Editing Metaphysics (section)

=== Causality ===
{{main|Causality}}

Causality is the relation between cause and effect whereby one entity produces or alters another entity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=20–22}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=218–219}} }}</ref> For instance, if a person bumps a glass and spills its contents then the bump is the cause and the spill is the effect.<ref>{{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=20}}</ref> Besides the single-case causation between particulars in this example, there is also general-case causation expressed in statements such as "smoking causes cancer".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 186]}} }}</ref> The term [[agent causation]] is used when people and their actions cause something.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=219, 252–253}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=233–234}} }}</ref> Causation is usually interpreted deterministically, meaning that a cause always brings about its effect. However, some philosophers such as [[G. E. M. Anscombe]] have provided counterexamples to this idea.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Wiland|Driver|2022|loc=§ 3. Metaphysics}}|{{harvnb|Van Miltenburg|2022|pp=1, 6}}}}</ref> Such counterexamples have inspired the development of [[Probabilistic causation|probabilistic theories]], which claim that the cause merely increases the probability that the effect occurs. This view can explain that smoking causes cancer even though this does not happen in every single case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=228–231}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA185 185–186]}} }}</ref>

The [[Humeanism#Causality and necessity|regularity theory of causation]], inspired by [[David Hume]]'s philosophy, states that causation is nothing but a [[constant conjunction]] in which the mind apprehends that one phenomenon, like putting one's hand in a fire, is always followed by another phenomenon, like a feeling of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lorkowski|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Necessary Connections and Hume’s Two Definitions, § 4. Causal Reductionism}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=24–25}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=220–221}} }}</ref> According to nomic regularity theories, regularities manifest as [[Scientific law|laws of nature]] studied by science.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=223–224}}</ref> [[Counterfactual conditional|Counterfactual]] theories focus not on regularities but on how effects depend on their causes. They state that effects owe their existence to the cause and would not occur without them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=26}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=221–222}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=224–225}} }}</ref> According to primitivism, causation is a basic concept that cannot be analyzed in terms of non-causal concepts, such as regularities or dependence relations. One form of primitivism identifies causal powers inherent in entities as the underlying mechanism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=231–232}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2009|pp=94–95}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|Anjum|2013}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=63–64}} }}</ref> Eliminativists reject the above theories by holding that there is no causation.<ref>{{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=231–232}}</ref>