Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

==={{anchor|Jadid's strongmanship: 1966–1970}}Jadid as strongman: 1966–1970===

===={{anchor|The beginning}}Beginning====
[[File:Syrian women in military uniform during a Ba'athist demonstration.jpg|thumb|Military demonstration of the neo-Ba'athist regime.]]
After the coup, Assad was appointed Minister of Defense.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=104}} This was his first cabinet post, and through his position, he would be thrust into the forefront of the Syrian–Israeli conflict.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=104}} His government was radically socialist, and sought to remake society from top to bottom.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=104}} Although Assad was a radical, he opposed the headlong rush for change.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=104}} Despite his title, he had little power in the government and took more orders than he issued.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=104}} Jadid was the undisputed leader at the time, opting to remain in the office of Assistant Regional Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command instead of taking executive office (which had historically been held by Sunnis).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=105}} [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] was given three of the four top executive positions in the country: President, Secretary-General of the National Command and Regional Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=105}} The post of prime minister was given to [[Yusuf Zu'ayyin]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=105}} Jadid (who was establishing his authority) focused on civilian issues and gave Assad ''de facto'' control of the Syrian military, considering him no threat.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=105}}

During the failed coup d'état of late 1966, [[Salim Hatum]] tried to overthrow Jadid's government.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=110}} Hatum (who felt snubbed when he was not appointed to the Regional Command after the February 1966 coup d'état) sought revenge and the return to power of [[Hammud al-Shufi]], the first Regional Secretary of the Regional Command after the Syrian Regional Branch's re-establishment in 1963.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=110}} When Jadid, Atassi and Regional Command member Jamil Shayya visited Suwayda, forces loyal to Hatum surrounded the city and captured them.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=112}} In a twist of fate, the city's [[Druze]] elders forbade the murder of their guests and demanded that Hatum wait.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=112}} Jadid and the others were placed under house arrest, with Hatum planning to kill them at his first opportunity.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=112}} When word of the mutiny spread to the Ministry of Defense, Assad ordered the 70th Armored Brigade to the city.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=112}} By this time Hatum, a Druze, knew that Assad would order the bombardment of Suwayda (a Druze-dominated city) if Hatum did not accede to his demands.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=112}} Hatum and his supporters fled to Jordan, where they were given asylum.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}} How Assad learned about the conspiracy is unknown, but Mustafa al-Hajj Ali (head of [[Military Intelligence Directorate (Syria)|military intelligence]]) may have telephoned the Ministry of Defense.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}} Due to his prompt action, Assad earned Jadid's gratitude.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}}

In the aftermath of the attempted coup Assad and Jadid purged the party's military organization, removing 89 officers; Assad removed an estimated 400 officers, Syria's largest military purge to date.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}} The purges, which began when the Ba'ath Party took power in 1963, had left the military weak.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}} As a result, when the [[Six-Day War]] broke out, Syria had no chance of victory.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=113}}

====Seizing power====
The Arab defeat in the [[Six-Day War]], in which Israel captured the [[Golan Heights]] from Syria, provoked a furious quarrel among Syria's leadership.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}} The civilian leadership blamed military incompetence, and the military responded by criticizing the civilian leadership (led by Jadid).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}} Several high-ranking party members demanded Assad's resignation, and an attempt was made to vote him out of the [[Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|Regional Command]], the party's highest decision-making body.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}} The motion was defeated by one vote, with [[Abd al-Karim al-Jundi]] (who the anti-Assad members hoped would succeed Assad as defense minister) voting, as Patrick Seale put it, "in a comradely gesture" to retain him.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}} During the end of the war, the party leadership freed Aflaqites Umran, [[Amin al-Hafiz]] and [[Mansur al-Atrash]] from prison.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}} Shortly after his release, Assad was approached by dissident Syrian military officers to oust the government; he refused, believing that a coup at that time would have helped Israel, but not Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=142}}
[[File:Women serving in Syrian Arab army, 1969.jpg|thumb|255x255px|Women serving in the army, 1969.]]
The war was a turning point for Assad (and Ba'athist Syria in general),{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=143}} and his attempted ouster began a power struggle with Jadid for control of the country.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=143}} Until then Assad had not shown ambition for high office, arousing little suspicion in others.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=143}} From the [[1963 Syrian coup d'état]] to the Six-Day War in 1967, Assad did not play a leading role in politics and was usually overshadowed by his contemporaries.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} As [[Patrick Seale]] wrote, he was "apparently content to be a solid member of the team without the aspiration to become number one".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Although Jadid was slow to see Assad's threat, shortly after the war Assad began developing a network in the military and promoted friends and close relatives to high positions.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}}

=====Differences with Jadid=====
Assad believed that Syria's defeat in the Six-Day War was Jadid's fault, and the accusations against himself were unjust.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} By this time Jadid had total control of the Regional Command, whose members supported his policies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Assad and Jadid began to differ on policy;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Assad believed that Jadid's policy of a [[people's war]] (an armed-guerrilla strategy) and [[class struggle]] had failed Syria, undermining its position.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Although Jadid continued to champion the concept of a people's war even after the Six-Day War, Assad opposed it. He felt that the Palestinian guerrilla fighters had been given too much autonomy and had raided Israel constantly, which in turn sparked the war.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Jadid had broken diplomatic relations with countries he deemed [[reactionary]], such as [[Saudi Arabia]] and [[Jordan]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}} Because of this, Syria did not receive aid from other Arab countries. Egypt and Jordan, which participated in the war, received [[Pound sterling|£]]135&nbsp;million per year for an undisclosed period.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=144}}

While Jadid and his supporters prioritised socialism and the "internal revolution", Assad wanted the leadership to focus on foreign policy and the containment of Israel.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=145}} The Ba'ath Party was divided over several issues, such as how the government could best use Syria's limited resources, the ideal relationship between the party and the people, the organization of the party and whether the class struggle should end.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=145}} These subjects were discussed heatedly in Ba'ath Party conclaves, and when they reached the Fourth Regional Congress the two sides were irreconcilable.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=145}}

Assad wanted to "democratize" the party by making it easier for people to join.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=146}} Jadid was wary of too large a membership, believing that the majority of those who joined were opportunists.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=145}} Assad, in an interview with Patrick Seale in the 1980s, stated that such a policy would make Party members believe they were a privileged class.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=146}} Another problem, Assad believed, was the lack of local government institutions.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=146}} Under Jadid, there was no governmental level below the [[Government of Syria|Council of Ministers]] (the Syrian government).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=146}} When the [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region|Iraqi Regional Branch]] (which continued to support the Aflaqite leadership) took control of Iraq in the [[17 July Revolution]], Assad was one of the few high-level politicians wishing to reconcile with them;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=146}} he called for the establishment of an "Eastern Front" with Iraq against Israel in 1968.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=147}} Jadid's foreign policy towards the [[Soviet Union]] was also criticised by Assad, who believed it had failed.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=147}} In many ways the relationship between the countries was poor, with the Soviets refusing to acknowledge Jadid's [[scientific socialism]] and Soviet newspapers calling him a "hothead".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}} Assad, on the contrary, called for greater [[pragmatism]] in decision-making.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}}

====="Duality of power"=====
{{Quote box|width=25em|align=left|quote=At a meeting someone raised the case of X. Should he not be brought back? Assad gave the questioner a hard look but said nothing. A little later the subject came up again and this time Assad said: I've heard something disagreeable about this officer. When he was on a course in England in 1954, his brother wrote asking for help for their sick mother. X took a £5 note out of his pocket, held it up and said he wouldn't part with it to save her life. Anyone who can't be loyal to his mother is not going to be loyal to the air force.|source=—General Fu'ad Kallas on the importance in which Assad laid on personal loyalty{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}}}}

The conflict between Assad and Jadid became the talk of the army and the party, with a "duality of power" noted between them.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}} Shortly after the failed attempt to expel Assad from the Regional Command, he began to consolidate his position in the military establishment{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}}—for example, by replacing Chief of Staff [[Ahmad al-Suwaydani]] with his friend [[Mustafa Tlass]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}} Although Suwaydani's relationship with Jadid had deteriorated, he was removed because of his complaints about "Alawi influence in the army".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=148}} Tlass was later appointed Assad's Deputy Minister of Defense (his second-in-command).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}} Others removed from their positions were Ahmad al-Mir (a founder and former member of the [[Military Committee (Syria)|Military Committee]], and former commander of the Golan Front) and Izzat Jadid (a close supporter of Jadid and commander of the 70th Armoured Brigade).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}}

[[File:Nasser, Atassi and Assad.jpg|thumb|right|alt=Two men shaking hands, with mustachioed man in background|Assad (center) and [[Nureddin al-Atassi]] (left) meeting with [[Egyptian President]] [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]], 1969]]By the Fourth Regional Congress and Tenth National Congress in September and October 1968, Assad had extended his grip on the army, and Jadid still controlled the party.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}} At both congresses, Assad was outvoted on most issues, and his arguments were firmly rejected.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}} While he failed in most of his attempts, he had enough support to remove two socialist theoreticians ([[Prime Minister of Syria|Prime Minister]] [[Yusuf Zu'ayyin]] and [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Syria)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]] [[Brahim Makhous]]) from the Regional Command.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=149}} However, the military's involvement in party politics was unpopular with the [[wikt:rank and file|rank and file]]; as the gulf between Assad and Jadid widened, the civilian and military party bodies were forbidden to contact each other.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=150}} Despite this, Assad was winning the race to accumulate power.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=150}} As [[Munif ar-Razzaz]] (ousted in the [[1966 Syrian coup d'état]]) noted, "Jadid's fatal mistake was to attempt to govern the army through the party".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=150}}

While Assad had taken control of the armed forces through his position as Minister of Defense, Jadid still controlled the security and intelligence sectors through [[Abd al-Karim al-Jundi]] (head of the [[National Security Bureau of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region|National Security Bureau]]).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=150}} Jundi—a paranoid, cruel man—was feared throughout Syria.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=150}} In February 1969, the Assad-Jadid conflict erupted in violent clashes through their respective proteges: [[Rifaat al-Assad]] (Hafez's brother and a high-ranking military commander) and Jundi.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} The reason for the violence was Rifaat al-Assad's suspicion that Jundi was planning an attempt on Assad's life.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} The suspected assassin was interrogated and confessed under torture.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} Acting on this information, Rifaat al-Assad argued that unless Jundi was removed from his post he and his brother were in danger.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}}
[[File:General of the Syrian army, Hafez al-Assad, 1969.jpg|thumb|244x244px|Assad in 1969]]
From 25 to 28 February 1969, the Assad brothers initiated "something just short of a coup".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} Under Assad's authority, tanks were moved into Damascus and the staffs of ''[[al-Ba'ath]]'' and ''[[al-Thawra (newspaper)|al-Thawra]]'' (two-party newspapers) and radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo were replaced with Assad loyalists.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} Latakia and Tartus, two Alawite-dominated cities, saw "fierce scuffles" ending with the overthrow of Jadid's supporters from local posts.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} Shortly afterwards, a wave of arrests of Jundi loyalists began.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} On 2 March, after a telephone argument with head of military intelligence [[Ali Duba]], Jundi committed suicide.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} When Zu'ayyin heard the news he wept, saying "we are all orphaned now" (referring to his and Jadid's loss of their protector).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=152}} Despite his rivalry with Jundi, Assad is said to have also wept when he heard the news.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}}

Assad was now in control, but he hesitated to push his advantage.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=151}} Jadid continued to rule Syria, and the Regional Command was unchanged.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=152}} However, Assad influenced Jadid to moderate his policies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=152}} Class struggle was muted, criticism of reactionary tendencies of other Arab states ceased, some political prisoners were freed, a coalition government was formed (with the Ba'ath Party in control) and the Eastern Front espoused by Assad was formed with Iraq and Jordan.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=153}} Jadid's isolationist policies were curtailed, and Syria re-established diplomatic relations with many of its foes.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=153}} Around this time, [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]]'s Egypt, [[Houari Boumediene]]'s Algeria and Ba'athist Iraq began sending emissaries to reconcile Assad and Jadid.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=153}}[[File: General Hafez al-Assad (1930-2000), the new president of Syria in November 1970.png|thumbnail|alt=Mustachioed man in military uniform|Assad in November 1970, shortly after seizing power|left|272x272px]]

===== 1970 Coup d’etat=====
{{See also|Corrective Movement (Syria)|al-Assad government}}

Assad began planning to seize power shortly after the failed [[Syrian invasion of Jordan|Syrian military intervention]] in the [[Black September]], a power struggle between the PLO and the [[List of kings of Jordan|Hashemite monarchy]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} While Assad had been in ''de facto'' command of Syrian politics since 1969, Jadid and his supporters still held the trappings of power.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} After attending Nasser's funeral, Assad returned to Syria for the Emergency National Congress (held on 30 October).{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} At the congress Assad was condemned by Jadid and his supporters, the majority of the party's delegates.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} However, before attending the congress Assad ordered his loyal troops to surround the building housing the meeting.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} Criticism of Assad's political position continued in a defeatist tone, with the majority of delegates believing that Assad had lost the battle.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}} Assad and Tlass were stripped of their government posts at the congress; these acts had little practical significance.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=162}}

When the National Congress ended on 12 November 1970, Assad ordered loyalists to arrest leading members of Jadid's government.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=164}} Although many mid-level officials were offered posts in Syrian embassies abroad, Jadid refused: "If I ever take power, you will be dragged through the streets until you die."{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=164}} Assad imprisoned him in [[Mezze prison]] until his death.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=164}} The coup was calm and bloodless; the only evidence of change to the outside world was the disappearance of newspapers, radio and television stations.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=164}} A Temporary Regional Command was soon established, and on 16 November the new government published its first decree.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=164}}