Editing Hegemony (section)

== International relations ==
In the field of [[international relations]], hegemony generally refers to the ability of an actor to shape the international system. Usually this actor is a state, such as [[British Empire|Britain]] in the 19th century or the United States in the 20th century. A hegemon may shape the international system through coercive and non-coercive means.<ref>Norrloff, Carla (2019). "Hegemony," ''Oxford Bibliographies'', https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0122.xml#</ref> According to Nuno Monteiro, hegemony is distinct from unipolarity.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Monteiro |first=Nuno P. |date=2012 |title=Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful |url=https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064 |journal=International Security |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=9–40 |doi=10.1162/ISEC_a_00064 |issn=0162-2889 |s2cid=57558611}}</ref> The latter refers to a preponderance of power within an anarchic system, whereas the former refers to a hierarchical system where the most powerful state has the ability to "control the external behavior of all other states."<ref name=":5"/>

The [[English school of international relations theory|English school of international relations]] takes a broader view of history. The research of [[Adam Watson]] was world-historical in scope. For him, hegemony was the most common order in history (historical "optimum") because many provinces of "frank" empires were under hegemonic rather than imperial rule. Watson summarized his life-long research: There was a spectrum of political systems ranging between multiple independent states and universal empire. The further a political system evolved towards one of the extremes, the greater was the gravitational pull towards the hegemonic center of the spectrum.<ref>Watson, Adam (1992). ''The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis'', (London: Routledge), pp. 122–125, 131–132, 324.</ref>

Hegemony may take different forms. Benevolent hegemons provide public goods to the countries within their sphere of influence. Coercive hegemons exert their economic or military power to discipline unruly or free-riding countries in their sphere of influence. Exploitative hegemonies extract resources from other countries.<ref>See Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." ''International Organization'' 39 (4): pp. 580–614.</ref><ref>Grunberg, Isabelle (1990). "Exploring the ‘Myth' of Hegemonic Stability." ''International Organization'' 44 (4): 431–477.</ref> 
 
A prominent theory in [[International Relations]] focusing on the role of hegemonies is [[hegemonic stability theory]]. Its premise is that a hegemonic power is necessary to develop and uphold a stable international political and economic order. The theory was developed in the 1970s by [[Robert Gilpin]]<ref name="Gilpin, Robert 1975">Gilpin, Robert (1975). ''U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation''. New York: Basic Books.</ref> and [[Stephen D. Krasner]],<ref>Krasner, Stephen D. (1976). "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." ''World Politics'' 28 (3): 317–347.</ref> among others. It has been criticized on both conceptual and empirical grounds. For example, [[Robert Keohane]] has argued that the theory is not a proper theory because it amounts to a series of allegedly redundant claims that apparently could not be used predictively.<ref name="Keohane, Robert O. 1984">Keohane, Robert O. (1984). ''After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. {{ISBN?}}</ref>

A number of International Relations scholars have examined the decline of hegemons and their orders. For some, such decline tends to be disruptive because the stability that the hegemon provided gives way to a power vacuum.<ref>Kindleberger, Charles P. (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy." ''International Studies Quarterly'' 25: 242–254.</ref><ref>Gilpin, Robert (1981). ''War and Change in World Politics''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).</ref> Others have maintained that cooperation may persist in the face of hegemonic decline because of institutions<ref name="Keohane, Robert O. 1984"/> or enhanced contributions from non-hegemonic powers.<ref>Snidal, Duncan (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." ''International Organization'' 39 (4): 580–614.</ref>

There has been a long debate in the field about whether American hegemony is in decline. As early as in the 1970s, [[Robert Gilpin]] suggested that the global order maintained by the United States would eventually decline as benefits from the public goods provided by Washington would diffuse to other states.<ref name="Gilpin, Robert 1975"/> In the 1980s, some scholars singled out Japan's economic growth and technological sophistication as a threat to U.S. primacy.<ref>Vogel, Ezra (1986). "Pax Nipponica." ''Foreign Affairs'' 64 (4): 752–767.</ref> More recently, analysts have focused on the economic and military rise of China and its challenge to U.S. hegemony.<ref>Schweller, Randall L., and Xiaoyu Pu (2011). "After Unipolarity: China's Vision of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline." ''International Security'' 36 (1): 41–72.</ref>

Scholars differ as to whether [[Polarity (international relations)|bipolarity or unipolarity]] is likely to produce the most stable and peaceful outcomes. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are among those who argue that bipolarity tends to generate relatively more stability,<ref name="Waltz 1979 132_133">{{Cite book |last=Waltz |first=Kenneth Neal |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j6qOAAAAMAAJ |title=Theory of International Politics |date=1979 |publisher=McGraw-Hill |isbn=978-0-07-554852-2 |pages=170–171 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Mearsheimer|first=John|title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics|publisher=W.W. Norton|year=2001|pages=44–45}}</ref> whereas John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth are among those arguing for the stabilizing impact of unipolarity. Some scholars, such as [[Karl Deutsch]] and [[J. David Singer]] argued that multipolarity was the most stable structure.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Deutsch|first1=Karl W.|last2=Singer|first2=J. David|date=1964|title=Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009578|journal=World Politics|volume=16|issue=3|pages=390–406|doi=10.2307/2009578|issn=0043-8871|jstor=2009578|s2cid=53540403 }}</ref>

Scholars disagree about the sources and stability of U.S. unipolarity. Realist international relations scholars argue that unipolarity is rooted in the superiority of U.S. material power since the end of the Cold War.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Wohlforth|first=William C.|date=1999|title=The Stability of a Unipolar World|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539346|journal=International Security|volume=24|issue=1|pages=5–41|doi=10.1162/016228899560031|jstor=2539346|s2cid=57568539|issn=0162-2889}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Norrlof|first=Carla|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lMfuht7crW4C|title=America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation|date=2010|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-48680-4|language=en}}</ref> Liberal international relations scholar [[John Ikenberry]] attributes U.S. hegemony in part to what he says are commitments and self-restraint that the United States established through the creation of international institutions (such as the United Nations, [[International Monetary Fund]], World Bank, and World Trade Organization).<ref name="Ikenberry">{{cite journal|last=Ikenberry|first=G. John|date=Winter 1998–1999|title=Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order|journal=International Security|volume=23|issue=3|pages=43–78|doi=10.1162/isec.23.3.43|jstor=2539338|s2cid=57566810}}</ref> Constructivist scholar [[Martha Finnemore]] argues that legitimation and institutionalization are key components of unipolarity.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Martha Finnemore|date=2009|title=Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be|journal=World Politics|volume=61|issue=1|pages=58–85|doi=10.1353/wp.0.0027|issn=1086-3338|doi-access=free}}</ref>