Editing Heuristic (section)

===Others===
* {{Annotated link|Satisficing}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=However, a different meaning of 'heuristic' was invoked in psychology with the Gestalt theorists, and later with Simon's notion of 'satisficing'.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Gigerenzer
	| first1 = Gerd
	| date = 2008
	| title = Why Heuristics Work
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/40212224
	| journal = Perspectives on Psychological Science
	| volume = 3
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 20–29
	| doi = 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00058.x
	| jstor = 40212224
	| pmid = 26158666
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote =Satisficing (Simon, 1955; Todd & Miller, 1999). Search through alternatives, and choose the first one that exceeds your aspiration level.}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url = https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Simon's (1955) satisficing heuristic searches through options in any order, stops as soon the first option exceeds an aspiration level, and chooses this option.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Representativeness heuristic}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=[T]he representativeness heuristic[:]Probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which one thing or event is representative of (resembles) another; the higher the representativeness (resemblance) the higher the probability estimation[.]}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Lu
	| first1 = Yun
	| last2 = Vasko
	| first2 = Francis
	| last3 = Drummond
	| first3 = Trevor
	| last4 = Vasko
	| first4 = Lisa
	| date = 2014
	| title = Probability & Perception: The Representativeness Heuristic in Action
	| url = https://doi.org/10.5951/mathteacher.108.2.0126
	| journal = The Mathematics Teacher
	| volume = 108
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 126–31
	| doi = 10.5951/mathteacher.108.2.0126
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = The belief that a sequence such as 11111111111111111111 is less probable than a sequence such as 66234441536125563152 is often referred to as the ''representativeness heuristic'' (Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Shaughnessy 1977, 1992).}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Tversky |first2=Amos |date=July 1973 |title=On the psychology of prediction. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/h0034747 |journal=Psychological Review |language=en |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=237–251 |doi=10.1037/h0034747 |issn=1939-1471 |access-date=2023-05-09 |archive-date=2023-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141521/https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037/h0034747 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Availability heuristic}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |date=1973-09-01 |title=Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285%2873%2990033-9 |journal=Cognitive Psychology |language=en |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=207–232 |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 |issn=0010-0285 |access-date=2023-08-24 |archive-date=2023-10-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028141521/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0010028573900339?via%3Dihub |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Chow
| first1 = Sheldon
| date = 2015
| title = Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'
| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/24562967
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 66
| issue = 4
| pages = 977–1016
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu028
| jstor = 24562967
| access-date = 5 May 2024
|quote=[T]he availability heuristic[:]The frequency of a class or the probability of an event is assessed according to the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman [1974])}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Awareness}}<ref>{{cite journal
| last1 = Gigerenzer
| first1 = G.
| last2 = Gaissmaier
| first2 = W.
| date = 2011
| title = Heuristic Decision Making
| url= https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2099042_4/component/file_2099041/content
| journal = Annual Review of Psychology
| volume = 62
| issue = 
| pages = 451–482
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
| pmid = 21126183
| access-date = 6 May 2024
| quote = Max Wertheimer, who was a close friend of Einstein, and his fellow Gestalt psychologists spoke of heuristic methods such as ‘looking around’ to guide search for information.| hdl = 11858/00-001M-0000-0024-F16D-5
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Base and superstructure}}<ref name=Loic>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Wacquant
	| first1 = Loic
	| date = 1985
	| title = Heuristic Models in Marxian Theory
	| url = https://doi.org/10.2307/2578970
	| journal = Social Forces
	| volume = 64
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 17–45
	| doi = 10.2307/2578970
	| jstor = 2578970
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = In building social theory, Marx used not one (as generally regarded) but three heuristic models: base-superstructure, organic totality, and dialectical development.}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Social organism}}<ref name=Loic/>
* {{Annotated link|Dialectic}}<ref name=Loic/>
* {{Annotated link|Continuum limit}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Hey
	| first1 = Spencer
	| date = 2016
	| title = Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43946078
	| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
	| volume = 67
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 471–95
	| doi = 10.1093/bjps/axu045
	| jstor = 43946078
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = The continuum limit heuristic is one member of a more general class of heuristics for variable reduction (Wilson [2007], pp. 184-92).}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Johari window}}
* {{Annotated link|Social rationality}}
* {{Annotated link|Desert (philosophy)}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Petersen
	| first1 = Michael
	| date = 2015
	| title = Evolutionary Political Psychology: On the Origin and Structure of Heuristics and Biases in Politics
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/43783844
	| journal = Political Psychology
	| volume = 36
	| issue = 1
	| pages = 45–78
	| doi = 10.1111/pops.12237
	| jstor = 43783844
	| access-date = 5 May 2024
    | quote = One of the political heuristics that has been most studied from an evolutionary perspective is the deservingness heuristic.{{nbsp}}... the deservingness heuristic is the psychological tendency of people to base their opinions about welfare programs on the efforts of the recipients. Specifically, the heuristic motivates people to support welfare benefits to recipients who are represented as victims of bad luck and reject benefits to recipients who are represented as lazy.}}</ref>
* {{annotated link|Less-is-better effect}}
* [[Simple random sample|Minimalist heuristic]]<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Todd
	| first1 = P
	| last2 = Dieckmann
	| first2 = A
	| date = 2004
	| title = Heuristics for Ordering Cue Search in Decision Making
	| url = https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221620559
	| journal = Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
	| volume = 
	| issue = 
	| pages = 13–18
	| doi = 
	| access-date = 6 May 2024
    | quote = The even simpler Minimalist heuristic, which searches through available cues in a random order[.]}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Unification of theories in physics}}<ref>{{cite journal
	| last1 = Kao
	| first1 = Molly
	| date = 2019
	| title = Unification beyond Justification: A Strategy for Theory Development
	| url = http://www.jstor.org/stable/45215151
	| journal = Synthese
	| volume = 196
	| issue = 8
	| pages = 3263–78
	| doi = 10.1007/s11229-017-1515-8
	| jstor = 45215151
	| access-date = 
| quote = The focus on unification as a heuristic strategy parallels certain elements of a related type of reasoning, namely that found in robustness analysis.}}</ref>
* {{Annotated link|Backward induction}}