Editing Mayaguez incident (section)

===The rescue plan===
[[File:Koh Tang aerial view.jpg|thumb|right|USAF reconnaissance photo of [[Koh Tang]], showing East Beach and two downed CH-53s (left) and West Beach (right)]]

On the afternoon of 14 May, Burns received the order to proceed with a simultaneous assault on Koh Tang and ''Mayaguez'' timed to begin just before sunrise (05:42) on 15 May.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|112}} D Company, 1/4 Marines would retake ''Mayaguez'' while BLT 2/9 Marines would rescue the crew on Koh Tang.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|113}} With minimal intelligence available regarding the geography of Koh Tang, the commander of BLT 2/9 and his staff took off in a [[Beechcraft King Air#Military King Air versions|U-21]] to make an aerial reconnaissance of the island.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|114}}

Arriving over Koh Tang at 16:00, they were prevented from closely approaching the island in order not to compromise the secrecy of the mission or draw ground fire, but they determined that the island was so covered in jungle that the only two viable landing zones available were beaches on the west and east shores of the northern portion of Koh Tang.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|114}} The [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] had made an assessment, in part from [[RF-4C]] and [[Lockheed U-2|U-2]] reconnaissance flights, that between 150 and 200 Khmer Rouge backed by heavy weapons occupied Koh Tang. This report was conveyed to U-Tapao but was never briefed to the planners (probably due to security classification issues) who believed that only about 20 Cambodian irregulars armed with small arms were on the island.<ref name=dia-2012>{{cite report |pages=37–39, 49 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB534-DIA-Declassified-Sourcebook/documents/DIA-46.pdf |title=The Vietnam Cauldron: Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia |author=Michael B. Petersen |publisher=Defense Intelligence Agency |work=Defense Intelligence Historical Perspectives, Number 2 |year=2012 |access-date=30 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170825000235/http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB534-DIA-Declassified-Sourcebook/documents/DIA-46.pdf |archive-date=25 August 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

At 21:00, the rescue plan was finalized. Six hundred Marines from BLT 2/9 — composed of E and G Companies — were assigned to conduct a combat assault in five CH-53 ''Knives'' and three HH-53 ''Jolly Greens'' to seize and hold Koh Tang.<ref name=Dunham/>{{rp|245}} Two helicopters would make a diversionary assault on the West Beach ({{Coord|10.316|N|103.135|E|display=inline}}), while six helicopters would make the main assault on the wider East Beach ({{Coord|10.316|N|103.139|E|display=inline}}). The East Beach force would move to the nearby compound where ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew was believed to be held and then move across and link up with the West Beach force.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|120–121}}

Two more waves of helicopters would be required to deploy all of BLT 2/9 to Koh Tang. The flight from U-Tapao to Koh Tang was a four-hour round trip. It was estimated that only 20–30 Khmer Rouge were on Koh Tang; the information regarding the heavy anti-aircraft fire coming from Koh Tang and the number of gunboats present was not passed on to the Marines.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|120–121}} Preparatory airstrikes of the landing zones were ruled out for fear of hitting crew members who might be held nearby.<ref name=Lavalle/>{{rp|104}}

A unit of 57 Marines from D Company, 1/4 Marines together with volunteers from [[Military Sealift Command]] to get ''Mayaguez'' underway, an explosive ordnance disposal team and a Cambodian linguist would be transferred by three HH-53 ''Jolly Greens'' to the ''Holt'' which was scheduled to arrive on station at dawn for a ship-to-ship boarding of ''Mayaguez'' one hour after the assault on Koh Tang began.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|122}} Two additional CH-53s (because of their superior firepower, all the HH-53s were used for troop lift) were tasked as [[combat search and rescue]] helicopters, supported by an [[EC-130]] "King" airborne, command, control and communications (ABCCC) aircraft of the [[56th Rescue Squadron]].<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|119}}

USS ''Wilson'' was assigned to support the Koh Tang operation, and, after retaking ''Mayaguez'', USS ''Holt'' would be deployed in a blocking position between Koh Tang and the Cambodian mainland with the mission of intercepting and engaging any Khmer reaction forces. U.S. Navy aircraft from ''Coral Sea'' were given the mission of striking targets on the Cambodian mainland to prevent interference with the rescue.<ref name=Chun/>{{rp|27}}

In the afternoon in New York City, the [[List of ambassadors of the United States to the United Nations|US ambassador to the UN]], [[John A. Scali]], delivered a request for assistance to [[Secretary-General of the United Nations|UN Secretary-General]] [[Kurt Waldheim]] that noted the US reserved the right to act in self-defense in accordance with [[Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter#Article 51: Self-defence|Article 51 of the UN Charter]].<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|37}} Waldheim called the [[Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations|Chinese representative to the UN]] to his office and contacted the Cambodians via a channel used previously to secure the release of foreign citizens from Phnom Penh.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|48}}

At 15:52 EDT (02:52 15 May Cambodia), Ford convened the fourth and final NSC meeting regarding ''Mayaguez''. Jones briefed the NSC on the assault plan and plans for strikes by [[Andersen Air Force Base|Guam]]-based [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress|B-52s]] on the port facilities at Kampong Som and the Ream Naval Base. Concerned that the use of B-52s might be excessive, Ford limited the bombing to attacks by carrier-based aircraft commencing at 07:45 (Cambodia) and gave the go-ahead to the rescue plan.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|123–124}} Given the reports that the crew had probably been moved to the mainland, the NSC discussed whether any Americans were actually on Koh Tang. Kissinger pointed out there was no way to know and that "taking the island if they are not there is easier to explain than failing to take it if they are." Schlesinger agreed that "we have an obligation to get the Americans or to see if they are there."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|41}}

At 19:00 EDT (06:00 15 May Cambodia) the UN issued a statement that the secretary-general was communicating with the Cambodians and that he encouraged all parties to refrain from further use of force.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|48}}