Editing Impi (section)

===Organisation of the Zulu forces===

'''Organization.''' The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and "armies" or bigger formations, although the Zulu did not use these terms in the modern sense. Size distinctions were taken account of, any grouping of men on a mission could collectively be called an impi, whether a raiding party of 100 or horde of 10,000. Numbers were not uniform, but dependent on a variety of factors including assignments by the king, or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities. A regiment might be 400 or 4000 men. These were grouped into Corps that took their name from the military kraals where they were mustered, or sometimes the dominant regiment of that locality.<ref>Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory, Ian Knight, Osprey: 2002, pp. 5–58</ref> While the modest Zulu population could not turn out the hundreds of thousand available to major world or continental powers like France, Britain, or Russia, the Zulu "nation in arms" approach could mobilize substantial forces in local context for short campaigns, and maneuver them in the Western equivalent of divisional strength. The victory won by Zulu king [[Cetshwayo]] at [[Battle of Ndondakusuka|Ndondakusuka]], for example, two decades before the [[Anglo-Zulu War]] of 1879, involved a battlefield deployment of 30,000 troops.<ref>Donald Morris, 1962. The Washing of the Spears, pp. 195–196</ref>

[[Image:zuluorderofbattlebig.jpg|thumb|300px|The Zulu order of battle at Isandlwana.<ref>Bruce Vandervort 1998. Wars of Imperial Conquest, pp. 20–78</ref>]]

'''Higher command and unit leadership.''' An [[inDuna]] guided each regiment, and he in turn answered to senior izinduna who controlled the corps grouping. Overall guidance of the host was furnished by elder izinduna usually with many years of experience. One or more of these elder chiefs might accompany a big force on an important mission. Coordination of tactical movements was supplied by the indunas who used hand signals and messengers. Generally before deploying for battle, the regiments were made to [[Squatting position|squat]] in a semicircle while these commanders made final assignments and adjustments. Lower level regimental izinduna, like the NCOs of today's armies, and yesterday's Roman centurions, were extremely important to morale and discipline. Prior to the clash at Isandhlwana for example, they imposed order on the frenzied rush of warriors eager to get at the British, and steadied those faltering under withering enemy fire during the battle.<ref>Morris, pp. 361–367. An Undi Corps commander named ''Qetuka'' for example is mentioned in this role.</ref> The widely spaced maneuvers of an impi sometimes could make control problematic once an attack was unleashed. Indeed, the Zulu attacks on the British strongpoints at Rorke's Drift and at Kambula, (both bloody defeats) seemed to have been carried out by over-enthusiastic leaders and warriors despite contrary orders of the Zulu King, Cetshwayo. Such over-confidence or disobedience by thrusting leaders or forces is not unusual in warfare. At the Battle of Trebia for example, the over-confident Roman commander Sempronius was provoked into a hasty attack, that resulted in a defeat for Roman arms.<ref>Lazenby, John (1998). Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War, pp. 55–56.</ref> Likewise, General George Custer disobeyed the orders of his superior, General Terry, and rashly launched a disastrous charge against Indian forces at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, resulting in the total destruction of his command.<ref>Brad Lookingbill. 2015. A Companion to Custer and the Little Bighorn Campaign – p 395</ref> Popular film re-enactments display a grizzled ''izinduna'' directing the Zulu host from a promontory with elegant sweeps of the hand, and the reserves still lay within top commanders' overall control. Coordination after an army was set in motion however relied more on the initial pre-positioning and assignments of the regiments before the advance, and the deep understanding by Zulu officers of the general attack plan. These sub-commanders could thus slow down or speed up their approach runs to maintain the general "buffalo horns" alignment to match terrain and situation.<ref>John Laband. 2014. Zulu Warriors: The Battle for the South African Frontier, 180-236.</ref>