Editing First Battle of the Marne (section)

==Aftermath==
The German retreat from 9–13 September marked the end of the [[Schlieffen Plan]]. Moltke is said to have reported to the [[Wilhelm II of Germany|Kaiser]]: "Your Majesty, we have lost the war."({{lang|de|Majestät, wir haben den Krieg verloren}}).{{sfn|Schüddekopf|1977|p=18}}

{{blockquote|Whether General von Moltke actually said to the Emperor, "Majesty, we have lost the war," we do not know. We know anyhow that with a prescience greater in political than in military affairs, he wrote to his wife on the night of the 9th, "Things have not gone well. The fighting east of Paris has not gone in our favour, and we shall have to pay for the damage we have done".{{sfn|Churchill|2005|p=168}}}}

On 14 September, German military authorities informed [[Kaiser Wilhelm II]] that "Moltke's nerves are at an end and [he] is no longer able to conduct operations." The Kaiser forced Moltke to resign due to "ill health." War Minister [[Erich von Falkenhayn]] was appointed to replace Moltke.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pages=301–302}}

After the Battle of the Marne, the Germans retreated for up to {{convert|90|km|mi}} and lost 11,717 prisoners, 30 field guns and 100 machine-guns to the French and 3,500 prisoners to the British before reaching the Aisne.{{sfn|Tyng|2007|p= 336}} The German retreat ended their hope of pushing the French beyond the Verdun–Marne–Paris line and winning a quick victory. Following the battle and the failures by both sides to turn the opponent's northern flank during the [[Race to the Sea]], the war of movement ended with the Germans and the allied powers facing each other across a stationary front line of trenches and defences that remained nearly stable for four years.

===Analysis===
At the start of the war, both sides had plans that they hoped would result in victory after a short war.{{sfn|Sumner|2010|p=5}} While the German invasion failed to defeat the French and British, after the battle the German army still occupied a large portion of northern France as well as most of Belgium. "France had lost 64 per cent of its iron, 62 per cent of its steel, and 50 per cent of its coal.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|page=315}} The failure of the French [[Plan 17]] caused that situation.{{sfn |Tuchman|1962|p=522}}

Joffre, whose planning had led to the disastrous [[Battle of the Frontiers]], was able to bring the allies to a tactical victory. He used interior lines to move troops from his right wing to the critical left wing and sacked generals. Due to the redistribution of French troops, the German 1st Army had 128 battalions facing 191 battalions of the French and BEF. The 2nd and 3rd German armies had 134 battalions facing 268 battalions of the French Fifth and new Ninth Army.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|p=231}} It was his orders that prevented [[Noël Édouard, vicomte de Curières de Castelnau|Castelnau]] from abandoning [[Nancy, France|Nancy]] on 6 September or reinforcing that army when the pivotal battle was unfolding on the other side of the battlefield.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|p=211}} He resisted counter-attacking until the time was right then put his full force behind it. D'Esperey should also receive credit as the author of the main stroke. As Joffre says in his memoirs: "it was he who made the Battle of the Marne possible".<ref>Joffre, 381</ref>

Historians characterise the Battle of the Marne as a partial success.{{sfn|Gardner|2003|p=73}} However, [[John Terraine]] wrote that "nowhere, and at no time, did it present the traditional aspect of victory", but nonetheless stated that the French and British stroke into the breach between the 1st and 2nd German Armies "made the battle of the Marne the decisive battle of the war".{{sfn|Terraine|1991|p=215}} [[Barbara W. Tuchman]] and [[Robert A. Doughty]] wrote that Joffre's victory at the Marne was far from decisive, Tuchman calling it an "…incomplete victory of the Marne…" and Doughty [the] "…opportunity for a decisive victory had slipped from his hands".{{sfn|Tuchman|1962|p=521}}{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=96}} Ian Sumner called it a flawed victory and that it proved impossible to deal the German armies  "a decisive blow".{{sfn|Sumner|2010|p=86}} Tuchman wrote that Kluck explained the German failure at the Marne as

{{blockquote|…the reason that transcends all others was the extraordinary and peculiar aptitude of the French soldier to recover quickly. […] That men will let themselves be killed where they stand, that is well-known and counted on in every plan of battle. But that men who have retreated for ten days, sleeping on the ground and half dead with fatigue, should be able to take up their rifles and attack when the bugle sounds, is a thing upon which we never counted. It was a possibility not studied in our war academy.{{sfn|Tuchman|1962|p=519}}}}

Richard Brooks in 2000 wrote that the significance of the battle centres on the fact that the failure of the Schlieffen Plan forced Germany to fight a two-front war against France and Russia—the scenario its strategists had long feared. Brooks claimed that, "By frustrating the Schlieffen Plan, Joffre had won the decisive battle of the war, and perhaps of the century".{{sfn|Brooks|2000|p=156}} The Battle of the Marne was also one of the first battles in which reconnaissance aircraft played a decisive role, by discovering weak points in the German lines, which the Entente armies were able to exploit.{{sfn|Mead|1983|pp=56–58}}

===Casualties===
It is difficult to separate the casualties in the Battle of the Marne from the casualties in the other related battles of August and September 1914. Over two million men fought in the campaign leading to the First Battle of the Marne and although there are no exact official casualty counts for the battle, estimates for the actions of September along the Marne front for all armies are often given as {{circa}} 500,000 killed or wounded. French casualties totalled {{circa}} {{nowrap|250,000 men,}} of whom an estimated 80,000 were killed. Tuchman gave French casualties for August as 206,515 from {{lang|fr|Armées Françaises}} and Herwig gave French casualties for September as 213,445, also from {{lang|fr|Armées Françaises}} for a total of just under 420,000 in the first two months of the war.{{sfn|Tuchman|1962|p=522}} According to [[Roger Chickering]], German casualties for the 1914 campaigns on the Western Front were 500,000.{{sfn|Chickering|2004|p= 31}} British casualties were {{nowrap|13,000 men,}} with {{nowrap|1,700 killed.}} No future battle on the Western Front would average so many casualties per day.<ref>''The First World War: Part 2: Under the Eagle'' (1914) TV mini-series 2003.</ref>

In 2009, Herwig re-estimated the casualties for the battle. He wrote that the French official history, {{lang|fr|Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre}}, gave 213,445 French casualties in September and assumed that {{circa}} 40% occurred during the Battle of the Marne. Using the German {{lang|de|Sanitätsberichte}}, Herwig recorded that from {{nowrap|1–10 September,}} the 1st Army had 13,254 casualties, the 2nd Army had 10,607 casualties, the 3rd Army had 14,987 casualties, the 4th Army had 9,433 casualties, the 5th Army had 19,434 casualties, the 6th Army had 21,200 casualties and the 7th Army had 10,164 casualties. Herwig estimated that the five German Armies from Verdun to Paris had 67,700 casualties during the battle and also assumed 85,000 casualties for the French. Herwig wrote that there were 1,701 British casualties (the British Official History noted that these losses were incurred from {{nowrap|6–10 September)}}.{{sfn|Edmonds|1926|p=313}} Herwig estimated 300,000 casualties for all sides at the Marne but questioned whether isolating the battle was justified.{{sfn|Herwig|2009|pp=xii, xv, 315–316}} [[Sergey Nelipovich]], using the same type of sources for the Germans, estimated they casualties as 10,602 killed, 16,815 missing and 47,432 wounded. He also estimated the losses of the Entente forces at about 268,500 people, including 45,000 killed, 173,000 wounded and 50,500 prisoners.{{sfn|Nelipovich|2023|p=106}} In 2010, Ian Sumner wrote that there were 12,733 British casualties, including 1,700 dead.{{sfn|Sumner|2010|p=89}} Sumner cites the same overall casualty figure for the French for September as Herwig from {{lang|fr|Armées Françaises}}, which includes the losses at the battle of the Aisne, as 213,445 but provides a further breakdown: 18,073 killed, 111,963 wounded and 83,409 missing. Most of the missing had been killed.{{sfn|Sumner|2010|p=88}}

Some notable people died in the battle, such as [[Charles Péguy]], who was killed while leading his platoon during an attack at the beginning of the battle.{{sfn|Tuchman|1962|p=522}}

===Subsequent operations===
====First Battle of the Aisne, 13–28 September====
{{Main|First Battle of the Aisne}}
[[File:Opposing positions 5 September (dashed line) 13 September (black line).jpg|thumb|{{center|Opposing positions: 5 September (dashed line) 13 September (solid line)}}]]
On 10 September, Joffre ordered the French armies and the BEF to advance and for four days, the Armies on the left flank moved forward and gathered up German stragglers, wounded and equipment, opposed only by rearguards. On {{nowrap|11 and 12 September,}} Joffre ordered outflanking manoeuvres by the armies on the left flank but the advance was too slow to catch the Germans, who ended their withdrawal on 14 September, on high ground on the north bank of the Aisne and began to dig in. Frontal attacks by the Ninth, Fifth, and Sixth Armies were repulsed from {{nowrap|15–16 September.}} This led Joffre to transfer the Second Army west to the left flank of the Sixth Army, the first phase of Entente attempts to outflank the German armies in "The Race to the Sea".{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=95–98}}

French troops had begun to move westwards on 2 September, using the undamaged railways behind the French front, which were able to move a corps to the left flank in {{nowrap|5–6 days.}} On 17 September, the French Sixth Army attacked from Soissons to Noyon, at the westernmost point of the French flank, with the XIII and IV corps, which were supported by the 61st and 62nd divisions of the 6th Group of Reserve Divisions. After this, the fighting moved north to [[Lassigny]] and the French dug in around [[Nampcel]].{{sfn|Edmonds|1926|p=388}}

The French Second Army completed a move from Lorraine and took over command of the left-hand corps of the Sixth Army, as indications appeared that German troops were also being moved from the eastern flank.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=97–99}} The German IX Reserve Corps arrived from Belgium by 15 September and the next day joined the 1st Army for an attack to the south-west, with the IV Corps and the 4th and 7th cavalry divisions, against the attempted French envelopment. The attack was cancelled and the IX Reserve Corps was ordered to withdraw behind the right flank of the 1st Army. The 2nd and 9th Cavalry divisions were dispatched as reinforcements the next day but before the retirement began, the French attack reached Carlepont and Noyon, before being contained on 18 September. The German armies attacked from Verdun westwards to Reims and the Aisne at the [[Battle of Flirey]] {{nowrap|(19 September}} – {{nowrap |11 October),}} cut the main railway from Verdun to Paris and created the St. Mihiel salient, south of the Verdun fortress zone. The main German effort remained on the western flank, which was revealed to the French by intercepted wireless messages.{{sfn |Edmonds|1926|pp= 400–401}} By 28 September, the Aisne front had stabilised and the BEF began to withdraw on the night of {{nowrap|1/2 October,}} with the first troops arriving in the [[Abbeville]] on the Somme on the night of {{nowrap|8/9 October.}} The BEF prepared to commence operations in [[French Flanders]] and Flanders in Belgium, joining with the British forces that had been in Belgium since August.{{sfn|Edmonds|1926|pp=407–408}}

====Race to the Sea====
{{Main|Race to the Sea}}
[[File:German and Allied operations, Artois and Flanders, September- November 1914.png|thumb|{{center|German and Allied operations, Artois and Flanders, September–November 1914}}]]
From {{nowrap |17 September}} – {{nowrap |17 October}} the belligerents made reciprocal attempts to turn the northern flank of their opponent. Joffre ordered the French Second Army to move to the north of the French Sixth Army, by moving from eastern France from {{nowrap|2–9 September}} and [[Erich von Falkenhayn|Falkenhayn]] who had replaced Moltke on 14 September, ordered the German 6th Army to move from the German-French border to the northern flank on 17 September. By the next day, French attacks north of the Aisne led Falkenhayn to order the 6th Army to repulse the French and secure the flank.{{sfn|Foley|2005|p=101}} The French advance at the [[First Battle of Picardy]] {{nowrap|(22–26 September)}} met a German attack rather than an open flank and by the end of the [[Battle of Albert (1914)|Battle of Albert]] {{nowrap|(25–29 September),}} the Second Army had been reinforced to eight Corps but was still opposed by German forces at the [[Battle of Arras (1914)|Battle of Arras]] {{nowrap|(1–4 October),}} rather than advancing around the German northern flank. The German 6th Army had also found that on arrival in the north, it was forced to oppose the French attack rather than advance around the flank and that the secondary objective, to protect the northern flank of the German Armies in France, had become the main task. By 6 October, the French needed British reinforcements to withstand German attacks around Lille. The BEF had begun to move from the Aisne to Flanders on 5 October and reinforcements from England assembled on the left flank of the [[Tenth Army (France)|Tenth Army]], which had been formed from the left flank units of the 2nd Army on 4 October.{{sfn |Doughty|2005|pp=98–100}}

The Entente Powers and the Germans attempted to take more ground after the "open" northern flank had disappeared.  The Franco-British attacks towards Lille in October at the battles of [[Battle of La Bassée|La Bassée]], [[Battle of Messines (1914)|Messines]] and [[Battle of Armentières|Armentières]] (October–November) were followed up by attempts to advance between the BEF and the Belgian army by a new French [[Eighth Army (France)|Eighth Army]]. The moves of the 7th and then the 6th Army from Alsace and Lorraine had been intended to secure German lines of communication through Belgium, where the Belgian army had sortied several times, during the period between the [[Great Retreat]] and the Battle of the Marne; in August, British marines had landed at [[Dunkirk]].{{sfn|Strachan|2001|pp=269–270}} In October, a new [[4th Army (German Empire)|4th Army]] was assembled from the III Reserve Corps, the siege artillery used against Antwerp, and four of the new reserve corps training in Germany. A German offensive began by 21 October but the 4th and 6th Armies were only able to take small amounts of ground, at great cost to both sides at the [[Battle of the Yser]] {{nowrap|(16–31 October)}} and further south in the [[First Battle of Ypres]] ({{nowrap |19 October}} – {{nowrap |22 November}}). Falkenhayn then attempted to achieve a limited goal of capturing Ypres and [[Kemmelberg|Mont Kemmel]].{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=103–104}}