Editing Daniel Dennett (section)

=== Realism ===
Dennett was known for his nuanced stance on realism. While he supported [[scientific realism]], advocating that entities and phenomena posited by scientific theories exist independently of our perceptions, he leant towards instrumentalism concerning certain theoretical entities, valuing their explanatory and predictive utility, as showing in his discussion of [[real patterns]].<ref name="Dennett, D. C. 1991">Dennett, D. C. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 27-51.</ref> Dennett's pragmatic realism underlines the entanglement of language, consciousness, and reality. He posited that our discourse about reality is mediated by our cognitive and linguistic capacities, marking a departure from [[Naïve realism]].<ref>Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Co.</ref>

==== Realism and instrumentalism ====
Dennett's philosophical stance on realism was intricately connected to his views on instrumentalism and the theory of real patterns.<ref name="Dennett, D. C. 1991"/> He drew a distinction between illata, which are genuine theoretical entities like electrons, and abstracta, which are "calculation bound entities or logical constructs" such as centers of gravity and the equator, placing beliefs and the like among the latter. One of Dennett's principal arguments was an instrumentalistic construal of intentional attributions, asserting that such attributions are environment-relative.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance - Wiley Online Library |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5#:~:text=Realism%2C%20instrumentalism%2C%20and%20the%20Intentional,such%20attributions%20ore%20environment%20relative |website=Wiley Online Library |doi=10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5 |access-date=October 5, 2023 |archive-date=November 14, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231114044508/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5#:~:text=Realism%2C%20instrumentalism%2C%20and%20the%20Intentional,such%20attributions%20ore%20environment%20relative |url-status=live }}</ref>

In discussing intentional states, Dennett posited that they should not be thought of as resembling theoretical entities, but rather as logical constructs, avoiding the pitfalls of intentional realism without lapsing into pure instrumentalism or even eliminativism.<ref>{{cite journal | title=Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It Is To Adopt the Intentional Stance | url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956311#:~:text=Dennett%2C%20intentional%20states%20should%20not,is%20the%20notion%20of%27a%20stance | journal=The Philosophical Quarterly | last1=Slors | first1=Marc | date=January 2, 1996 | volume=46 | issue=182 | pages=93–98 | doi=10.2307/2956311 | jstor=2956311 | access-date=October 5, 2023 | archive-date=November 18, 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118055313/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2956311#:~:text=Dennett%2C%20intentional%20states%20should%20not,is%20the%20notion%20of%27a%20stance | url-status=live }}</ref> His instrumentalism and anti-realism were crucial aspects of his view on intentionality, emphasizing the centrality and indispensability of the intentional stance to our conceptual scheme.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Intentional Stance. DANIEL DENNETT. Cambridge: MIT Press - JSTOR |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026682#:~:text=Dennett%27s%20instrumentalism%20and%20anti,taken |website=JSTOR |access-date=October 5, 2023 |archive-date=November 18, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231118055311/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026682#:~:text=Dennett%27s%20instrumentalism%20and%20anti,taken |url-status=live }}</ref>