Editing Nicholas I of Russia (section)

=== Ottoman Empire and Persia ===
[[File:Navarino.jpg|thumb|270px|The [[Battle of Navarino]], in October 1827, marked the effective end of [[Ottoman Greece|Ottoman rule in Greece]].]]

While Nicholas was attempting to maintain the status quo in Europe, he followed a somewhat more aggressive policy toward the neighbouring empires to the south, the [[Ottoman Empire]] and [[Qajar Iran|Persia]]. Nicholas was widely believed at the time to be following the traditional Russian policy of resolving the so-called [[Eastern Question]] by seeking to partition the Ottoman Empire and establish a protectorate over the Orthodox population of the [[Balkans]], still largely under Ottoman control in the 1820s.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63">Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 38.</ref> In fact, Nicholas was deeply committed to upholding the status quo in Europe and feared any attempt to devour the decaying Ottoman Empire would both upset his ally Austria, which also had interests in the Balkans, and bring about an Anglo-French coalition in defense of the Ottomans.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63"/> Furthermore, in the war of 1828–29, the Russians defeated the Ottomans in every battle fought in the field and advanced deep into the Balkans, but the Russians discovered that they lacked the necessary logistical strength to take Constantinople.<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 47.</ref>

Nicholas' policy towards the Ottoman Empire was to use the [[Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca|1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca]] which gave Russia a vague right as protector of Orthodox peoples in the Balkans, as a way of placing the Ottoman Empire into the Russian sphere of influence, which was felt to be a more achievable goal than conquering the entire Ottoman Empire.<ref name="Rendall pages 37-63"/> Nicholas actually wanted to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a stable but weak state that would be unable to stand up to Russia, which was felt to serve Russia's interests. Nicholas always thought of Russia as first and foremost a European power and regarded Europe as more important than the Middle East.<ref name="ReferenceA">Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 48.</ref> The Russian Foreign Minister [[Karl Nesselrode]] wrote in letter to his ambassador in Constantinople Nikolai Muravyov that the victory of [[Muhammad Ali of Egypt]] over Mahmud II would lead to a new dynasty ruling the Ottoman Empire.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Nesselrode continued that if the able Muhammad Ali became sultan then it "could, with the elevation of a new personage to the Turkish throne, revive new strength in that declining empire and distract our attention and forces from European affairs, and thus the monarch [Nicholas] is especially concerned to keep the sultan on his tottering throne."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> At the same time, Nicholas argued that because of the economic importance to Russia of the Turkish straits, through which Russia exports its grain, that Russia had the "right" to intervene in Ottoman affairs.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> In 1833, Nicholas told the Austrian ambassador [[Karl Ludwig von Ficquelmont]] that "Oriental affairs are above all a matter for Russia."<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 pp. 48–49.</ref> At the same time that Nicholas claimed the Ottoman Empire was within the Russian sphere of influence, he made it clear that he had no interest in annexing the empire. At another meeting with Ficquelmont in 1833, Nicholas, speaking with the "Greek Project" of Catherine the Great in mind said: "I know everything that has been said of the projects of the Empress Catherine, and Russia has renounced the goal she had set out. I wish to maintain the Turkish empire... It if falls, I do not desire its debris. I need nothing."<ref>Rendall, Matthew "Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841" pp. 37–63 from ''The International History Review'', Volume 24, Issue #1, March 2002 p. 50.</ref> Ultimately, Nicholas's policies in the Near East proved to be both costly and largely futile.
[[File:Siege of Erivan Fortress on 1 October 1827.jpg|thumb|270x270px|[[Capture of Erivan]] fortress by Russian troops under leadership of [[Ivan Paskevich]] in 1827 during the [[Russo-Persian War (1826–28)|Russo-Persian War]]]]
In 1826–28, Nicholas fought the [[Russo-Persian War (1826–28)]], which ended with Persia forced to cede its last remaining territories in the [[Caucasus]]. Russia [[Russo-Persian Wars|had conquered]] all the territories of Iran in both the [[North Caucasus]] and [[South Caucasus]], comprising modern-day [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], [[Dagestan]], [[Armenia]], and [[Azerbaijan]], through the course of the 19th century.<ref>Timothy C. Dowling [https://books.google.com/books?id=KTq2BQAAQBAJ&pg=PA728 ''Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond''] p. 728 ABC-CLIO, 2 December 2014 {{ISBN|1598849484}}</ref> The treaty further conceded extraterritoriality to Russian subjects in Iran (capitulation).<ref>{{cite book|last1=Yarshater|first1=Ehsan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vBQZAQAAIAAJ&q=treaty+of+turkmenchay+capitulation|title=Encyclopædia Iranica, Volume 13|date=2004|publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul|isbn=978-0-93327-395-5|page=260}}</ref> As Professor Virginia Aksan adds, the 1828 [[Treaty of Turkmenchay]] "removed Iran from the military equation."<ref>Aksan, Virginia. (2014). ''Ottoman Wars, 1700–1870: An Empire Besieged'' p. 463. Routledge. {{ISBN|978-1317884033}}</ref>

Russia fought a successful war against the Ottomans in [[Russo-Turkish War (1828–29)|1828–29]], but it did little to increase Russian power in Europe. Only a small Greek state became independent in the Balkans, with limited Russian influence. In 1833, Russia negotiated the [[Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi]] with the Ottoman Empire. The major European parties mistakenly believed that the treaty contained a secret clause granting Russia the right to transit warships through the [[Bosphorus]] and [[Dardanelles]] straits. This misconception led to the [[London Straits Convention]] of 1841, which affirmed Ottoman control over the straits and forbade any power, including Russia, from sending warships through them. Buoyed by his role in suppressing the revolutions of 1848 as well as his mistaken belief he could rely on British diplomatic support, Nicholas moved against the Ottomans, who declared war on Russia on 8 October 1853. On 30 November, Russian [[Pavel Nakhimov|Admiral Nakhimov]] caught the Turkish fleet in the harbor at Sinope and destroyed it.<ref>Edward Crankshaw, ''The Shadow of the Winter Palace'', p. 133.</ref>

[[File:Mirror Case Depicting the Meeting of Nasir al-Din Mirza and Tsar Nicholas I in Erivan, dated A.D. 1854 (interior panel, zoomed in).jpg|thumb|right|Interior panel of a mirror case commemorating the 1838 meeting of Iranian crown prince [[Naser al-Din Shah Qajar|Naser al-Din Mirza]] (later, [[Shah]]) and Tsar Nicholas I of Russia in [[Yerevan|Erivan]] in the [[Armenian Oblast]]. The scene at the center shows the seven-year-old prince sitting on the tsar's lap, accompanied by an entourage. Created by Mohammad Esmail Esfahani in [[Tehran]], dated 1854]]

Fearing the results of a total Ottoman defeat by Russia, in 1854 [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]], [[French Second Empire|France]], the [[Kingdom of Sardinia (1720–1861)|Kingdom of Sardinia]] formed a military coalition and joined forces with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The preceding conflict became known as the [[Crimean War]] in the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe, but was labelled in Russia the "Eastern War" (Russian: Восточная война, ''Vostochnaya Vojna''). In April 1854, Austria signed a defensive pact with Prussia.<ref>Edward Crankshaw, ''The Shadow of the Winter Palace'', pp. 135–136</ref> Thus, Russia found herself in a war with every Great Power of Europe either allied against her militarily or diplomatically.<ref>Edvard Radzinsky, ''Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar'', p. 94.</ref>

In 1853 [[Mikhail Pogodin]], professor of history at Moscow University, wrote a memorandum to Nicholas. Nicholas himself read Pogodin's text and approvingly commented: "That is the whole point."<ref name="slate"/> According to historian [[Orlando Figes]], "The memorandum clearly struck a chord with Nicholas, who shared Pogodin's sense that Russia's role as the protector of the Orthodox had not been recognized or understood and that Russia was unfairly treated by the West." Pogodin wrote:<ref>{{cite book|last1=Figes|first1=Orlando|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dimVhWPx_88C&pg=PA134|title=The Crimean War: A History|date=2011|isbn=9781429997249|page=134|publisher=Henry Holt and Company }}</ref>
{{Blockquote|France takes Algeria from Turkey, and almost every year England annexes another Indian principality: none of this disturbs the balance of power; but when Russia occupies Moldavia and Wallachia, albeit only temporarily, that disturbs the balance of power. France occupies Rome and stays there several years during peacetime: that is nothing; but Russia only thinks of occupying Constantinople, and the peace of Europe is threatened. The English declare war on the Chinese, who have, it seems, offended them: no one has the right to intervene; but Russia is obliged to ask Europe for permission if it quarrels with its neighbor. England threatens Greece to support the [[Don Pacifico affair|false claims]] of a miserable Jew and burns its fleet: that is a lawful action; but Russia demands a treaty to protect millions of Christians, and that is deemed to strengthen its position in the East at the expense of the balance of power. We can expect nothing from the West but blind hatred and malice...|Mikhail Pogodin's memorandum to Nicholas I, 1853<ref name="slate">{{cite news |title=The Long History of Russian Whataboutism |url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/03/russia-and-western-double-standards-the-long-history-of-russian-complaints-about-unfair-treatment.html |work=Slate |date=March 21, 2014}}</ref>}}

Austria offered the Ottomans diplomatic support, and Prussia remained neutral, thus leaving Russia without any allies on the continent. The European allies landed in [[Crimea]] and laid siege to the well-fortified Russian [[Sevastopol Naval Base]]. The Russians lost battles at Alma in September 1854<ref name="l425">W. Bruce Lincoln, ''The Romanovs'', p. 425.</ref> and then at Inkerman.<ref name=l425/> After the prolonged [[Siege of Sevastopol (1854–55)]] the base fell, exposing Russia's inability to defend a major fortification on its own soil. On the death of Nicholas I, Alexander II became emperor. On 15 January 1856, the new emperor took Russia out of the war on very unfavorable terms, which included the loss of a naval fleet on the Black Sea.