Editing Naturalistic fallacy (section)

===Non-synonymous properties===
In 1939, [[William Frankena]]<ref name="Frankena 1939">{{cite journal |title=The Naturalistic Fallacy |first=W. K. |last=Frankena |journal=Mind |volume=48 |number=192 |date=October 1939 |pages=464–477 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/mind/XLVIII.192.464 |jstor=2250706}}</ref> critiqued [[G. E. Moore]]'s conception of the naturalistic fallacy. Frankena stated that, in arguing that ''good'' cannot be defined by natural properties, Moore was trying to avoid a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties.<ref name="IEP Moore">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Moore, George Edward |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/moore/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |accessdate=March 31, 2011 |last=Preston |first=Aaron |date=December 30, 2005}}</ref> 

Frankena also argued that ''naturalistic fallacy'' is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (''naturalistic''), he noted that Moore rejected defining ''good'' in non-natural as well as natural terms.<ref name="Hamid">{{cite book |pages=93–96 |title=G.E. Moore: A Study of His Ethics |last=Hamid |first=Md. Abdul |isbn=978-81-7099-174-8 |publisher=Mittal Publications |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lxnsElfqa70C&pg=PA94 |year=1989}}</ref> Frankena rejected the idea that the second word (''fallacy'') represented an error in [[reasoning]] &ndash; a fallacy as it is usually recognized &ndash; rather than an error in [[semantics]].<ref name="Ridge">{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |last=Ridge |first=Michael |title=Moral Non-Naturalism |date=June 26, 2008 |accessdate=March 31, 2011 |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/}}</ref> 

In Moore's [[open-question argument]], because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as: the fact that there is always an open question merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are.<ref name="Flew">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Definist fallacy |encyclopedia=A Dictionary of Philosophy |page=85 |last=Flew |first=Antony |author-link=Antony Flew |year=1984 |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-312-20923-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MmJHVU9Rv3YC&pg=PA85}}</ref> Thus, even if good ''were'' identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument; however, Frankena objects that this{{what|date=December 2024}} would be committing the fallacy of [[begging the question]].<ref name="Ridge"/>