, national service obligations, local labor laws, and taxes on their salaries. Local infrastructure would be subjected to improvements or modifications to by NATO forces when deemed necessary to facilitate the mission.<ref name=guardian/> 
According to Tim Judah, the Serbian side used Annex B only later on as a reason for the failure of talks; at the time, the Serbs rejected any discussion of the involvement of foreign troops, let alone the extensive rights that would have been afforded them by Annex B.<ref name = "Judah 324" />

===Signing===
The agreement was signed by [[Ibrahim Rugova]], [[Hashim Thaçi]], [[Rexhep Qosja]] and [[Veton Surroi]] on behalf of "Kosovo" in the presence of [[Christopher R. Hill|Christopher Hill]] and [[Wolfgang Petritsch]] on 18 March 1999. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia refused to sign the agreement.<ref name="uncouncil" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wille |first1=Tobias |title=Representation and agency in diplomacy: How Kosovo came to agree to the Rambouillet accords |journal=Journal of International Relations and Development |date=2019 |volume=22 |issue=4 |pages=808–831 |doi=10.1057/s41268-017-0120-2 |url=https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/fdhxj/download}}</ref>

===Aftermath===
Events proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet. The [[Kosovo Verification Mission|international monitors]] from the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|OSCE]] were withdrawn on 22 March for fear of the monitors' safety ahead of the anticipated bombing by NATO.  On 23 March, the Serbian assembly issued a resolution that condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors,<ref>{{Harvnb|Herring|2000|p=227}}.</ref> and accepted the principle of "autonomy" for Kosovo<ref name="conclusions">{{cite web| url=http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10030.html  |title=Conclusions of Serbian parliament |work=SerbiaInfo |publisher=Serbian Government |date= 24 March 1999 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080214160503/http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10030.html |archive-date = 14 February 2008}}</ref> and non-military part of the agreement.

NATO leaders had expected that a brief bombing campaign would lead to Serb forces withdrawing from Kosovo, hence ending the humanitarian crisis; but [[Slobodan Milošević|Milošević]] may have gambled that his government and armed forces could withstand a few days of bombing without serious harm.<ref name = "Judah 324">{{Harvnb|Judah|2009|p=324}}.</ref><!--
Article 2 of the UN Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state";<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter II |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref> Article 39 stipulates that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security";<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter VII |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref> and Article 53 states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council".<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter VIII |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref>
== Use of force ==
A highly controversial facet of the negotiations at Rambouillet was the [[Threat of force (public international law)|threat of force]], against the FRY, that girded them.

Article 2 of the UN Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state";<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter II |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref> Article 39 stipulates that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security";<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter VII |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref> and Article 53 states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council".<ref>{{Cite web |title= Charter of the United Nations » Chapter VIII |url= http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html |website= un.org |access-date= 13 March 2016 }}</ref>

Proponents and critics of the bombing differ on, for example, whether NATO's threatened and then actual use of force were violations of the territorial integrity and political independence of the FRY, and whether NATO meets the criteria of a regional agency.<ref></ref>-->