Editing Free-rider problem (section)

== Altruistic solutions ==

=== Social norms ===
Psychologically, people are only fundamentally considered free-riders by others when they take benefits and withhold contributions. Although free-riders are recognised in all cultures, the degree of tolerance they experience and methods of dealing with them vary due to cultural differences.<ref>Delton, A., Cosmides, L., Guemo, M., Robertson, T., & Tooby, J. (2012) The Psychosemantics of Free Riding: Dissecting the Architecture of a Moral Concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102 (6), 1252-1270</ref> The impact of [[social norm]]s on free-riding differs between cultural contexts, which may lead to a variance between results in research on free-riding when applied cross-culturally. However, the impact of social norms on privately- and voluntarily-provided public goods is considered to have some level of effect on free-riding in many contexts. For example, social sanctioning is a norm in and of itself that has a high degree of universality.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vyrastekova |first1=Jana |last2=Funaki |first2=Yukihiko |last3=Takeuchi |first3=Ai |title=Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in public goods game experiment |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |volume=40 |issue=6 |pages=919–928 |date=2011 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2011.08.020|hdl=2066/95402 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The goal of much research on the topic of social sanctioning and its effect on free-riding is to explain the altruistic motivation that is observed in various societies.

Free-riding is often thought of only in terms of positive and negative externalities felt by the public. The impact of social norms on actions and motivations related to [[altruism]] are often underestimated in economic solutions and the models from which they are derived.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hustinx |first1=Lesley |last2=Cnaan |first2=R. A. |last3=Handy |first3=F. |title=Navigating theories of volunteering: A hybrid map for a complex phenomenon |journal=Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour |date=2010 |volume=40 |issue=4 |pages=410–434 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00439.x|url=https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/1100542 |hdl=1854/LU-1100542 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

=== Altruistic social sanctions ===
While non-altruistic social sanctions occur when people establish common property regimes, people sometimes punish free-riders even without being rewarded. The exact nature of motivation remains to be explored.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fehr |first1=Ernst |last2=Gächter |first2=Simon |year=2002 |title=Altruistic punishment in humans |journal=Nature |volume=415 |issue=6868 |pages=137–40 |doi=10.1038/415137a|pmid=11805825 |bibcode=2002Natur.415..137F |s2cid=4310962 }}</ref> Whether costly punishment can explain cooperation is disputed.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dreber |first1=Anna |display-authors=etal |year=2008 |title=Winners don't punish |journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]] |volume=452 |issue=7185 |pages=348–51 |doi=10.1038/nature06723 |pmid=18354481 |pmc=2292414|bibcode=2008Natur.452..348D }}</ref> Recent research finds that costly punishment is less effective in real-world environments.{{Citation needed|date=April 2025}}

Other research finds that social sanctions cannot be generalized as strategic in the context of public goods. Preferences between secret sanctions{{efn|Untraceable sanctions between players in the game}} and standard sanctions{{efn|Traceable sanctions, including feedback between players in an otherwise identical environment}} on free riders did not vary significantly. Rather, some individuals preferred to sanction others regardless of secrecy.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vyrastekova |first1=Jana |last2=Funaki |first2=Yukihiko |last3=Takeuchi |first3=Ai |title=Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment |journal=The Journal of Socio-Economics |volume=40 |issue=6 |pages=919–928 |date=2011 |doi=10.1016/j.socec.2011.08.020|hdl=2066/95402 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Other research built on the findings of [[behavioral economics]] finds that, in a dilemmatic donation game, donors are motivated by the fear of loss. In the game, donors' deposits were only refunded if the donors always punish free-riding and non-commitment among other individuals. Pool-punishment, in which everyone loses their deposit if one donor does not punish the free rider, provided more stable results than punishment without consideration of the consensus of the group. Individual-to-individual peer punishment led to less-consistently-applied social sanctions.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sasaki |first1=Tatsuya |last2=Okada |first2=Isamu |last3=Uchida |first3=Satoshi |last4=Chen |first4=Xiaojie |title=Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution |journal=Games |date=2015 |volume=6 |issue=4 |pages=574–587 |doi=10.3390/g6040574|doi-access=free |hdl=10419/167960 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Although this research is experimental in nature, it may collectively prove useful when applied in public policy decisions seeking to improve free-rider problems within society.