Editing Omniscience (section)

==Omniscience and the privacy of conscious experience==
Some philosophers, such as [[Patrick Grim]], [[Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski|Linda Zagzebski]], Stephan Torre, and William Mander have discussed the issue of whether the apparent exclusively first-person nature of conscious experience is compatible with God's omniscience. There is a strong sense in which conscious experience is private, meaning that no outside observer can gain knowledge of what it is like to be me ''as me''. If a subject cannot know what it is like to be another subject in an objective manner, the question is whether that limitation applies to God as well. If it does, then God cannot be said to be omniscient since there is then a form of knowledge that God lacks access to.

The philosopher Patrick Grim<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Grim|first=Patrick|date=1985|title=Against omniscience: The case from essential indexicals|journal=Noûs|volume=19|issue=2|pages=151–180|jstor=2214928|doi=10.2307/2214928|url=https://philarchive.org/rec/GRIAOT }}</ref> most notably raised this issue. Linda Zagzebski<ref>{{Cite book|title=Omnisubjectivity : a defense of a divine attribute|author=Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus|isbn=9780874621839|location=Milwaukee, Wisconsin|oclc=825106425|year = 2013}}</ref> argued against this by introducing the notion of ''perfect empathy'', a proposed relation that God can have to subjects that would allow God to have perfect knowledge of their conscious experience. William Mander<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mander|first=William|date=2000|title=Does God know what it is like to be me?|journal=Heythrop Journal|volume=43|issue=4|pages=430–443|doi=10.1111/1468-2265.00203}}</ref> argued that God can only have such knowledge if our experiences are part of God's broader experience. Stephan Torre<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Torre|first=Stephan|date=2006|title=De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being|journal=Faith and Philosophy|volume=23|issue=2|pages=191–200|doi=10.5840/faithphil200623215|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol23/iss2/5}}</ref> claimed that God can have such knowledge if self-knowledge involves the ascription of properties, either to oneself or to others.