Editing Max Weber (section)

==={{Lang|de|Verstehen}}===
{{Main|Verstehen}}

{{quote box
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| quote = The result of what has been said so far is that an "objective" treatment of cultural occurrences, in the sense that the ideal aim of scientific work would be to reduce the empirical [reality] to "laws", is absurd. ''Not'' because{{snd}}as it has often been claimed{{snd}}the course of cultural processes or, say, processes in the human mind would, "objectively" speaking, be less law-like, but for the following two reasons: (1) knowledge of social laws does not constitute knowledge of social reality, but is only one of the various tools that our intellect needs for that [latter] purpose; (2) knowledge of ''cultural'' occurrences is only conceivable if it takes as its point of departure the ''significance'' that the reality of life, with its always individual character, has for us in certain ''particular'' respects. No law can reveal to us in ''what'' sense and in ''what'' respects this will be the case, as that is determined by those ''value ideas'' in the light of which we look at "culture" in each individual case.
| source = —Max Weber in "The 'Objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy", 1904.{{sfn|Weber|2012|pp=119, 138}}
}}

In terms of methodology, Weber was primarily concerned with the question of [[objectivity and subjectivity]], distinguishing social action from [[social behavior]] and noting that social action must be understood through the subjective relationships between individuals.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Ritzer|2y=2009|2p=31|3a1=Weber|3y=2011|3pp=7–32}} According to him, the study of social action through interpretive means or {{Lang|de|verstehen}} ("to understand") needed to be based upon understanding the [[Meaning-making|subjective meaning]] and purpose that individuals attached to their actions.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Heath|2y=2024|3a1=Swedberg|3a2=Agevall|3y=2016|3pp=356–357}} Determining an individual's interpretation of their actions required either empathically or rationally derived evidence.{{sfnm|Kim|2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=356–357|3a1=Rhoads|3y=2021|3pp=132–133}} Weber noted that the importance of subjectivity in the social sciences made the creation of fool-proof, universal laws much more difficult than in the [[natural science]]s and that the amount of objective knowledge that social sciences were able to create was limited. Overall, he supported objective science as a goal worth striving for but noted that it was ultimately an unreachable goal.{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=228–230}}

Weber's methodology was developed in the context of wider debates about social scientific methodology.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1p=187|2a1=Beiser|2y=2011|2pp=551–552}} The first of which was the {{Lang|de|[[Methodenstreit]]}} ("method dispute").{{sfnm|1a1=Kim|1y=2022|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=15–16|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=525–528}} His position in it was close to [[historicism]], as he thought that social actions were heavily tied to particular historical contexts. Furthermore, analysing social actions required an understanding of the relevant individuals' subjective motivations.{{sfn|Beiser|2011|pp=527–529, 546}} Therefore, his methodology emphasised the use of [[comparative history|comparative historical analysis]].{{sfn|Allan|2005|p=153}} As such, he was more interested in explaining how a certain outcome was the result of various historical processes than in predicting those processes' outcome in the future.{{sfn|Allan|2005|p=148}} The second debate that shaped Weber's perspective on methodology was the {{Lang|de|[[Werturteilsstreit]]}} ("value-judgement dispute").{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–552}} This debate was held between 1909 and 1914 on the subject of [[value-judgement]]s in the social sciences. It originated with a debate in the {{Lang|de|Verein für Socialpolitik}} between the supporters of the idea that ethics was an important consideration in the field of economics and those who opposed it.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=185–189|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2p=365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–552}} Weber's position was that the social sciences should strive to be [[value-free]].{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=364–365|3a1=Aldenhoff-Hübinger|3y=2004|3p=144}} In his view, scholars and students needed to avoid promoting political values in the classroom. Science had no part in the choosing of values. With regards to economics, he argued that productivity was not a useful scientific concept, as it could impede the proper evaluation of economic phenomena.{{sfnm|1a1=Kaesler|1y=1988|1pp=184–187|2a1=Swedberg|2a2=Agevall|2y=2016|2pp=364–365|3a1=Beiser|3y=2011|3pp=551–553}}