Editing Nihilism (section)

=== Mereological nihilism ===
{{main|Mereological nihilism}}
Mereological or compositional nihilism is the view that complex or composite objects do not exist. Composite objects are objects made up of [[proper part]]s. For example, a house is a composite object made up of parts like walls, windows, doors, and so forth. Each of these parts is itself a composite object made up of smaller parts, such as molecules and atoms. Mereological nihilists argue that only non-composite or simple objects exist, such as [[elementary particle]]s. As a result, composite objects are understood as mere collections of simple objects. According to this view, there are no houses or tables, there are only elementary particles arranged house-wise or table-wise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} }}</ref>

Mereological nihilism is sometimes proposed as a solution to avoid metaphysical paradoxes, like the [[Ship of Theseus]].<ref>{{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}}</ref>{{efn|The Ship of Theseus is a thought experiment in which the parts of a ship are gradually replaced until no original part remains. The metaphysical paradox is tied to the question of whether the resulting ship is the same as the original ship. This problem does not arise for mereological nihilism, since it denies the existence of composite objects.<ref>{{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843, 854–855}}</ref>}} Another argument in favor of mereological nihilism comes from [[Ockham's Razor]], emphasizing the parsimony and [[simplicity]] of a minimal [[ontology]] that excludes everything except simple objects.<ref>{{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}}</ref> Opponents of mereological nihilism highlight the counterintuitive consequences of denying the existence of ordinary objects, which contradict [[common sense]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }}</ref> Other criticisms assert that mereological nihilism is unable to provide a coherent framework for how to understand collections of elementary particles or fails to explain phenomena like [[emergent properties]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2014|pp=1511–1512, 1526}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|2017|pp=77–78}} }}</ref>