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==Criticisms of meta-ethical relativism== ===Philosophical=== ====R. M. Hare==== {{See also|Universal prescriptivism}} Some philosophers, for example [[R. M. Hare]] (1919β2002), argue that moral propositions remain subject to human logical rules, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content, including those subject to cultural or religious standards or norms. Thus, for example, they contend that one cannot hold contradictory ethical judgments. This allows for moral [[discourse]] with shared standards, notwithstanding the descriptive properties or [[truth condition]]s of moral terms. They do not affirm or deny that moral facts exist, only that human logic applies to our moral assertions; consequently, they postulate an objective and preferred standard of moral justification, albeit in a very limited sense. Nevertheless, according to Hare, human logic shows the error of relativism in one very important sense (see Hare's ''Sorting out Ethics''). Hare and other philosophers also point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This parallels our treatment of other terms such as ''less'' or ''more'', which meet with universal understanding and do not depend upon independent standards (for example, one can convert measurements). It applies to good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too; for example, when we say, "this is a ''good'' wrench" or "this is a ''bad'' wheel". This evaluative property of certain terms also allows people of different beliefs to have meaningful discussions on moral questions, even though they may disagree about certain "facts".{{citation needed|date=April 2020}} ====Walter Terence Stace==== "Ethical Relativity" is the topic of the first two chapters in ''The Concept of Morals'', in which [[Walter Terence Stace]] argues against [[moral absolutism]], but for [[moral universalism]].<ref>{{cite book | last = Stace | first = Walter T. | title = The Concept of Morals | publisher = The MacMillan Company | date = 1975|orig-date=1937 | location = New York | pages = 67 | isbn = 0-8446-2990-1 }}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last1=Baghramian|first1=Maria|title=Relativism|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/relativism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-05-28|last2=Carter|first2=J. Adam}}</ref> ====Philosophical poverty==== Critics propose that moral relativism fails because it rejects basic premises of discussions on morality, or because it cannot arbitrate disagreement. Many critics, including [[Ibn Warraq]] and [[Eddie Tabash]], have suggested that meta-ethical relativists essentially take themselves out of any discussion of normative morality, since they seem to be rejecting an assumption of such discussions: the premise that there are right and wrong answers that can be discovered through reason. Practically speaking, such critics will argue that meta-ethical relativism may amount to [[moral nihilism]], or else incoherence.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Moral Relativism {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/|website=www.iep.utm.edu|access-date=2020-05-28}}</ref> These critics argue specifically that the moral relativists reduce the extent of their input in normative moral discussions to either rejecting the very having of the discussion, or else deeming both disagreeing parties to be correct. For instance, the moral relativist can only appeal to preference to object to the practice of murder or torture by individuals for [[Hedonism|hedonistic]] pleasure.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.podcast.tv/video-podcasts/reasonable-doubts-podcast-121147.html|title=Reasonable Doubts Podcast, Ibn Warraq interviews "Defending the West" and "What the Koran Really Says"|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091118155705/http://www.podcast.tv/video-podcasts/reasonable-doubts-podcast-121147.html|archive-date=2009-11-18}}</ref> This accusation that relativists reject widely held terms of discourse is similar to arguments used against other "discussion-stoppers" like some forms of [[solipsism]] or the rejection of [[Inductive reasoning|induction]].{{citation needed|date=April 2020}} Philosopher [[Simon Blackburn]] made a similar criticism,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://philosophybites.com/2007/08/simon-blackburn.html|title=Simon Blackburn on Moral Relativism|website=philosophy bites}}</ref> and explains that moral relativism fails as a ''moral system'' simply because it cannot arbitrate disagreements.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Blackburn|first=Simon|date=1998|title=Review of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653640|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=58|issue=1|pages=195β198|doi=10.2307/2653640|jstor=2653640|issn=0031-8205}}</ref> ====Other criticism==== Some arguments come when people question which moral justifications or truths are said to be relative. Because people belong to many groups based on culture, race, religion, etc., it is difficult to claim that the values of the group have authority for the members. A part of meta-ethical relativism is identifying which group of people those truths are relative to. Another component is that many people belong to more than one group. The beliefs of the groups that a person belongs to may be fundamentally different, and so it is hard to decide which are relative and which win out. A person practicing meta-ethical relativism would not necessarily object to either view, but develop an opinion and argument.<ref>{{Cite book|edition = Fall 2015|title = Moral Relativism|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/moral-relativism/|date = 2015-01-01|first = Chris|last = Gowans|editor-first = Edward N.|editor-last = Zalta}}</ref> ===Religious=== ====Protestantism==== {{See also|Protestantism}} ====Roman Catholicism==== {{See also|Relativism#Catholic Church and relativism}} Catholic and some secular intellectuals attribute the perceived post-[[World War II|war]] decadence of Europe to the displacement of absolute values by moral relativism. [[Pope Benedict XVI]], [[Marcello Pera]] and others have argued that after about 1960, Europeans massively abandoned many traditional norms rooted in [[Christianity]] and replaced them with continuously evolving relative moral rules. In this view, [[Human sexual behavior|sexual activity]] has become separated from procreation, which led to a decline in the importance of [[family|families]] and to [[Sub-replacement fertility|depopulation]].<ref>[[Pope Benedict XVI|Josef Cardinal Ratzinger]], [[Marcello Pera]], ''Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam'' (Basic Books, 2006. {{ISBN|0-465-00634-5}}).</ref> The most authoritative response to moral relativism from the Catholic perspective can be found in ''[[Veritatis Splendor]]'', an [[encyclical]] by [[Pope John Paul II]]. Many of the main criticisms of moral relativism by the Catholic Church relate largely to modern controversies, such as elective abortion. ====Buddhism==== [[Bhikkhu Bodhi]], an American [[Buddhist]] monk, has written: <blockquote> By assigning value and spiritual ideals to private subjectivity, the materialistic [[world view]] ... threatens to undermine any secure objective foundation for morality. The result is the widespread moral degeneration that we witness today. To counter this tendency, mere moral exhortation is insufficient. If morality is to function as an efficient guide to conduct, it cannot be propounded as a self-justifying scheme but must be embedded in a more comprehensive spiritual system which grounds morality in a transpersonal order. Religion must affirm, in the clearest terms, that morality and ethical values are not mere decorative frills of personal opinion, not subjective superstructure, but intrinsic laws of the cosmos built into the heart of reality.<ref>[[Bhikkhu Bodhi]], "A Buddhist Response to Contemporary Dilemmas of Human Existence" [http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/response.html article link at Access to Insight]</ref> </blockquote>
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