Editing Operation Anaconda (section)

====Battle of Takur Ghar====
{{Main|Battle of Takur Ghar}}
[[File:AnacondaAreaOfOperations.jpg|thumb|right|A strategic map of operations by U.S. forces in the Shah-i-Kot Valley during the operation]]
On the second day of the operation, General Hagenbeck and Colonel Wiercinski decided to make some changes. Because many soldiers in the southern blocking position of the 187th Infantry had been wounded, Hagenbeck chose to withdraw forces from the southern end of the valley. Instead, he relocated them to the northern position to assist the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in carrying out a sweep from the north to the south along the eastern ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Ron Corkran's 187th Infantry Battalion arrived in the northern region around 8:00 PM on March 3 and began their careful sweep southward, encountering no resistance. It became clear that the defenders had abandoned the valley floor. By the end of the day, they had successfully cleared a path to the base of Takur Ghar, and had gained a much better feel for the opposition, which had proven to be more formidable than initially anticipated.<ref name=Folse2022>{{cite book |last1=Folse |first1=Mark |publisher=U.S. Army Center of Military History |location=Washington, D.C. |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-83/cmhPub_70-83-1.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314234551/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-83/cmhPub_70-83-1.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 14, 2023 |title= Operation Enduring Freedom : September 2001-March 2002 |year=2022}}</ref>

General Hagenbeck also took steps to address the challenges the air assault team had faced on the initial day of the operation. The Apache helicopters had suffered significant damage, and it had become apparent that the AC-130 aircraft were susceptible to ground fire, making them unsuitable for daytime operations. Furthermore, there weren't enough Air Force tactical controllers available to fulfill the demand for precision-guided strikes against al-Qaeda positions. To tackle these issues, CENTCOM deployed five [[A-10 Thunderbolt II]] aircraft. Not only were these robust aircraft far less susceptible to ground fire, but they could also remain over the battlefield during daylight hours and deliver accurate strikes without requiring the assistance of Air Force tactical controllers.<ref name=Folse2022/>

In the late evening of 3 March, Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber received notice from Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, commander of [[TF 11]], that two SEAL fire teams commanded by [[Lieutenant commander (United States)|Lieutenant Commander]] Vic Hyder were to be inserted into the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The two SEAL fire teams, Mako 30 and Mako 21, planned to establish an observation point on either end of the valley. One team would move to the peak of [[Takur Ghar]], which commanded the southern approach to the Shah-i-Kot valley. Due to time constraints, a helicopter insertion would be needed for the teams to reach the peak before dawn.  Hyder requested authorization to shift the insertion 24 hours to the next evening but was directed that insertion was critical to SOF providing support to the Operation. Originally, an insertion point {{convert|1400|m|yd}} east of the peak was identified, but due to uncontrollable time constraints, the SEALs of Mako 30 were forced into an insertion to the peak itself. Even though all overhead imagery showed no signs of life on the peak of Takur Ghar, Lieutenant Commander Hyder gave the team final guidance per special operation procedure that if any signs were seen, the mission would be aborted.

The SEAL fire team, Mako 30, was picked up by an MH-47 Chinook helicopter, at 23:23 on 3 March. However, the Chinook experienced engine difficulties and new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original helicopters. This delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the [[landing zone]] east of the peak until 02:30 on 4 March, which did not allow enough time to reach the peak before daylight. Blaber was notified that the SEALs were forced to insert on the peak to fulfill the order to infil Mako 30 that night. Nail 22, an AC-130H Spectre, reconnoitered the peak, and, seeing no enemy activity, declared the mountaintop secure. It was then called away to support other troops before the Chinook arrived.

At approximately 03:00, the Chinook attempted to land atop the mountain. As they approached, the pilots and SEALs observed tracks in the snow and other signs of recent human activity. As they discussed a possible mission abort, the helicopter was met with effective RPG fire.  Two Rocket Propelled Grenades slammed into the helicopter, shutting down one of its engines, the electric system, and the hydraulic systems. Petty Officer First Class [[Neil C. Roberts]] had fallen out of the open ramp as the pilot had taken evasive actions. They first attempted to return and retrieve him, but the engine damage prevented proper control and the helicopter was forced to crash-land in the valley below, approximately 4 miles away. The SEAL team Mako 30, regrouped and was ferried by nearby units to another Chinook to go back to Takur Ghar and search for Roberts. The AC-130 was then directed to attack the large groupings of enemy combatants currently exposed on top of the mountain, one to three minutes before the Mako 30 was scheduled to arrive. When the Chinook dropped off the SEALs back on top of the mountain, they came under immediate fire, and Air Force [[Forward air control|combat controller]] Technical Sergeant [[John A. Chapman]] was seriously injured, along with two Navy SEALs. Mako 30 was forced off the peak due to the heavy fire and damage done. The [[75th Ranger Regiment|Ranger]] [[quick reaction force]] (QRF) force located at [[Bagram Air Base]] and led by [[Nate Self|Captain Nate Self]], was called in to search for the SEAL who fell out of the helicopter, now alone on top of the mountain.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lowrey |first1=Nathan S. |title=U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2002: From the Sea |date=2011 |publisher=United States Marine Corps, History Division |page=264 |isbn=978-0-16-089557-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L8Wej8Z9Sn4C&q=U.S.+Marines+in+Afghanistan,+2001-2002:+From+the+Sea |language=en}}</ref>

Around this time command decided to change the frequencies for satellite radio communications which different units, including the AFO teams in their reconnaissance positions, were relying on to conduct and adapt the mission as the battle unfolded. One of the generals in overall charge of the events at Takur Ghar ordered the radio frequencies switched to prevent the plan being modified.{{Citation needed|date=November 2012}}  Though the change may have been meant to enhance direct control of the rescue of the downed SEAL atop Takur Ghar, it had the critical effect of severely limiting communications between the different teams participating in the battle.
[[File:Ch-47 Chinook helicopters take off in the early morning in support of Operation Anaconda, March 2002.jpg|thumb|left|Ch-47 Chinook helicopters take off in the early morning in support of Operation Anaconda, March 2002.]]

At 03:45, the Ranger quick reaction force was dispatched to the area. Though they weren't given a specific mission, they were to establish communication for further instructions upon reaching Gardez, 10 minutes from the mountain. The quick reaction force consisted of 19 Rangers, a [[Tactical Air Control Party]] ([[Tacp]]), and a three-man USAF [[Air Force Special Tactics|special tactics team]] carried by two Chinooks, Razor 01 and Razor 02. As Air Force rules prohibited [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] aircraft from remaining in hostile airspace in daylight after the crash of an AC-130 in [[Khafji]] in the [[Gulf War]], the AC-130 support protecting Mako 30 was forced to leave before Razor 01 reached the landing zone, although the leadership was aware that Razor 01 was incoming. Unfortunately, the Razor Chinooks had not been equipped with functioning satellite radios to maintain communication with the headquarters in Bagram or, even more critically, the AFO Team's lead. Also, unfortunately, the pilot of the Razor 01 was not told about the enemy's anti-aircraft location on top of the mountain. Due to the satellite communications difficulties (which may have been caused by a little-known space weather effect caused by [[Equatorial plasma bubble|equatorial plasma bubbles]]<ref>{{cite news |title=Could Plasma Bubble Have Doomed U.S. Copter in Afghanistan Battle? |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/could-plasma-bubble-have-doomed-u-s-copter-afghanistan-battle-n214411 |work=NBC News |date=29 September 2014 |language=en}}</ref>), Razor 01 was mistakenly directed to the "hot" landing zone on the peak at {{Coord|33|20|34|N|69|12|49|E|type:mountain_region:AF}}. Because of this, the Razor 01 flew into the same enemy trap that the SEALs had flown into, with no one able to communicate the reality of the situation.

At approximately 06:10, Razor 01 reached the landing zone. The aircraft immediately began taking fire, and the right door [[minigun]]ner, Sergeant Phillip Svitak, was killed by small arms fire. Drone footage of the incident showed the mortally wounded Technical Sergeant [[John A. Chapman]] drawing fire away from Razor 01 as it landed. This action earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor.  A rocket-propelled grenade then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it to crash land. As the Rangers and special tactics team exited the aircraft, Private First Class Matt Commons, posthumously promoted to Corporal, Sergeant Brad Crose, and Specialist Marc Anderson were also killed, leading to a total of three Ranger casualties during the operation. The surviving crew and quick-reaction force at first attempted a daring assault on the Taliban positions but faced tough resistance from concealed insurgent bunkers, which caused the Rangers to retreat and take cover in a hillock where a fierce firefight began.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=US Army Rangers 1989–2015: Panama to Afghanistan |date=24 May 2016 |publisher=Bloomsbury USA |isbn=978-1-4728-1540-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U1cnswEACAAJ&q=us+army+ranger+1989-2015+leigh+neville |language=en}}</ref> Razor 02, which had been diverted to Gardez as Razor 01 was landing on Takur Ghar, returned with the rest of the quick-reaction force and Lieutenant Commander Hyder at 06:25. With the help of the new arrivals and close air support, the force was able to consolidate its position on the peak. The quick reaction force's Chalk 2 moved up the mountain to assist Chalk 1. While air force jets provided suppressive fire on the mountain top with individual gun runs since Mako 30 was less than {{convert|100|m|yd}} north of the peak and Chalk 1 with its downed MH-47 was less than 100 m south of the peak. Hyder saw the need to assist Mako 21 who at that time had two dead and two injured, one of them non-ambulatory. It was obvious from this viewpoint that the proximity of friendly forces to the enemy positions was preventing sufficient suppressive firepower from being used due to danger close distance to both Mako 30 and quick reaction force chalk 1. Hyder directed the Chalk 2 leader to continue mission up the mountain and moved, alone, to link up with Mako 21 in order to assist that team's movement away from the peak thereby creating a better situation for air assets to support by fire. An enemy counterattack midday mortally wounded Senior Airman [[Jason D. Cunningham]], a [[Air Force Pararescue|pararescueman]].  The wounded were refused [[medical evacuation]] during the daylight hours, due to risk of another downed helicopter. Mako 30 and Lt. Cmdr. Hyder moved down the mountain with their wounded. Through threat of nearby enemy response elements, hypothermia and shock of wounded personnel, and across nearly 30" of snow in extreme terrain, Mako 21 found a site suitable for an MH-47. The SEAL team set up defenses, attempted to warm the wounded, and waited for dark when a recovery would be attempted.

Australian [[Special Air Service Regiment]] (SASR) soldiers inserted with a United States Air Force Combat Controller had infiltrated the area prior to the first helicopter crash undetected as part of a long range reconnaissance mission when the Chinooks went down. They remained undetected in an [[observation post]] through the firefight and proved critical in co-ordinating multiple Coalition air strikes to prevent the al-Qaeda fighters from overrunning the downed aircraft, to devastating effect. This, plus the actions of the two SASR officers working with the 10th Mountain Division, earned the commander of the Australian SASR force in Afghanistan the US Bronze Star for his unit's outstanding contribution to the war on terrorism. Australian soldiers had utilised 'virtual reality' style software for mission rehearsal prior to insertion, and this contributed significantly to their situational awareness in the darkness and poor weather conditions. This was the first time this capability had been used for a live combat mission.

At around 20:00, the quick-reaction force and Mako 30/21 were exfiltrated from the Takur Ghar peak. As a result of this action, both Technical Sergeant Chapman and Senior Airman Cunningham were awarded the [[Air Force Cross (United States)|Air Force Cross]], the second-highest award for bravery. In 2018, Chapman's Air Force Cross was upgraded to the Medal of Honor and he was promoted posthumously to the rank of Master Sergeant. US and Afghan sources believe at least 200 Taliban and [[Al Qaida]] fighters were killed during the initial assault and subsequent rescue mission.

Also on March 4, the 2nd Battalion of the Rakkasans air assaulted into the eastern end of the valley, immediately attacking the heights under Apache cover. Meanwhile, the 3rd battalion were dropped into the northern end of the valley with the objective of linking up with the stranded forces at the blocking positions. Supported by 16 Apaches, 5 USMC Cobras helicopters and several A-10A ground attack aircraft; the Rakkasans methodically cleared an estimated 130 caves, 22 bunkers and 40 buildings to finally secure the valley.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.66</ref>

=====Fate of Roberts=====
It is not certain whether the sailor died immediately or was killed by opposing soldiers. There is a possibility that Roberts was captured by the al Qaeda fighters, and executed later with a single shot to the back of the head (One of the feeds showed a group of 8-10 fighters huddling around what appeared to be a body; both GRIM 32 and MAKO 30 noted that an [[IR strobe]] was active, a video feed showed the fighters passing the IR strobe around).<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013.:</ref> This report has not been confirmed. Major General Frank Hagenbeck did confirm that al-Qaeda fighters were seen (on live video feed from a [[RQ-1 Predator|Predator]] drone orbiting the firefight) chasing Roberts, and later dragging his body away from the spot where he fell. Another feed from the same Predator showed a puff of heat [from a rifle] and the indistinct figure in front of it fall.<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013:</ref> Also, the quick-reaction soldiers reported fighters wearing Robert's gear and finding "a helmet with a bullet hole in it, [from which] it was clear the last person [Roberts] to wear it had been shot in the head."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Predator drone footage also suggested the possibility that Technical Sergeant John Chapman was alive and fighting on the peak after the SEALs left rather than being killed outright as thought by Mako 30. Chapman was seen fighting in a bunker against multiple enemies before stepping into the open and braving enemy small arms fire one last time to allow the quick reaction force helicopter a bit of breathing room.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

A paper written by Andrew Milani (Former commander of the [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]]) and Dr. Stephen D. Biddle entitled "Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the battle of Takur Ghar" noted that the Predator was on station 90 minutes after Roberts had fallen; the images that were shot before the Predator had arrived were shot by GRIM-32's Infrared Cameras.<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013. Page 352:</ref> although this has not been confirmed by commanders.