Editing Failed state (section)

=== Promoting development through foreign aid ===
Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2013) analyzed the systematic failure of the development of failed states. They defined "state administrative capability for implementation" as the key aspect of state development, and found out the mechanism in which failed states stumbled regardless of decades of development practices tried, billions of dollars spent, and alleged "progress" boasted. These countries adopted the following techniques which led to undermining it: 
# ''systemic isomorphic mimicry''—disguising the dysfunction of states by simply mimicking the appearance of functional states. 
# ''premature load bearing''—limited-capacity states being overloaded with "unrealistic expectations".

In light of the fact that many of these countries would likely need centuries to reach the state capability of developed countries, they suggested creating "context-specific institutions", promoting "incremental reform process", and setting "realistic expectations" for attaining the goal of substantial development.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last1=Pritchett |first1=Lant |last2=Woolcock |first2=Michael |last3=Andrews |first3=Matt |title=Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation |journal=Journal of Development Studies |date=January 2013 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.1080/00220388.2012.709614 |s2cid=14363040 |url=https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/239_PritchettWoolcockAndrews_Looking_like_a_state_final.pdf }}</ref>

Foreign aid produces several unintended consequences when used to develop the institutional capacity of state. Donors will often delegate aid spending to recipient governments since they do not have the information or capacity to identify who is in the greatest need and how it can be best spent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jablonski |first1=Ryan S. |title=How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution |journal=World Politics |date=2014 |volume=66 |issue=2 |page=301|doi=10.1017/S0043887114000045 |s2cid=154675681 |url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53267/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Jablonski%2C%20R_How%20aid%20targets%20votes_Jablonski_How%20aid%20targets%20votes_2014.pdf }}</ref> The downside of this is that it can be captured by recipient governments and diverted either towards self-enrichment of incumbent elites or to establish and maintain clientelist networks to allow them to remain in power—for example, in Kenya, aid allocation is biased towards constituencies with high vote shares for the incumbent, so the geographic distribution of aid changes to their supporters following a change of regime.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jablonski |first1=Ryan S. |title=How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution |journal=World Politics |date=2014 |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=294–295 |doi=10.1017/s0043887114000045|s2cid=154675681 |url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53267/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Jablonski%2C%20R_How%20aid%20targets%20votes_Jablonski_How%20aid%20targets%20votes_2014.pdf }}</ref> Furthermore, aid can also be diverted to non-state actors, and thus undermine the state's monopoly on violence, such as in Colombia during the 1990s and 2000s, where US aid to the Colombian military was diverted by the military to paramilitary groups, leading to significant increases in paramilitary violence in municipalities located near military bases.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dube |first1=Oeindrila |last2=Naidu |first2=Suresh |title=Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia |journal=The Journal of Politics |date=2015 |volume=77 |issue=1 |pages=249–250 |doi=10.1086/679021 |s2cid=220454361 |url=http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423498 |access-date=2019-07-04 |archive-date=2013-01-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130123232113/http://cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423498/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> The implication is that foreign aid can undermine the state by both feeding corruption of incumbent elites, and empowering groups outside of the state.

Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle (2006) acknowledged the controversy over the effect of foreign aid that has developed in recent years. They argued that although there is a call for an increase in large aid efforts in Africa by the international community, this will actually create what they call an "aid-institutions paradox".<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Moss, Todd |author2=Gunilla Pettersson |author3=Nicolas Van de Walle |date=2006|title=An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on dependency and state-building in sub-Saharan Africa |series=Center for Global Development Working Paper |volume=74 |pages=1, 2, 3, 19|url=https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/55015/2005_WP11_Moss_Pettersson_vandeWalle.pdf?sequence=1}}</ref> This paradox is formed because of the large cash contributions that Western countries have given to African countries have created institutions that are "less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy."<ref name=":2" /> They mention that the gradual decrease of aid may help foster long-lasting institutions, which is proven by the United States' efforts in Korea after the Cold War.

Berman, Eli, Felter, Shapiro, and Trolan (2013) also found similar evidence to support the paradox, stating that large US aid attempts in African agriculture have only resulted in further conflict between citizens. Notably, small investments such as grants for schools have proven to decrease violence compared to large investments, which create "incentives to capture economic rents through violence."<ref>{{cite web |last=Eli Berman |author2=Joseph H. Felter |author3=Jacob N. Shapiro |author4=Erin Troland|date=2013|title=Effective Aid in Conflict Zones|url=http://voxeu.org/article/effective-aid-conflict-zones |website=VoxEU.org}}</ref>

Furthermore, Binyavanga Wainaina (2009) likens Western aid to colonization, in which countries believe that large cash contributions to spur the African economy will lead to political development and less violence. In reality, these cash contributions do not invest in Africa's growth economically, politically and most of all, socially.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://onbeing.org/programs/binyavanga-wainaina-the-ethics-of-aid-one-kenyans-perspective/|title=The Ethics of Aid: One Kenyan's Perspective|last=Binyavanga|first=Wainaina|date=August 27, 2009|website=On Being|access-date=May 19, 2017}}</ref>