Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

==Unsanctioned Nuclear Activity or U.N.A==
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}

===NPT Non Signatories===
[[India]], [[Pakistan]] and [[Israel]] have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plants or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

[[Pokhran-II|In May 1998 India]] and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding a [[nuclear arms race]] between them, with Pakistan involving the [[People's Republic of China]], an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers.

Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. [[Kashmir]] is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty [[Kashmir dispute|being in dispute since 1948]]. There is a persistent low-level bilateral military conflict due to the alleged backing of insurgency by Pakistan in India, and the infiltration of Pakistani state-backed militants into the Indian state of [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]], along with the [[Kashmir conflict|disputed status of Kashmir]].

Both engaged in a [[conventional arms]] race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.
[[File:Venn diagram nuclear knowledge sharing.gif|thumb|273x273px|Venn diagram displaying the historical proliferation among declared (solid circles) and undeclared nuclear weapon states (dashed circles). Numbers in parentheses are the explosive nuclear tests conducted by a particular nation. The overlap between Russia and U.S. reflects the purchase by the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Agency.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Paine|first1=C. E.|last2=McKinzie|first2=M. G.|date=1998|title=Does the U.S. science-based stockpile stewardship program pose a proliferation threat?|url=http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/1998/06/does_the_us_science-based_stoc.html|journal=Science & Global Security|volume=7|issue=2|pages=151–193|issn=0892-9882|doi=10.1080/08929889808426453|bibcode=1998S&GS....7..151P}}</ref>]]
But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, as viewed by Indian strategists, Pakistan is aided by China's [[People's Liberation Army]].

====India====
{{Main|India and nuclear weapons}}
{{update section|date=April 2015}}
Nuclear power for civil use is [[Nuclear power in India|well established in India]]. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. Due to economic and technological isolation of India after the nuclear tests in 1974, India has largely diverted focus on developing and perfecting the fast breeder technology by intensive materials and fuel cycle research at the dedicated center established for research into fast reactor technology, [[Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research|Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research]] (IGCAR) at [[Kalpakkam]], in the [[South India|southern part of the country]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thebulletin.org/2016/11/a-fast-reactor-at-any-cost-the-perverse-pursuit-of-breeder-reactors-in-india/|title=A fast reactor at any cost: The perverse pursuit of breeder reactors in India|date=2016-11-03|website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|language=en-US|access-date=2019-03-27|archive-date=4 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190804145743/https://thebulletin.org/2016/11/a-fast-reactor-at-any-cost-the-perverse-pursuit-of-breeder-reactors-in-india/|url-status=live}}</ref> At the moment, India has a small fast [[breeder reactor]] and is planning a much larger one ([[Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Indian-government-takes-steps-to-get-nuclear-back|title=Indian government takes steps to get nuclear back on track - World Nuclear News|website=world-nuclear-news.org|access-date=2019-03-27|archive-date=27 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190327134412/http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Indian-government-takes-steps-to-get-nuclear-back|url-status=live}}</ref>). This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:
* two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
* two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and
* ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
* two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at Tarapur (known as TAPP: [[Tarapur Atomic Power Station]])

The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site.  Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000.

Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40 MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100 MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads.

It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used Canadian [[CANDU reactor]]s to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be [http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/Canada-India%20CIRUS%20agreement.htm "employed for peaceful purposes only."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927064255/http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/Canada-India%20CIRUS%20agreement.htm |date=27 September 2007 }}. Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor [http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/US-India%20CIRUS%20agreement.htm "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927064456/http://www.nci.org/06nci/04/US-India%20CIRUS%20agreement.htm |date=27 September 2007 }}. India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, [[Smiling Buddha]].<ref name="nwa-inwptb">{{cite web|url=http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html|title=The Beginning: 1944–1960|access-date=10 November 2006|publisher=Nuclear Weapon Archive|year=2001|work=India's Nuclear Weapons Program}}</ref> The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development.

India [[nuclear testing|exploded a nuclear device]] in 1974, the so-called [[Smiling Buddha]] test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own [[Agni-II|medium-range missile]] and has developed an [[Agni-III|intermediate-range missile]] capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.

In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in [[Operation Shakti]]. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".

Indian security policies are driven by:
* its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region
* its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes
* its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India

It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental.
India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 war]], relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.

[[United States|American]] [[President of the United States|President]] [[George W. Bush]] met with India [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] [[Manmohan Singh]] to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.<ref>U.S. Department of State Archive – U.S. – India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170202023951/https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm |date=2 February 2017 }}</ref>

====Pakistan====
{{Main|Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons|l1 = Pakistan and nuclear weapons}}
{{cleanup|section|reason=many recent edits to this section are poorly worded and need checking for POV, accuracy and consistency with cited sources|date=January 2013}}
[[File:Libya centrifuges 2003 (at Y12).jpg|thumb|In 2003, [[Libya]] admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these [[centrifuge]]s, known as ''Pak-1'', were acquired from Pakistan]]

Over the years in [[Pakistan]], [[Nuclear power programme in Pakistan|nuclear power infrastructure]] has been well established. It is dedicated to the industrial and [[Economy of Pakistan|economic development]] of the country.<ref name="Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission report to IAEA">{{cite web|last=Siddiqui|first=Saeed Alam|title=Nuclear Power Development in Pakistan|url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:3oRH89UaOQQJ:www.sassi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Saeed-Alam.ppt+nuclear+power+plants+pakistan&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgek4PypetsOSPHSbhxkYEXQObdA46_pH3NXxGzNUg-Ou-Lt5Oa2OcCSxrPpRfjZbDGHz3xdEa1J3xPJ5fxID0ppj9HynLB4h_XMltdq3ZjZOBrjWM1t0stkqhHdWiur6AnP7B8&sig=AHIEtbQap0nOd7xlM-TSA4kY4oco_YvF5Q|publisher=Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission report to IAEA|access-date=23 December 2012|archive-date=8 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131008191820/https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:3oRH89UaOQQJ:www.sassi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Saeed-Alam.ppt+nuclear+power+plants+pakistan&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgek4PypetsOSPHSbhxkYEXQObdA46_pH3NXxGzNUg-Ou-Lt5Oa2OcCSxrPpRfjZbDGHz3xdEa1J3xPJ5fxID0ppj9HynLB4h_XMltdq3ZjZOBrjWM1t0stkqhHdWiur6AnP7B8&sig=AHIEtbQap0nOd7xlM-TSA4kY4oco_YvF5Q|url-status=live}}</ref> Its current nuclear policy is aimed to promote the socio-economic development of its people as a "foremost priority";<ref name="Pakistan Tribune" /> and to fulfill energy, economic, and industrial needs from nuclear sources.<ref name="Pakistan Tribune">{{cite news|last=Staff|title=Civil nuclear technology: Pakistan wants end to 'discrimination'|url=http://paktribune.com/news/Civil-nuclear-technology-Pakistan-wants-end-to-discrimination-248591.html|access-date=23 November 2012|newspaper=Pakistan Tribune|date=27 March 2012|archive-date=23 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121123095503/http://paktribune.com/news/Civil-nuclear-technology-Pakistan-wants-end-to-discrimination-248591.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> {{As of|2012}}, there were three operational mega-commercial nuclear power plants while three larger ones were under construction.<ref name="Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission report to IAEA" /> The nuclear power plants supplied 787&nbsp;[[megawatts]] (MW) (roughly ≈3.6%) of electricity, and the country has projected production of 8800 MW by 2030.<ref name="Directorate-General for Nuclear Power Generation">{{cite web|last=Syed Yousaf|first=Raza|title=Current Picture of Electrical Energy in Pakistan|url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:T4QW3douApsJ:www.iaea.org/INPRO/4th_Dialogue_Forum/DAY_3_01_August-ready/2._-_DG-C3-4-31-07-2012.pdf+pakistan+nuclear+power+program+2050&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjUcYBzrkzBdSSwbflDwBpLkLAkFaFROisP_jK3E3S97aqHY9tMS-It6gaYDd-q4lZP8BEuD6e4C5E91EnlkiSKIw-JbWuYsNwjNNC1f1Nxyw9D0Ib_V424k5ghsCazU80qDKfF&sig=AHIEtbRAsJSVdJ36dVxzvdggw_Xz16RLGg|publisher=Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Directorate-General for Nuclear Power Generation|access-date=28 November 2012|date=31 July 2012|archive-date=30 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200330175724/https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:T4QW3douApsJ:www.iaea.org/INPRO/4th_Dialogue_Forum/DAY_3_01_August-ready/2._-_DG-C3-4-31-07-2012.pdf+pakistan+nuclear+power+program+2050&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjUcYBzrkzBdSSwbflDwBpLkLAkFaFROisP_jK3E3S97aqHY9tMS-It6gaYDd-q4lZP8BEuD6e4C5E91EnlkiSKIw-JbWuYsNwjNNC1f1Nxyw9D0Ib_V424k5ghsCazU80qDKfF&sig=AHIEtbRAsJSVdJ36dVxzvdggw_Xz16RLGg|url-status=live}}</ref> Infrastructure established by the IAEA and the U.S. in the 1950s–1960s was based on peaceful research and development and the economic prosperity of the country.<ref name="Dawn Newspapers, 1995">{{cite news|last=Siddiqi|first=Muhammad Ali|title=N-deterrent vital to security, says PM Benazir Bhutto|url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1995/20Ap95.html#ndet|access-date=13 May 2012|work=Dawn|location=Pakistans|date=20 April 1995|agency=Dawn Media Group|pages=3–6|quote=Pakistanis are "security conscious" because of the 1971 trauma and the three wars with India. Pakistan's programme was peaceful but was "a deterrent to India" because New Delhi had detonated a nuclear device. Pakistan, thus, had to take every step to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty|archive-date=9 June 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120609132144/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1995/20Ap95.html#ndet|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Although the civil-sector nuclear power was established in the 1950s, the country has an [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction|active nuclear weapons program]] which was started in the 1970s.<ref name="Dawn Newspapers, 1995" /> The bomb program has its roots after [[East Pakistan]] gained its independence through the [[Bangladesh Liberation War]], as the new nation of [[Bangladesh]], after [[India]]'s successful intervention led to a [[Instrument of Surrender (1971)|decisive victory]] over Pakistan in 1971.<ref name="Dawn Newspapers, 1995" /> This large-scale but clandestine atomic bomb project was directed towards the indigenous development of reactor and military-grade plutonium.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} In 1974, when India surprised the world with the successful detonation of its own bomb, codename ''[[Smiling Buddha]]'', it became "imperative for Pakistan" to pursue weapons research.<ref name="Dawn News Interviews" /> According to a leading scientist in the program, it became clear that once India detonated their bomb, "[[Newton's Third Law]]" came into "operation", from then on it was a classic case of "[[action and reaction]]".<ref name="Dawn News Interviews">{{cite news|last=Samdani|first=Zafar|title=India, Pakistan can build hydrogen bomb: Scientist|url=http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/mar25.html#indi|access-date=23 December 2012|newspaper=Dawn News Interviews|date=25 March 2000|archive-date=15 October 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091015164528/http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/mar25.html#indi|url-status=dead}}</ref> Earlier efforts were directed towards mastering the plutonium technology from France, but that route was slowed when the plan failed after U.S. intervention to cancel the project.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego the "plutonium" route and covertly continued its indigenous research under [[Munir Ahmad Khan]] and it succeeded with that route in the early 1980s.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} Reacting to India's first nuclear weapon test, Prime Minister [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] and the country's political and military science circles sensed this test as final and dangerous anticipation to Pakistan's "moral and physical existence."<ref name="Time Magazine, 1985">{{cite news |title=Who Has the Bomb |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080408142911/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=8 April 2008 |magazine=Time |access-date=9 January 2013 |author=George Russell |date=3 June 1985 }}</ref> With diplomat [[Aziz Ahmed (civil servant)|Aziz Ahmed]] on his side, Prime Minister Bhutto launched a serious diplomatic offense and aggressively maintained at the session of the [[United Nations Security Council]]:

{{Blockquote|text=Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "[[Nuclear warfare|nuclear threat]] and [[Nuclear blackmail|blackmail]]" unparalleled elsewhere. ... If the world's community failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear blackmail, these countries would be constraint to launch atomic bomb programs of their own! ... [A]ssurances provided by the United Nations were not "Enough!"...&nbsp;|sign=Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, <small>statement written in "''Eating Grass''"</small>|source=source<ref name="Stanford University Press">{{cite book|last=Khan|first=Feroz Hassan|title=Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb |publisher=Stanford University Press|location=Stanford, California |isbn=978-0-8047-7601-1 |pages=119–120|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yGgrNAsKZjEC&pg=PA100 |access-date=9 January 2013|chapter-format=google book|chapter=The Route to Nuclear Ambition|date=22 November 2012}}</ref>}}

After 1974, [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto|Bhutto's government]] redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium.<ref name="Daily Times, 2007" /> Pakistan had established science directorates in almost all of her embassies in the important countries of the world, with theoretical physicist [[S.A. Butt]] being the director.<ref name="Daily Times, 2007">{{cite news|last=Washington Release|title=AQ Khan network was 'imports-exports enterprise'|url=http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C08%5C22%5Cstory_22-8-2007_pg7_26|access-date=23 December 2012|newspaper=Daily Times, 2007|date=22 August 2007|archive-date=3 November 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103205002/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C08%5C22%5Cstory_22-8-2007_pg7_26|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] then established a network through Dubai to smuggle [[URENCO]] technology to the [[Engineering Research Laboratories]].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-07-06/news/27723085_1_aq-khan-nuclear-proliferation-nuclear-technology |work=The Times of India |title=Mush helped proliferate N-technology : AQ Khan |date=6 July 2008 |access-date=23 December 2012 |archive-date=2 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130502205313/http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-07-06/news/27723085_1_aq-khan-nuclear-proliferation-nuclear-technology |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=John Pike |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm |title=A.Q. Khan |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |access-date=20 February 2013 |archive-date=22 April 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422074606/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khan.htm |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="bomb">{{cite book |title=America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise |last1=Armstrong|first1=David |author2=Joseph John Trento, National Security News Service|year=2007|publisher=Steerforth Press, 2007 |isbn=978-1-58642-137-3|page=165}}</ref><ref name="cbsnews">{{cite news |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n&tag=mncol;lst;3 |publisher=CBS News |title=Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb |access-date=23 December 2012 |archive-date=10 November 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101110160556/http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=3483035n |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Agencies |url=http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/514870/ |title=Lankan Muslims in Dubai supplied N-materials to Pak: A Q Khan |work=Express India |date=9 September 2009 |access-date=20 February 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113203148/http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Lankan-Muslims-in-Dubai-supplied-Nmaterials-to-Pak-A-Q-Khan/514870/ |archive-date=13 January 2012 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm |publisher=BBC News |title=On the trail of the black market bombs |date=12 February 2004 |access-date=23 December 2012 |archive-date=9 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111109101458/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3481499.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> Earlier, he worked with the ''[[Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratoriu|Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories]]'' (FDO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining, Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents to the technology.<ref name="Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz 2007" /> Against popular perception, the technology that Khan had brought from Urenco was based on first generation civil reactor technology, filled with many serious technical errors, though it was an authentic and vital link for the country's [[gas centrifuge]] project.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American [[Emerson Electric Co.]] from shipping components to Pakistan, he describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as: "That man from the German team was unethical.<ref name="Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz 2007" /> When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] member and questions were asked in [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|[British] Parliament]]."<ref name="Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz 2007" /> By 1978, his efforts paid off and made him into a national hero.<ref name="Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz 2007" />

In early 1996 the next Prime Minister of Pakistan [[Benazir Bhutto]] made it clear that "if India conducts a nuclear test, Pakistan could be forced to "follow suit".<ref>"Bhutto Warns India Against Testing Nuclear Device" Daily Telegraph (London), 6 January 1996, p. 12, by Ahmed Rashid</ref><ref name="NTI; Pakistan Television (PTV)">{{cite web|last=NTI|title=6 January 1996|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_2000.html|publisher=NTI; Pakistan Television (PTV)|access-date=18 November 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101108072216/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_2000.html|archive-date=8 November 2010}}</ref> In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime Minister [[Nawaz Sharif]] who maintained that "since 1972, [P]akistan had progressed significantly, and we have left that stage (developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made a "hostage" to India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!"<ref name="NTI publications, September 1997">{{cite web|last=NTI|first=Shahid Ahmed Khan|title=Nuclear Chronology|quote=Nawaz Sharif acknowledged his country's nuclear capability on 7 September 1997 |url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_2000.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101108072216/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_2000.html|archive-date=8 November 2010|work=NTI publications|access-date=2 December 2011}}</ref> In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground [[Chagai-I|tests in the Chagai Hills]], five on 28 May and one on 30 May. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded.

In 2004, the revelation of Khan's efforts led to the exposure of many defunct European consortiums which had defied export restrictions in the 1970s, and of many defunct Dutch companies that exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976.<ref name="Craig S. Smith 2004">Craig S. Smith, "Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe", ''The New York Times'', 19 February 2004, page A3.</ref> Many centrifuge components were apparently manufactured by the [[Malaysia]]n [[Scomi Precision Engineering nuclear scandal|Scomi Precision Engineering]] with the assistance of South Asian and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front.<ref name=Powell>{{cite news|title=The Man Who Sold the Bomb|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025193-1,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080111144318/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1025193-1,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=11 January 2008|access-date=7 August 2013|newspaper=Time|date=14 February 2005|author=Bill Powell|author2=Tim McGirk}}</ref>

It was widely believed to have had direct involvement by the Government of Pakistan.<ref name=IISS-black-market/> This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of that Government to allow the IAEA to interview the alleged head of the [[nuclear black market]], who happened to be no other than Abdul Qadeer Khan. Confessing his crimes a month later on national television, Khan bailed out the Government by taking full responsibility.<ref name=IISS-black-market/> Independent investigation conducted by [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] (IISS) confirmed that he had control over the import-export deals, and his acquisition activities were largely unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities.<ref name=IISS-black-market/> All of his activities went undetected for several years. He duly confessed to running the atomic proliferation ring from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3889/Khan_network-paper.pdf |title=The Khan Network |access-date=21 May 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305092331/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3889/Khan_network-paper.pdf |archive-date=5 March 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> He was immediately given presidential immunity.<ref name=IISS-black-market/> The exact nature of involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.<ref name=IISS-black-market>{{Citation |title=Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks |chapter=A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation From Pakistan |chapter-url=http://sites.miis.edu/exportcontrols/files/2009/02/IISS-from-web.pdf |publisher=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |access-date=7 July 2018 |archive-date=21 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170821205351/http://sites.miis.edu/exportcontrols/files/2009/02/IISS-from-web.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> However, the contents of Abdul Qadeer Khan's personal diaries present his perspective on the matters related to his activities concerning nuclear secrets. He claimed that he acted only at the order or "instigation" of the Pakistan government. Even when there was no official authorization, Pakistani military knew of Khan's activity according to the contents of the diaries. On one occasion in 1980, a colonel knew of Khan being in touch with Syria's Defense Minister Gen. [[Mustafa Tlass]] and Gen. Hikmat Shihabi. Six months later, Khan was warned by [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq|Zia Ul Haq]] to be careful over "nuclear drawings".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Simon Henderson |first=opinion contributor |date=2021-10-11 |title=What AQ Khan’s diaries tell about Pakistan’s drive for a nuclear bomb |url=https://thehill.com/opinion/international/576186-what-aq-khans-diaries-tell-about-pakistans-drive-for-a-nuclear-bomb/ |access-date=2024-10-11 |website=The Hill |language=en-US}}</ref>

====North Korea====
{{Main|North Korea and nuclear weapons}}

The [[Democratic People's Republic of Korea]] (or better known as [[North Korea]]), joined the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|NPT]] in 1985 and had subsequently signed a [[IAEA safeguards|safeguards]] agreement with the IAEA. However, it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at [[Nyongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center|Yongbyon]], for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the [[United States]] resulting in the [[Agreed Framework|Agreed Framework of 1994]], which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme.

During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high-level delegation of [[Pakistan military]] visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, [[Prime Minister of Pakistan|PM]] [[Benazir Bhutto]] repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid [[state visit]] to North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed its Ghauri system by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under [[A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories|Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories]]. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the [[Dongfeng (missile)|M Dongfeng]] series of missiles to Pakistan. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter was forced to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment for US$50 million.

It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in ''[[Jane's Defence Weekly]]'' (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was the nuclear technology. The KRL was in charge of both the uranium program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice the exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production).

A ''[[The New York Times|New York Times]]'' report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (''[[The Washington Times]]'', 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (''The Washington Times'', 18 October 2002).

====Israel====
{{See also|Israel and weapons of mass destruction|Nuclear weapons and Israel}}

[[Israel]] is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |title=Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance &#124; Arms Control Association |publisher=Armscontrol.org |access-date=20 February 2013 |archive-date=10 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310001332/http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |url-status=live }}</ref> This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's [[policy of deliberate ambiguity]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf |title=Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Development Facilities |first=Abdullah |last=Toukan |date=14 March 2009 |website=csis.org |publisher=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] (CSIS) |access-date=7 September 2011 |archive-date=22 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090722235700/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of [[Dimona]], the [[Negev Nuclear Research Center]]. Its construction commenced in 1958, with [[France|French]] assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "[[desalination plant]]", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.{{Citation needed|date=March 2011}} However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity".

Norway sold 20 tonnes of [[heavy water]] needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent the use of heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper ''[[Daily Express]]'' accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960.<ref>{{cite news |last=Crick |first=Michael |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm |title=How Britain helped Israel get the bomb |work=Newsnight |date=3 August 2005 |access-date=20 February 2013 |archive-date=8 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108110133/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4743493.stm |url-status=live }}</ref>
When the [[United States Intelligence Community|United States intelligence community]] discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that the U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections.

<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: [[Image:Vanunu-glove-box-bomb-components.jpg|thumb|right|[[Mordechai Vanunu]]'s photograph of a [[Negev Nuclear Research Center]] glove box containing nuclear materials in a model bomb assembly, one of about 60 photographs he later gave to the British press]] -->
Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections.

In 1986, [[Mordechai Vanunu]], a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli [[Mossad]] agents arrested him in Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel. An Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of [[treason]] and [[espionage]],<ref>Staff writers, [https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-05-28-mn-15-story.html ISRAEL : Vanunu's Treason Appeal Is Rejected]  ''Los Angeles Times'', 28 May 1990</ref> and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed.

Comments on photographs taken by Vanunu inside the [[Negev Nuclear Research Center]] have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist [[Frank Barnaby]], who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons.<ref name=barnaby-opinion>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdf|title=Expert opinion of Frank Charles Barnaby in the matter of Mordechai Vanunu|author=Frank Barnaby|date=14 June 2004|access-date=16 December 2007|archive-date=26 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080226205511/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a report to the [[USAF Counterproliferation Center]], while France was previously a leader in nuclear research "Israel and France were at a similar level of expertise after WWII, and Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French effort.{{Dead link|date=July 2024}}"<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm|title=Israel's Nuclear Weapons|website=au.af.mil|access-date=4 August 2013|archive-date=14 September 2000|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000914203946/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 1986 [[Francis Perrin (physicist)|Francis Perrin]], [[Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique|French high-commissioner for atomic energy]] from 1951 to 1970 stated that in 1949 Israeli scientists were invited to the [[Saclay]] nuclear research facility, this cooperation leading to a joint effort including sharing of knowledge between French and Israeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the [[Manhattan Project]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm|title=Israel's Nuclear Weapons|website=nuke.fas.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=27 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230527083703/https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/nuke.html|title=Israel's Nuclear Weapon Capability: An Overview|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150429192508/http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/nuke.html|archive-date=29 April 2015|access-date=4 August 2013}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/95-washington-report-archives-1982-1987/december-1986/694-israels-nuclear-arsenal.html|title=Mohammed Omer Wins Norwegian PEN Prize – Telling the truth for more than 30 years|access-date=4 August 2013|archive-date=27 April 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140427025443/http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/95-washington-report-archives-1982-1987/december-1986/694-israels-nuclear-arsenal.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Nuclear arms control in South Asia===
{{Main|Lahore Summit|Agra summit}}
The public stance of India and Pakistan on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia.

India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.

Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.

The United States for some years, especially under the [[Clinton administration]], pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.

India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed.

Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified [[Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement|a treaty]] not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.

Having promoted the [[Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]] since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.

===NPT signatories===

====Egypt====
{{Main|Nuclear program of Egypt}}
In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high-enriched and [[low-enriched uranium]] particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.<ref name=SS2008>{{Cite web|url=http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2008.html|title=International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Statement for 2008 and Background to the Safeguards Statement|access-date=29 February 2012|archive-date=10 March 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120310091442/http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2008.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2008/safeguards.pdf|title=International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Annual Report (2008)|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-date=16 August 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090816062145/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2008/safeguards.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> In May 2009, ''Reuters'' reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-egypt-idUSTRE54543S20090506|title=High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA|date=6 May 2017|work=Reuters|access-date=2 July 2017|archive-date=9 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170909142945/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-egypt-idUSTRE54543S20090506|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Iran====
{{Main|Iran and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons}} {{See also|Nuclear program of Iran}}
In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.<ref>[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf GOV/2003/75] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025173821/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf |date=25 October 2007 }}, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003.</ref> In 2005, the [[International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA]] Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]].<ref name="IAEAIran2005">{{Cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf|title=&#124; IAEA|website=iaea.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701200637/https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf|title=&#124; IAEA|website=iaea.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=4 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191204170215/https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.<ref>[https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm Security Council demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140816102056/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm |date=16 August 2014 }} (UN News Centre Press Release, 31 July 2006)</ref><ref name="autogenerated1">{{Cite news|title=Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt uranium enrichment, unanimously adopting Resolution 1737|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|publisher=[[United Nations]]|date=23 December 2006|access-date=23 December 2006|archive-date=17 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240417034423/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=24 March 2007|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm|title=SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO|publisher=United Nations|work=UN News Centre|access-date=16 April 2007|archive-date=15 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210515133149/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>[https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140816214019/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9268.doc.htm |date=16 August 2014 }}. Department of Public Information, UN Security Council.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm|title=SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS EARLIER RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT, CALLS ON COUNTRY TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS 'FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY' – Meetings Coverage and Press Releases|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130522162257/http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm|archive-date=22 May 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.<ref>{{cite web|date=23 December 2006|url=https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|title=Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously adopting Resolution 1737 (2006)|access-date=29 June 2017|archive-date=17 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240417034423/https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hA01f9zNaIJ4IK_Hcuwqy4zf6MWg|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111218110855/http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hA01f9zNaIJ4IK_Hcuwqy4zf6MWg|url-status=dead|title=''AFP'':Six powers to meet soon over Iran's nuclear program|archive-date=18 December 2011|access-date=8 January 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=207020|title=Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks|date=2 November 2009|access-date=8 January 2010|archive-date=6 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306185130/http://tehrantimes.com/index_view.asp?code=207020|url-status=live}}</ref> and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/|title=Iran's Nuclear Program|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100607145346/http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/|archive-date=7 June 2010|access-date=8 January 2010}}</ref><ref>[http://scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes American Institute of Physics: The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120715053949/http://scitation.aip.org/getabs/servlet/GetabsServlet?prog=normal&id=PHTOAD000061000009000040000001&idtype=cvips&gifs=yes |date=15 July 2012 }}<blockquote>The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material</blockquote></ref> The director general of the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], [[Yukiya Amano]], said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite news| last = Westall| first = Sylvia| title = No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head| work = [[Reuters]]| date = 3 July 2009| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true| access-date = 1 December 2009| archive-date = 10 July 2009| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090710174347/http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL312024420090703?sp=true| url-status = live}}</ref>

====Iraq====
{{more citations needed section|date=January 2013}}
{{See also|Iraq and weapons of mass destruction}}
Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.

Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, [[Osiraq]], was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the [[Iran–Iraq War]] and was [[Operation Opera|destroyed by Israeli bombers]] in June 1981.

Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.

After inspections in Iraq following the UN [[Gulf War]] cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme.

The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for [[electromagnetic isotope separation]] (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a [[mass spectrometer]] (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of [[uranium-238]] and [[uranium-235]] are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the [[Manhattan Project]] to make the highly enriched uranium used in the [[Little Boy|Hiroshima bomb]], but was abandoned soon afterwards.

The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near [[Baghdad]], and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.

The Iraqis were also very interested in [[Nuclear fuel cycle#Enrichment|centrifuge enrichment]], and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998, ''[[Newsweek]]'' reported that [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the [[United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission|UNMOVIC]] officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an [[ISI (Pakistan)|ISI]] sting operation, due to [[Iraq–Pakistan relations|strained relations]] between two countries.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan_memo.html|title=Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries?|website=isis-online.org|access-date=1 July 2023|archive-date=1 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230701200625/https://isis-online.org/publications/southasia/khan_memo.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[Government of Pakistan]] and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst the government declared the evidence to be "fraudulent".<ref name="International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISSI)">{{cite book |last=Fitzpatrick |first=Mark |contribution=Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network |title=Nuclear black markets |location=London, United Kingdom |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-86079-201-7 |publisher=International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)}}</ref>

They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid-1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.

The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.

====Libya====
{{Main|Libya and nuclear technology}}
[[Libya]] possesses ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons [[History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi|under the leadership]] of [[Muammar Gaddafi]]. On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including [[Libya and weapons of mass destruction|weapons of mass destruction]] and [[Intermediate-range ballistic missile|long-range ballistic missiles]].<ref>[http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130513214815/http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology |date=13 May 2013 }}, Arms Control Association.</ref><ref name=LibyaTimeline>[https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml News Update on IAEA & Libya] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120328014901/https://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/libya_timeline.shtml |date=28 March 2012 }}, Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 – September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency.</ref><ref name=NuclearThreat>{{Cite web| last =Rohlfing| first =Joan| title =Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview| work =Nuclear Threat Initiative| url =http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/nuclear/| access-date =18 March 2014| archive-date =6 October 2013| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20131006060954/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/libya/nuclear/| url-status =live}}</ref> Libya signed the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) in 1980.<ref>[http://iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf GOV/2004/12] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170907014825/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf |date=7 September 2017 }}, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.</ref> In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate its formerly undeclared nuclear program, which it found had violated Libya's safeguards agreement, and approved Libya's Additional Protocol.<ref name=LibyaTimeline/><ref>{{cite web|title=Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Resolution adopted by the Board on 10 March 2004|url=http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf|publisher=International Atomic Energy Agency|access-date=7 April 2013|date=10 March 2004|archive-date=29 July 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130729130546/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by the IAEA.<ref name=NuclearThreat/>

====Myanmar====
{{Main|Myanmar and weapons of mass destruction}}
A report in the ''[[The Sydney Morning Herald|Sydney Morning Herald]]'' and ''[[Searchina]]'', a Japanese newspaper, report that two [[Myanmar|Myanma]] defectors saying that the [[State Peace and Development Council]] junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by [[Russia]] that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."<ref>''Searchina'', "Reasons for digging tunnels in Burma", 11 August 2009.</ref> In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} Recently, the [[David Albright]]-led [[Institute for Science and International Security]] (ISIS) rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help. {{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.{{Citation needed|date=August 2009}} During an [[ASEAN]] meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state [[Hillary Clinton]] highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between [[North Korea]] and [[Burma]] which we take very seriously," Clinton said.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20121025174440/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-02/rest-of-world/28184985_1_myanmar-junta-nuclear-reactor-burma "Myanmar building nuke reactor, says media report"]. ''[[The Times of India]]'', 2 August 2009.</ref> However, in 2012, after contact with the American president, Barack Obama, the Burmese leader, Thein Sein, renounced military ties with DPRK (North Korea).<ref>{{cite news|title=Goodbye clenched fist, hello sweaty palm|url=https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21566656-president-barack-obama-makes-unprecedented-visit-former-pariah-goodbye-clenched-fist-hello|access-date=25 November 2012|newspaper=The Economist|date=17 November 2012|archive-date=24 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121124212231/http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21566656-president-barack-obama-makes-unprecedented-visit-former-pariah-goodbye-clenched-fist-hello|url-status=live}}</ref>

====North Korea====
{{See also|North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|Six-party talks}}
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the [[Soviet Union|USSR]]. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 [[MWt]] (5 [[MWe]]), based on the [[UK]] [[Magnox]] design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.

In addition, it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox [[spent nuclear fuel]] safe, recovering [[uranium]] and [[plutonium]]. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at the [[Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center]] were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies that indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance.

Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the [[Agreed Framework]] in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.

While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as [[trade sanctions]]. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}}

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light-water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in [[Beijing]]; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever [[2006 North Korean nuclear test|nuclear weapon test]]. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a [[2009 North Korean nuclear test|second nuclear test]] on 25 May 2009.

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an [[2013 North Korean nuclear test|underground nuclear explosion]] with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter.

====Russia====
{{Main|Russia and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons|l1 = Russia and nuclear weapons}}

Security of [[Russia and weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons in Russia]] remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian [[Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)|SVR]] defector [[Sergei Tretyakov (intelligence officer)|Tretyakov]], he had a meeting with two Russian businessmen representing a state-created ''C-W'' corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of [[Novaya Zemlya]] (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his [[dacha]] outside [[Moscow]]. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" ([[Vladimir Dmitriev|Vladimir K. Dmitriev]]) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".<ref name="Comrade J">Pete Earley, "Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War", Penguin Books, 2007, {{ISBN|978-0-399-15439-3}}, pages 114–121.</ref>

====South Africa====
{{Main|Nuclear programme of South Africa}}
In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards.<ref>Von Wielligh, N. & von Wielligh-Steyn, L. (2015). The Bomb – South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme. Pretoria: Litera.</ref> At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.

The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.<ref name="fas-sanwp">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/|title=Nuclear Weapons Program|access-date=10 November 2006|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|year=2000|work=WMD Around the World – South Africa|archive-date=7 October 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061007024204/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Sweden====
{{Main|Swedish nuclear weapons program}}

After World War II, Sweden considered building nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion. From 1945 to 1972 the [[Government of Sweden|Swedish government]] ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program under the guise of civilian defense research at the [[Swedish National Defence Research Institute]]. By the late 1950s, the work had reached the point where underground testing was feasible. However, at that time the [[Riksdag]] prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons, pledging that research should be done only for the purpose of defense against nuclear attack. The option to continue development was abandoned in 1966, and Sweden subsequently signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. The program was finally concluded in 1972.{{citation needed|date=May 2021}}

====Syria====
{{Main|Syria and weapons of mass destruction}}
On 6 September 2007, [[Israel]] bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (''see [[Operation Outside the Box]]'').<ref name="Globalsecurity Airstrike">[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/070906-airstrike.htm 6 September 2007 Air strike] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025052954/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/070906-airstrike.htm |date=25 October 2007 }} at [http://www.globalsecurity.org globalsecurity.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170722053244/http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/secret-cities.htm |date=22 July 2017 }}. Retrieved 24 October 2007.</ref> The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.<ref name=SS2008 /> Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.<ref name=SS2008 /> The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.<ref name=SS2008 /> Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8050478.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090110204457/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8050478.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=10 January 2009 |title=Syria rejects U.S. allegations on existence of nuclear activities |publisher=News.xinhuanet.com |date=25 April 2008 |access-date=15 May 2009}}</ref> IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.<ref name=IAEAHaaretz>{{cite web |url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/978043.html |title=IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian nuclear reactor |publisher=Haaretz.com |access-date=15 May 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080426141322/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/978043.html |archive-date=26 April 2008 }}</ref>

====Taiwan====
{{Main|Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons}}
During the [[Cold War]], the United States deployed nuclear weapons at [[Tainan Air Force Base]] of [[Taiwan]] as part of the [[United States Taiwan Defense Command]]. Nonetheless, Taiwan began its own nuclear weapon program under the auspices of the [[Institute of Nuclear Energy Research]] (INER) at the [[Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology]] since 1967. Taiwan was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from [[Canada]] and low-grade [[plutonium]] from the United States), which were subject to [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) safeguards, but which Taiwan used for its nuclear weapon program.<ref>{{cite book | last = Roy | first = Denny | title = Taiwan: A Political History | url = https://archive.org/details/taiwan00denn | url-access = registration | publisher = Cornell University Press | isbn = 0-8014-8805-2 | year = 2003 | access-date = 18 November 2019 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180403202247/https://archive.org/details/taiwan00denn | archive-date = 3 April 2018 | url-status = live }}</ref> In 1972, US president ordered to remove the nuclear weapons from Taiwan by 1974.<ref>{{cite web |title=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 20 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19991020/ |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |publisher=George Washington University |access-date=27 September 2020 |archive-date=7 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210207142738/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19991020/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Then recognized as the [[Republic of China]], Taiwan ratified the NPT in 1970. After the IAEA found evidences of Taiwan's efforts to produce the [[weapons-grade plutonium]], Taiwan agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapon program under U.S. pressure in September 1976. The nuclear reactor was shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S. However secret nuclear activities were exposed after the [[Lieyu massacre]] by Colonel [[Chang Hsien-yi]], deputy director of INER, who defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. This program was also halted under the U.S. pressure.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Ide|first=William|date=1999-10-14|title=How the US stopped Taiwan's bomb|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/1999/10/14/0000006401/1|work=Taipei Times|access-date=2020-02-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200202140227/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/1999/10/14/0000006401/1|archive-date=2 February 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>