Editing Immanuel Kant (section)

====Interpretive disagreements====
One interpretation, known as the "two-world" interpretation, regards Kant's position as a statement of epistemological limitation, meaning that we are not able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, and therefore cannot access the "[[thing-in-itself]]". On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical to the phenomenal empirical object.<ref>{{cite book |last=Allison |first=Henry E. |title=Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense |year=2004 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0300102666 |pages=25–28}}</ref> Kant also spoke, however, of the thing-in-itself or ''transcendent object'' as a product of the (human) understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, a different interpretation argues that the thing-in-itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §§3.1–3.2}}{{sfn|Stang|2022|loc = §§4–5}} On this alternative view, the same objects to which we attribute empirical properties like color, size, and shape are also, when considered as they are in themselves, the things-in-themselves, otherwise inaccessible to human knowledge.<ref>{{cite book |last=Langton |first=Rae |title=Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves |year=1998 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199243174|pages=105–107}}</ref>