Editing Long March (section)

==The Long March==

===Escape from Jiangxi===
[[File:Mao Zhou Zhu.jpg|thumb|right|[[Zhou Enlai]], [[Mao Zedong]], and [[Zhu De]] during the Long March.]]
Since the Central Base Area could not be held, the Standing Committee appointed Bo (responsible for politics), Braun (responsible for military strategy), and Zhou (responsible for the implementation of military planning) to organize the evacuation. Since the enemy was close, Zhou, in charge of logistics, made his plans in complete secrecy. It was not disclosed who was to leave or when: even senior leaders were only at the last moments told of the Army's movements. It is not known what criteria were used to determine who would stay and who would go, but 16,000 troops and some of the Communists' most notable commanders at the time (including [[Xiang Ying]], [[Chen Yi (general)|Chen Yi]], [[Tan Zhenlin]], and [[Qu Qiubai]]) were left to form a rear guard, to divert the main force of Nationalist troops from noticing, and preventing, the general withdrawal.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=56–57}}

The first movements to screen the retreat were undertaken by forces led by [[Fang Zhimin]], breaking through Kuomintang lines in June 1934. Although Fang Zhimin's troops were soon destroyed, these movements surprised the Kuomintang, who were numerically superior to the Communists at the time and did not expect an attack on their fortified perimeter.

The early troop movements were actually a diversion to allow the retreat of more important leaders from Jiangxi. On October 16, 1934, a force of about 130,000 soldiers and civilians under Bo Gu and Otto Braun attacked the line of Kuomintang positions near Yudu.  More than 86,000 troops, 11,000 administrative personnel and thousands of civilian porters actually completed the breakout; the remainder, largely wounded or ill soldiers, continued to fight a delaying action after the main force had left, and then dispersed into the countryside.<ref>Mao Zedong, ''On Tactics...'': [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1935/12_27.htm#n26 Note 26] retrieved 2007-02-17</ref> Several prominent members of the Chinese Soviet who remained behind were captured and executed by the Kuomintang after the fall of Ruijin in November 1934, including [[Qu Qiubai]] and the youngest brother of Mao Zedong, [[Mao Zetan]].
[[File:中国工农红军红星司令部在抢渡湘江前绘制的地图 03572.jpg|thumb|Map drawn by the Red Army Command before the Battle of Xiangjiang]]
The withdrawal began in early October 1934.  Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General [[Chen Jitang]], a Guangdong warlord who Zhou identified as being likely to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent [[Pan Hannian]] to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=58}} The Red army successfully crossed the [[Xinfeng River]] and marched through the province of Guangdong and into [[Hunan]] before encountering the last of Chiang's fortifications at the [[Xiang River]].

After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties.  Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of Jiangxi with the First Red Army, only 36,000 successfully escaped. Due to the low morale within the Red Army at the time, it is not possible to know what proportion of these losses were due to military casualties, and which proportion were due to desertion. The conditions of the Red Army's forced withdrawal demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly Bo Gu and Otto Braun), but Zhou remained calm and retained his command.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=58}} Most Communist losses occurred over only two days of heavy fighting, from November 30 to December 1, 1934.

===Determining the direction of the Red Army===
After escaping Chiang's encirclement, it was obvious to Party leaders that Chiang was intent on intercepting what remained of the Red Army in Hunan, and the direction of the Red Army's movements had to be reconsidered.  The plan to rendezvous and join He Long's army in Hunan had become too risky. Mao suggested to Zhou that the Red Army change direction, towards Guizhou, where Mao expected enemy defenses to be weak.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=58}}

A meeting at [[Tongdao]], close to the border of Hunan and Guizhou, was convened to discuss the direction of the Red Army on December 12, 1934.  Zhou endorsed Mao's proposal, encouraging other leaders to overrule the objections of Bo and Braun. Another dispute of the direction of the Red Army occurred soon after, once the Red Army reached [[Liping County|Liping]], in the mountains of southeast Guizhou. Braun believed that they should travel to eastern Guizhou, but Mao wanted to go to western Guizhou, where he expected KMT forces to be lighter and which borders [[Sichuan]], and to establish a base area there. In a meeting to decide the army's direction, Zhou sided with Mao, making Braun "fly into a rage because he was overruled in the debate." At the meeting it was decided that the Red Army would travel towards [[Zunyi]], in western Guizhou.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=59}}

On January 1, 1935, the Red Army reached the Wu River. Bo and Braun again insisted the Red Army move back to western Hunan to join other Communist troops in the area, but their prestige had considerably declined by that point, and their suggestion was rejected. Even Zhou had become impatient, and proposed a new rule which was put into effect immediately: that all military plans had to be submitted to the Politburo for approval.  The movement passed, clearly depriving Braun of the right to direct military affairs. On January 15 the Red Army captured Zunyi, the second largest city in Guizhou. As Mao had predicted, the city was weakly defended, and was too far from Nationalist forces to be under immediate threat of attack.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=59}}  By the time the Red Army occupied Zunyi, it was highly depleted, and counted little more than 10,000 men.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=60-61}} Zhou used the peace afforded in Zunyi to call an enlarged Politburo meeting, in order to examine the causes of the Communists' repeated defeats.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=59}}

===The Zunyi Conference===
{{main|Zunyi Conference}}
The Communists' Zunyi Conference lasted from January 15–17, 1935, and resulted in a reshuffling of the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Party politburo]]. Zhou intended the conference to draw lessons from the Red Army's past failures, and to develop strategies for the future. Much of the discussion revolved around whether the defeats of the Red Army were due to unavoidable circumstances, or inadequacies of leadership.  Bo Gu, the first speaker, attributed the Red Army's losses to "objective" causes, particularly the enemy's overwhelming numerical superiority, and poor coordination of Communist forces.  Braun's interpreter, [[Wu Xiuquan]], later recalled that Bo's arguments did not impress his audience, and that Bo came across as someone attempting to avoid responsibility.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=59}}

Zhou Enlai was the next to speak. Zhou blamed the Red Army's failures on poor decisions at the leadership level, and blamed himself as one of the three people most responsible.  Zhou's willingness to accept responsibility was well received. [[Zhang Wentian]], basing many of his conclusions on recent discussions with Mao, attacked Bo and Braun directly, criticizing them for numerous strategic and tactical errors.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=60}}

After Zhang, Mao gave a speech in which he analyzed the poor tactics and strategies of the two leaders. With Zhou's explicit backing, Mao won over the meeting. Seventeen of the meeting's twenty participants (the exceptions being Bo, Braun, and [[Kai Feng (politician)|He Kequan]]) argued in his favor.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=60}}

Of the three leaders who had controlled the Party before the Zunyi Conference, only Zhou Enlai's political career survived. Zhou was held partially responsible for the Red Army's defeat, but was retained at the top level of Party leadership because of his differences with Bo and Braun at Ningdu, his successful tactics in defeating Chiang's fourth Encirclement Campaign, and his resolute support of Mao.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=60}} Although the failed leadership of Bo Gu and Otto Braun was denounced, Mao was not able to win the support of a sufficient number of Party leaders to gain outright power at the conference.<ref name="Kampen1" />

A major shift in the Party's leadership occurred two months later, in March 1935. Mao was passed over for the position of [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|General Secretary]] by [[Zhang Wentian]], but gained enough influence to be elected one of three members of Military Affairs Commission. The other two members were Zhou Enlai, who retained his position as Director of the commission, and [[Wang Jiaxiang]], whose support Mao had enlisted earlier.<ref name="Kampen1">{{cite book | last = Kampen | first = Thomas | year = 2000 | title = Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership | publisher = Nordic Institute of Asian Studies | pages = 67–68  | isbn = 87-87062-76-3}}</ref>  Within this group, Zhou was empowered to make the final decisions on military matters, while Mao was Zhou's assistant.  Wang was in charge of Party affairs.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=60}}

===Escaping Chiang's pursuit===

When the army resumed its march northward, the direct route to Sichuan was blocked by Chiang's forces. Mao's forces spent the next several months maneuvering to avoid direct confrontation with hostile forces, but still attempting to move north to join [[Zhang Guotao]]'s Fourth Red Army.<ref>Chang and Halliday suggested that Mao delayed the move into Sichuan in order to consolidate his power before joining the other parts of the Red Army, and that rather than facing direct attack from Chiang's forces, Chiang was herding the Reds into Sichuan. (Chang, Halliday, ''Mao, The Unknown Story'', pp. 135–162). The work, however, has been criticized for lacking strong evidence.</ref> While Chiang's armies approached Mao in northern [[Guizhou]] from three directions, Mao maneuvered out of the encirclement by [[Battle of Chishui River|crossing the Chishui River four times]]. Then, Mao led the Red Army, crossing the [[Wu River (Yangtze tributary)|Wu River]] and marching towards [[Guiyang]]. He feigned an attack to this city when Chiang was visiting. Chiang ordered his army in [[Kunming]] to move eastward to save Guiyang, but the Red Army turned towards Kunming immediately and entered Yunnan, where the Yangtze River was lightly guarded.

In February 1935, Mao's wife, [[He Zizhen]], gave birth to a daughter. Because of the harsh conditions, the infant was left with a local family.<ref>{{cite news | title = Mao's lost children |work=The Guardian | date = March 16, 2006 | url = https://www.theguardian.com/china/story/0,,1731887,00.html  | access-date = 2007-03-15 | location=London | first=Sun | last=Shuyun}}</ref>{{efn|Two Europeans retracing the Long March route in 2003 met a woman in rural Yunnan province said by local officials to be Mao and He Zizhen's long-lost daughter.<ref>George Mason University, History News Network: [http://hnn.us/comments/9444.html Woman wonders whether she is Mao's abandoned Long March daughter] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927190120/http://hnn.us/comments/9444.html |date=September 27, 2007 }} (Retrieved 2007-03-15)</ref>}}

[[File:Luding bridge.jpg|thumb|200px|right|The Luding Bridge]]
The Communist forces were harassed by both the Kuomintang and local [[Warlord era|warlords]]. To avoid a fatal confrontation, Zhou and Mao maneuvered the Red army south and west, through Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan, feigning attacks on Guiyang and Kunming to disguise their movements. The First Red Army crossed the Yangtze (the section of [[Yangtze|Jinsha River]]) on May 9, 1935, finally escaping determined pursuit, but still had to deal with dangerous mountain passes at heights of up to 4,000 meters, rough climatic conditions, shortages of food, clothing, and equipment, and tribes of local ethnic groups hostile to Chinese encroachment.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=61}} The Red Army had to capture river crossings defended by warlords and Nationalist troops. The most famous was [[Luding Bridge]], extolled in official history as an heroic triumph, although many historians now believe that the difficulty of the battle was exaggerated or that the incident was fabricated for propaganda purposes.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chang |first=Jung |title=Mao: The Unknown Story |publisher=Alfred A. Knoff |year=2005}}</ref>

===Conflict with ethnic warlords===
Warlords often refused to help out the [[Kuomintang]] against the Communist Red Army, preferring to save their own forces.

300 "Khampa bandits" were enlisted into the Kuomintang's Consolatory Commission military in Sichuan, where they were part of the effort of the central government of China to penetrate and destabilize the local Han warlords such as [[Liu Wenhui]]. The Chinese government sought to exercise full control over frontier areas against the warlords. Liu had refused to do battle with the Red Army, to save his own military from destruction. The Consolatory Commission forces were used to battle the Communist Red Army, but were defeated when their religious leader was captured by Communist forces.<ref>{{cite book|access-date=2011-12-27|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC&q=force+of+about+300+soldiers+was+organized+and+augmented+by+recruiting+local+Khampa+bandits+into+the+army&pg=PA52|title=Modern China's ethnic frontiers: a journey to the west|author1-link=Lin Hsiao-ting|author=Hsiao-ting Lin|year=2010|publisher=Taylor & Francis|edition=illustrated|volume=67 of Routledge studies in the modern history of Asia|page=52|quote=A force of about 300 soldiers was organized and augmented by recruiting local Khampa bandits into the army. The relationship between the Consolatory Commission and Liu Wenhui seriously deteriorated in early 1936, when the Norla Hutuktu|isbn=978-0-415-58264-3}}</ref>

Communist forces on the Long March clashed against Kham rebels in the [[1934 Khamba Rebellion]], who were fleeing from Tibetan government forces.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/TheKarmaofTibet.pdf|title=The Karma of Tibet|last1=Arpi|first1=Claude|pages=95–96|access-date=24 April 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923204622/http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/TheKarmaofTibet.pdf|archive-date=September 23, 2015|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

===The Fourth Red Army===
In June–July 1935, the troops under Mao united with the Fourth Red Army, led by Zhang Guotao, which had retreated west from [[Henan]]. Zhang had taken a different route of evacuation, and arrived at Lianghekou with 84,000 troops in relatively good condition. The fact that he had control of superior forces gave him the power to challenge the authority of Zhou and Mao, whose power was based largely on the Party's support. Zhang demanded that one of his own generals, [[Chen Changhao]], take over Zhou's position as political commissar of the entire Red Army, and suggested that Zhang himself replace Zhu De on the Military Commission.  Zhang argued that such a reorganization would create a more "equal" army organization.  On July 18, Zhou relinquished his position as political commissar, and several leading positions were taken over by generals of the Fourth Red Army.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=61}}

These changes had no long-term significance because Zhang and Mao disagreed with the direction of the army. Zhang insisted on going southwest, while Mao insisted on going northwards, towards Shaanxi. No agreement was reached, and the two armies eventually split, each going their separate ways.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=61}}

Zhang Guotao's Fourth Red Army took a different route than Mao, travelling south, then west, and finally north through China. On the way Zhang's forces were largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim allies, the [[Ma clique]]. The remnants of Zhang's forces later rejoined elements of the Second Red Army before eventually linking up with Mao's forces in Shaanxi.<ref name="Fourth Front Army">New Long March 2: [http://www.newlongmarch2.com/Why_en.asp Fourth Front Army] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928070907/http://www.newlongmarch2.com/Why_en.asp |date=September 28, 2007 }} (Retrieved November 23, 2006)</ref>

===The Second Red Army===
[[File:DSCN1728.JPG|thumb|260px|[[Tiger Leaping Gorge]] in the [[Jade Dragon Snow Mountain]] massif of western [[Yunnan]] province]]
The Second Red Army began its own withdrawal west from Hubei in November 1935, led by [[He Long]], who commanded the KMT Twentieth Army in 1923 before joining the CCP. In 1932 he established a [[Soviet (council)|soviet]] in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area, and in August 1934 received command of the Second Red Army, establishing a base in Hubei. An advance party of the First Red Army, called the Sixth Corps, commanded by Xiao Ke, was sent towards the Second Red Army two months before the beginning of the Long March. Xiao Ke's force would link up with He Long and his army, but lost communication with the First Army that came behind. It was at this point that [[Li Zhen (female general)|Li Zhen]]'s unit was assigned to He Long's command, having already served in the Sixth Corps.<ref name=bio>{{cite book|last1=Wiles|first1=Sue|editor1-last=Lee|editor1-first=Lily Xiao Hong|editor2-last=Stefanowska|editor2-first=A. D.|editor3-last=Ho|editor3-first=Clara Wing-chung|title=Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women: The Qing Period 1644–1911|chapter=Li Zhen|date=2015|publisher=Routledge|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-7656-0798-0}}</ref>

On November 19, 1935, the Second Red Army set out on its own Long March. He Long's force was driven further west than the First Red Army, all the way to [[Lijiang, Yunnan|Lijiang]] in Yunnan province, then across the [[Jade Dragon Snow Mountain]] massif and through the Tibetan highlands of western Sichuan. He Long and Xiao Ke were married to sisters who also accompanied the army. He Long's wife, Jian Xianren, carried the baby daughter she had given birth to three weeks before the retreat began. Jian Xianfo gave birth to a son in the desolate swamps of northern Sichuan.<ref name=cd>''China Daily'' (November 23, 2003): [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/23/content_283948.htm Stepping into history] (Retrieved November 23, 2006)</ref> Forces of the Second Army detained two European missionaries, [[Rudolf Alfred Bosshardt|Rudolf Bosshardt]] and Arnolis Hayman, for 16 months.<ref>The New Long March, Photo Archive (January 5, 2005): [http://www.newlongmarch2.com/DisplayNews_en.asp?TextID=83&page=3 Kidnapped!] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928070929/http://www.newlongmarch2.com/DisplayNews_en.asp?TextID=83&page=3 |date=September 28, 2007 }} Retrieved 2007-03-15</ref> Bosshardt later related his account of the details of daily life on the Long March in a book.<ref>{{cite book | last=Bosshardt, Rudolf A. | title=The Restraining Hand: Captivity for Christ in China | publisher =  Hodder and Stoughton, London | year = 1936}}</ref>

===Union of the three armies===
Mao's First Red Army traversed several swamps and was attacked by Muslim [[Hui people|Hui]] [[Ma clique]] forces under Generals [[Ma Bufang]] and [[Ma Buqing]].<ref name="Fourth Front Army"/> Finally, in October 1935, Mao's army reached Shaanxi province and joined with local Communist forces there, led by [[Liu Zhidan]], [[Gao Gang]], and [[Xu Haidong]], who had already established a Soviet base in northern Shaanxi.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=62}} The remnants of Zhang's Fourth Red Army eventually rejoined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CCP, was never able to challenge Mao's authority.<ref name="Fourth Front Army"/> After an expedition of almost a year, the Second Red Army reached [[Bao'an Subdistrict, Zhidan County|Bao'an (Shaanxi)]] on October 22, 1936, known in China as the "union of the three armies", and the end of the Long March.

All along the way, the Communist Army confiscated property and weapons from local [[warlord]]s and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor. Nevertheless, only some 8,000 troops under Mao's command, the First Front Army, ultimately made it to the final destination of [[Yan'an]] in 1935. Of these, less than 7,000 were among the original 100,000 soldiers who had started the march. A variety of factors contributed to the losses including [[fatigue (physical)|fatigue]], hunger and cold, sickness, desertion, and military casualties.  During the retreat, membership in the party fell from 300,000 to around 40,000.<ref>{{cite book | last = Yang |first = Benjamin | year = 1990 | title = From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March | publisher = Westview Press | page = 233  | isbn = 0-8133-7672-6}}</ref>

In November 1935, shortly after settling in northern Shaanxi, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the Red Army.  Following a major reshuffling of official roles, Mao became the chairman of the Military Commission, with Zhou and [[Deng Xiaoping]] as vice-chairmen. (After Zhang Gutao reached Shaanxi, Deng was replaced by Zhang).  This marked Mao's position as the pre-eminent leader of the Party, with Zhou in a position second to Mao.  Both Mao and Zhou retained their positions until their deaths in 1976.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=62}}

===Aftermath===

[[File:Long-march.jpg|thumb|275px|right|A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors]]

While costly, the Long March gave the CCP the isolation it needed, allowing its army to recuperate and rebuild in the north. It also was vital in helping the CCP to gain a positive reputation among the peasants due to the determination and dedication of the surviving participants of the Long March. Mao wrote in 1935:
<blockquote>The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation.<ref>Mao Zedong, in ''On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'' (December 27, 1935): [http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-08/14/content_554037.htm "The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081212212710/http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-08/14/content_554037.htm |date=December 12, 2008 }} (Retrieved November 25, 2006)</ref></blockquote>

In addition, policies ordered by Mao for all soldiers to follow, the [[Eight Points of Attention]], instructed the army to treat peasants respectfully and pay fairly for, rather than confiscate, any goods, in spite of the desperate need for food and supplies. This policy won support for the Communists among the rural peasants.<ref name=step/>

Hostilities ceased while the Nationalists and Chinese Communists formed a nominal alliance during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] from 1937 until 1945. During these years, the CCP persevered and strengthened its influence. The Red Army fought a disciplined and organized guerilla campaign<ref>*{{cite book| translator-last = Griffith | translator-first = Samuel B.| year = 2005| title = On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung (1937)| publisher = Dover Books on History| page = 94
| isbn = 0-486-44376-0}}</ref> against superior Japanese forces, allowing it to gain experience. Following the end of [[World War II]], the resurgent Communist [[Eighth Route Army]], later called the People's Liberation Army, returned to drive the Kuomintang out of [[Mainland China]] to the island of [[Geography of Taiwan|Taiwan]]. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Long March has been glorified as an example of the CCP's strength and resilience.

The Long March solidified Mao's status as the undisputed leader of the CCP, though he did not officially become party chairman until 1943. Other survivors of the March also went on to become prominent party leaders well into the 1990s, including Zhu De, [[Lin Biao]], [[Liu Shaoqi]], [[Dong Biwu]], [[Ye Jianying]], [[Li Xiannian]], [[Yang Shangkun]], Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.

At the age of 9, [[Xiang Xuan]], the nephew of He Long, was the youngest participant of the Long March.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202302/12/WS63e8cbbba31057c47ebae4a9.html|title=Youngest {{as written|soli|der [sic]}} of the Long March dies at 97|newspaper=China Daily|date=2023-02-12|access-date=2024-01-16}}</ref> [[Wu Zhong (general)|Wu Zhong]], one of the participants in the Long March, became the youngest general in the [[People's Liberation Army]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.163.com/dy/article/IUMC7GR40541A30T.html|title=我军历史上最年轻的将军吴忠：12岁参军，58岁挎步枪作战|newspaper=163.com|date=2016-04-01|access-date=2024-12-20}}</ref>

The last known survivor of the Long March, [[Tu Tongjin]], a native of Changting, Fujian, died at the age of 108 on April 3rd, 2023.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://ishare.ifeng.com/c/s/v002tfLbyXRwl62jA4AoT0HwfqxPgaxmZ9-_w2d--CU8QaWys__|title=The 109-year-old founding major general Tu Tongjin passed away}}</ref>