Editing Doolittle Raid (section)

=== Additional perspectives ===
Doolittle recounted in his autobiography that at the time he thought the mission was a failure and he would be demoted upon return to the US.{{sfn|Doolittle|Glines|1991|pp=7, 10, 267}}

This mission showed that a B-25 takeoff from a carrier was easier than previously thought, and night operations could be possible in the future. [[Shuttle bombing]] runs (taking off and landing at different air bases) were shown to be an effective carrier task force tactic since there was no need for the ships to wait for the returning aircraft.{{sfn|Doolittle|Glines|1991|pp=7, 10, 267}}

The American pilots, instead of landing as planned, were forced to bail out due to a lack of ground lighting to provide guidance. Chinese airfield crews recounted that due to the unexpected early arrival of the B-25s, homing beacon and runway torch lights were not on for fear of possible Japanese airstrikes (as had happened previously). If [[Claire Lee Chennault]] had been informed of the mission specifics, the outcome might have been very much better for the Americans: Chennault had built an effective air surveillance net in China that would have been able to provide updated arrival information about the raiders to the airfield crews, and could have confirmed that there was no risk of Japanese airstrikes, allowing the landing lights to be lit at the time necessary to allow safe landings.{{sfn|Doolittle|Glines|1991|pp=7, 10, 267}}

Chiang Kai-Shek awarded the raiders China's highest military decorations,{{sfn|Doolittle|Glines|1991|p=281}} and predicted (in his diary) that Japan would alter its goals and strategy as a result of the disgrace.{{refn|group=note |The diaries are in the Hoover Institute of Stanford University.}} Indeed, the raid was a shock to staff at Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. As a direct consequence, Japan attacked territories in China to prevent similar shuttle bombing runs. High command withdrew substantial air force resources from supporting offensive operations in order to defend the home islands. The [[Aleutian Islands campaign]] was launched to prevent the US from using the islands as bomber bases to attack Japan—this required two carriers that otherwise would have been used for the [[Battle of Midway]]. Thus, the raid's most significant strategic accomplishment was that it compelled the Japanese high command into ordering a very inefficient disposition of their forces, and poor decision-making due to fear of attack, for the rest of the war.<ref>{{cite magazine |title=War in the Pacific: View from Japan |trans-magazine=[[Bungeishunjū (magazine)|Bungeishunjū]] |script-magazine=ja:文藝春秋 |language=ja |date=1994}}</ref>

[[Mitsuo Fuchida]] and [[Shigeyoshi Miwa]] considered the "one-way" raid "excellent strategy", with the bombers evading Army fighters by flying "much lower than anticipated". Kuroshima said the raid "passed like a shiver over Japan" and Miwa criticized the Army for claiming to have shot down nine aircraft rather than "not even one".{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1982|p=25}}