Editing Epistemology (section)

=== Other concepts ===
[[Rationality]] is closely related to justification and the terms ''rational belief'' and ''justified belief'' are sometimes used interchangeably. However, rationality has a wider scope that encompasses both a theoretical side, covering beliefs, and a practical side, covering [[Decision theory|decisions]], [[intention]]s, and [[Action (philosophy)|actions]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=123–124}} | {{harvnb|Foley|2011|pp=37, 39–40}} | {{harvnb|Harman|2013|loc=§ Theoretical and Practical Rationality}} | {{harvnb|Mele|Rawling|2004|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> There are different conceptions about what it means for something to be rational. According to one view, a mental state is rational if it is based on or responsive to good reasons. Another view emphasizes the role of coherence, stating that rationality requires that the different mental states of a person are [[consistent]] and support each other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heinzelmann|2023|pp=312–314}} | {{harvnb|Kiesewetter|2020|pp=332–334}} }}</ref> A slightly different approach holds that rationality is about achieving certain goals. Two goals of theoretical rationality are accuracy and comprehensiveness, meaning that a person has as few false beliefs and as many true beliefs as possible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Foley|2011|pp=39–40}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=123–124}} }}</ref>

Epistemologists rely on the concept of epistemic norms as criteria to assess the cognitive quality of beliefs, like their justification and rationality. They distinguish between deontic norms, which [[Normativity|prescribe]] what people should believe, and [[axiological]] norms, which identify the goals and [[Value (ethics and social sciences)|values]] of beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=109}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2011|p=47}} }}</ref> Epistemic norms are closely linked to intellectual or [[epistemic virtue]]s, which are character traits like [[open-mindedness]] and [[conscientiousness]]. Epistemic virtues help individuals form true beliefs and acquire knowledge. They contrast with epistemic vices and act as foundational concepts of [[virtue epistemology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=88}} | {{harvnb|Choo|2016|pp=91–92}} | {{harvnb|Montmarquet|1987|pp=482–483]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Interest in epistemic virtues has increased since [[Ernest Sosa]]'s formulation of virtue epistemology in the 1980s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Turri|Alfano|Greco|2021|loc=§ 2. Precursors and Contemporary Origins}} | {{harvnb|Greco|2005|p=288}} }}</ref>}}

Epistemologists understand [[evidence]] for a belief as information that favors or supports it. They conceptualize evidence primarily in terms of mental states, such as sensory impressions or other known propositions. But in a wider sense, it can also include physical objects, like [[Bloodstain pattern analysis|bloodstains examined by forensic analysts]] or financial records studied by investigative journalists.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=50–51}} | {{harvnb|DiFate|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Nature of Evidence: What Is It and What Does It Do?}} | {{harvnb|Kelly|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|McGrew|2011|pp=58–59}} }}</ref> Evidence is often understood in terms of [[probability]]: evidence for a belief makes it more likely that the belief is true.<ref>{{harvnb|McGrew|2011|p=59}}</ref> A [[defeater]] is evidence against a belief or evidence that undermines another piece of evidence. For instance, [[witness testimony]] linking a suspect to a crime is evidence of their guilt, while an [[alibi]] is a defeater.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sudduth|loc=Lead section, § 2c. Constraints on Propositional Defeaters}} | {{harvnb|McPherson|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6I7fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> [[Evidentialism|Evidentialists]] analyze justification in terms of evidence by asserting that for a belief to be justified, it needs to rest on adequate evidence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Kelly|2016|loc=§ 1. Evidence as That Which Justifies Belief}} }}</ref>

The presence of evidence usually affects [[doubt]] and [[certainty]], which are subjective attitudes toward propositions that differ regarding their level of confidence. Doubt involves questioning the validity or truth of a proposition. Certainty, by contrast, is a strong affirmative conviction, indicating an absence of doubt about the proposition's truth. Doubt and certainty are central to ancient Greek skepticism and its goal of establishing that no belief is immune to doubt. They are also crucial in attempts to find a secure foundation of all knowledge, such as [[René Descartes]]' [[Foundationalism|foundationalist]] epistemology.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=18–19, 44}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005a|p=134}} | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005b|p=220}} }}</ref>

While propositional knowledge is the main topic in epistemology, some theorists focus on [[understanding]] instead. Understanding is a more holistic notion that involves a wider grasp of a subject. To understand something, a person requires awareness of how different things are connected and why they are the way they are. For example, knowledge of isolated facts memorized from a textbook does not amount to understanding. According to one view, understanding is a unique epistemic good that, unlike propositional knowledge, is always intrinsically valuable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=150}} | {{harvnb|Grimm|2011|pp=84, 88}} | {{harvnb|Gordon|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> [[Wisdom]] is similar in this regard and is sometimes considered the highest epistemic good. It encompasses a reflective understanding with practical applications, helping people grasp and evaluate complex situations and lead a good life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kekes|2005|p=959}} | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|p=157}} | {{harvnb|Whitcomb|2011|p=95}} }}</ref>

In epistemology, knowledge ascription is the act of attributing knowledge to someone, expressed in sentences like "Sarah knows that it will rain today".<ref>{{harvnb|Brown|Gerken|2012|pp=1–2}}</ref> According to invariantism, knowledge ascriptions have fixed standards across different contexts. [[Contextualism|Contextualists]], by contrast, argue that knowledge ascriptions are context-dependent. From this perspective, Sarah may know about the weather in the context of an everyday conversation even though she is not sufficiently informed to know it in the context of a rigorous [[meteorology|meteorological]] debate.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|Gerken|2012|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Rysiew|2023|loc=Lead section, § 3. Support for EC: Apparently Inconsistent Knowledge Claims, Skeptical and Everyday}} }}</ref> [[Contrastivism]], another view, argues that knowledge ascriptions are comparative, meaning that to know something involves distinguishing it from relevant alternatives. For example, if a person spots a bird in the garden, they may know that it is a sparrow rather than an eagle, but they may not know that it is a sparrow rather than an indistinguishable sparrow hologram.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cockram|Morton|2017}} | {{harvnb|Baumann|2016|pp=59–60}} }}</ref>