Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Epiphenomenalism===
{{Main|Epiphenomenalism}}

[[Epiphenomenalism]] states that all mental events are caused by a physical event and have no physical consequences, and that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states. So, the mental event of deciding to pick up a rock ("''M1''") is caused by the firing of specific neurons in the brain ("''P1''"). When the arm and hand move to pick up the rock ("''P2''") this is not caused by the preceding mental event ''M1'', nor by ''M1'' and ''P1'' together, but only by ''P1''. The physical causes are in principle reducible to fundamental physics, and therefore mental causes are eliminated using this [[reductionist]] explanation. If P1 causes both ''M1'' and ''P2'', there is no [[overdetermination]] in the explanation for ''P2''.<ref name="SEP" />

The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by [[Julien Offray de La Mettrie|La Mettrie]] (1745), and then by [[Pierre Jean George Cabanis|Cabanis]] (1802), and was further explicated by [[Shadworth Hodgson|Hodgson]] (1870) and [[T.H. Huxley|Huxley]] (1874).<ref>Gallagher, S. 2006. "Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will". pp. 109–124 in ''Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?'', edited by S. Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref> [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Jackson]] gave a [[#The subjective argument|subjective argument]] for epiphenomenalism, but later rejected it and embraced [[physicalism]].<ref name="Jackson 2003 251">{{cite journal|last=Jackson|first=Frank|title=Mind and Illusion|journal=Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement|date=September 2003|volume=53|doi=10.1017/S1358246100008365|pages=251–271|s2cid=170304272}}</ref>