Editing George B. McClellan (section)

===General-in-chief===
[[File:Centreville, VA, Quaker Guns in the fort on the heights.jpg|thumb|"[[Quaker gun]]s" (logs used as ruses to imitate cannons) in former Confederate fortifications at [[Manassas, Virginia|Manassas Junction]]]]
On November 1, 1861, Winfield Scott retired and McClellan became general-in-chief of all the Union armies. The president expressed his concern about the "vast labor" involved in the dual role of army commander and general-in-chief, but McClellan responded, "I can do it all."<ref name="McPherson360" />

Lincoln, as well as many other leaders and citizens of the northern states, became increasingly impatient with McClellan's slowness to attack the Confederate forces still massed near Washington. The Union defeat at the minor [[Battle of Ball's Bluff]] near [[Leesburg, Virginia|Leesburg]] in October added to the frustration and indirectly damaged McClellan. In December, the Congress formed a [[United States Congress Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War|Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War]], which became a thorn in the side of many generals throughout the war, accusing them of incompetence and, in some cases, treason. McClellan was called as the first witness on December 23, but he contracted [[typhoid fever]] and could not attend. Instead, his subordinate officers testified, and their candid admissions that they had no knowledge of specific strategies for advancing against the Confederates raised many calls for McClellan's dismissal.<ref name="Dp7Qn" />

McClellan further damaged his reputation by his insulting insubordination to his commander-in-chief. He privately referred to Lincoln, whom he had known before the war as a lawyer for the Illinois Central, as "nothing more than a well-meaning baboon", a "gorilla", and "ever unworthy of ... his high position".<ref name="12LyN" /> On November 13, he snubbed the president, who had come to visit McClellan's house, by making him wait for 30 minutes, only to be told that the general had gone to bed and could not receive him.<ref name="IgHkI" />

On January 10, 1862, Lincoln met with top generals (McClellan did not attend) and directed them to formulate a plan of attack, expressing his exasperation with General McClellan with the following remark: "If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time."<ref name="RxnAE" /> On January 12, 1862, McClellan was summoned to the White House, where the Cabinet demanded to hear his war plans. For the first time, he revealed his intentions to transport the Army of the Potomac by ship to [[Urbanna, Virginia|Urbanna]], Virginia, on the [[Rappahannock River]], outflanking the Confederate forces near Washington, and proceeding {{convert|50|mi|km}} overland to capture Richmond. He refused to give any specific details of the proposed campaign, even to his friend, newly appointed War Secretary [[Edwin M. Stanton]]. On January 27, Lincoln issued an order that required all of his armies to begin offensive operations by February 22, [[Presidents' Day (United States)|Washington's birthday]]. On January 31, he issued a supplementary order for the Army of the Potomac to move overland to attack the Confederates at [[Manassas, Virginia|Manassas Junction]] and [[Centreville, Virginia|Centreville]]. McClellan immediately replied with a 22-page letter objecting in detail to the president's plan and advocating instead his Urbanna plan, which was the first written instance of the plan's details being presented to the president. Although Lincoln believed his plan was superior, he was relieved that McClellan finally agreed to begin moving, and reluctantly approved. On March 8, doubting McClellan's resolve, Lincoln again interfered with the army commander's prerogatives. He called a [[council of war]] at the White House in which McClellan's subordinates were asked about their confidence in the Urbanna plan. They expressed their confidence to varying degrees. After the meeting, Lincoln issued another order, naming specific officers as corps commanders to report to McClellan (who had been reluctant to do so prior to assessing his division commanders' effectiveness in combat, even though this would have meant his direct supervision of twelve divisions in the field).<ref name="yY1AL" />

Two more crises would confront McClellan before he could implement his plans. The Confederate forces under General [[Joseph E. Johnston]] withdrew from their positions before Washington, assuming new positions south of the Rappahannock, which completely nullified the Urbanna strategy. McClellan revised his plans to have his troops disembark at [[Fort Monroe, Virginia|Fort Monroe]], [[Virginia]], and advance up the [[Virginia Peninsula]] to Richmond, an operation that would be known as the [[Peninsula Campaign]]. Then, however, McClellan came under extreme criticism in the press and Congress when it was learned that Johnston's forces had not only slipped away unnoticed, but had for months fooled the Union Army with logs painted black to appear as cannons, nicknamed [[Quaker Gun]]s. Congress's joint committee visited the abandoned Confederate lines and radical Republicans introduced a resolution demanding the dismissal of McClellan, but it was narrowly defeated by a parliamentary maneuver.<ref name="kCOI0" /> The second crisis was the emergence of the Confederate [[ironclad]] [[CSS Virginia|CSS ''Virginia'']], which threw Washington into a panic and made naval support operations on the [[James River (Virginia)|James River]] seem problematic.

On March 11, 1862, Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief, leaving him in command of only the Army of the Potomac, ostensibly so that McClellan would be free to devote all his attention to the move on Richmond. Lincoln's order was ambiguous as to whether McClellan might be restored following a successful campaign. In fact, the general-in-chief position was left unfilled. Lincoln, Stanton, and a group of officers who formed the "War Board" directed the strategic actions of the Union armies that spring. Although McClellan was assuaged by supportive comments Lincoln made to him, in time he saw the change of command very differently, describing it as a part of an intrigue "to secure the failure of the approaching campaign".<ref name="JKwUv" />