Editing Chrysippus (section)

== Physics ==
[[File:Chrysippus of Soli.jpg|right|thumb|A partial marble [[Bust (sculpture)|bust]] of Chrysippus that is a Roman copy of a [[Hellenistic]] original ([[Louvre Museum]]).]]
Chrysippus insisted on the organic unity of the [[universe]], as well as the [[wikt:correlation|correlation]] and mutual interdependence of all of its parts.<ref>[[Cicero]], ''De Natura Deorum'', ii, 19</ref> He said, the universe is "the soul and guide of itself."<ref>Plutarch, [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0389%3Asection%3D41 ''De Stoicorum Repugnantiis'', 41.]</ref> Following Zeno, Chrysippus determined fiery breath or [[aether (classical element)|aether]] to be the primitive substance of the universe.<ref>{{Harvnb|Hicks|1911|p=944}}</ref> Objects are made up of inert formless matter and an informing soul, "''[[pneuma (Stoic)|pneuma]]''", provides form to the undifferentiated matter.<ref name="otoole431">{{Harvnb|O'Toole|Jennings|2004|p=431}}</ref> The ''pneuma'' [[wikt:pervade|pervades]] all of substance and maintains the unity of the universe and constitutes the [[soul]] of the human being.<ref name="otoole431"/>

The [[classical elements]] change into one another by a process of [[condensation]] and [[rarefaction]].<ref name="stock79">{{Harvnb|Stock|1908|p=79}}</ref> [[Fire (classical element)|Fire]] first becomes solidified into [[Air (classical element)|air]]; then air into [[Water (classical element)|water]]; and lastly, water into [[Earth (classical element)|earth]]. The process of dissolution takes place in the reverse order: earth being rarefied into water, water into air and air into fire.<ref name="stock79"/>

The human soul was divided by Chrysippus into eight faculties: the five senses, the power of [[reproduction]], the power of [[speech]], and the "ruling part" that is located in the chest rather than the head.<ref name="sharples67">{{Harvnb|Sharples|2014|p=67}}</ref> Individual souls are perishable; but, according to the view originated by Chrysippus, the souls of wise people survive longer after their death.<ref name="sharples67"/> No individual soul can, however, survive beyond the [[ekpyrosis|periodic conflagration]], when the universe is [[palingenesis|renewed]].<ref name="sharples67"/><!--It is not clear on page 67 whether this last idea originated with Chrysippus or Heraclitus or...?-->

There were no universals or abstract objects for Chrysippus, making him a kind of [[nominalist]].{{efn|"[Stoics] have often been presented as the first nominalists, rejecting the existence of universal concepts altogether. ... For Chrysippus there are no universal entities, whether they be conceived as substantial [[Platonic Forms]] or in some other manner."<ref>John Sellars, ''Stoicism'', Routledge, 2014, pp. 84–85</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://iep.utm.edu/chrysippus/|title=Chrysippus &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>}}

===Fate===
For Chrysippus, all things happen according to [[destiny|fate]]: what seems to be accidental has always some hidden cause.<ref name="zeller178">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=178}}</ref> The unity of the world consists in the chain-like dependence of cause upon cause.<ref name="zeller176">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=176}}</ref> Nothing can take place without a sufficient cause.<ref name="zeller175">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=175}}</ref> According to Chrysippus, every proposition is either true or false, and this must apply to future events as well:<ref name="zeller174">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=174}}</ref>
<blockquote>If any motion exists without a cause, then not every proposition will be either true or false. For that which has not efficient causes is neither true nor false. But every proposition is either true or false. Therefore, there is no motion without a cause. And if this is so, then all effects owe their existence to prior causes. And if this is so, all things happen by fate. It follows therefore that whatever happens, happens by fate.<ref>Cicero, ''On Fate'', 20–21</ref></blockquote>
The Stoic view of fate is entirely based on a view of the universe as a whole. Individual things and persons only come into consideration as dependent parts of this whole.<ref name="zeller177">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=177}}</ref> Everything is, in every respect, determined by this relation, and is consequently subject to the general order of the world.<ref name="zeller176"/>

If his opponents objected that, if everything is determined by destiny, there is no [[individual responsibility]], since what has been once foreordained must happen, come what may, Chrysippus replied that there is a distinction to be made between simple and complex predestination.<ref name="zeller181">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=181}}</ref> Becoming ill may be fated whatever happens but, if a person's recovery is linked to consulting a doctor, then consulting the doctor is fated to occur together with that person's recovery, and this becomes a complex fact.<ref name="kenny195">{{Harvnb|Kenny|2006|p=195}} referencing [[Cicero]], ''On Fate'', 28–29</ref> All human actions{{snd}}in fact, our destiny{{snd}}are decided by our relation to things,<ref name="zeller182">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=182}}</ref> or as Chrysippus put it, events are "co-fated" to occur:<ref name="kenny195"/>
<blockquote>The non-destruction of one's coat, he says, is not fated simply, but co-fated with its being taken care of, and someone's being saved from his enemies is co-fated with his fleeing those enemies; and having children is co-fated with being willing to lie with a woman. ... For many things cannot occur without our being willing and indeed contributing a most strenuous eagerness and zeal for these things, since, he says, it was fated for these things to occur in conjunction with this personal effort. ... But it will be in our power, he says, with what is in our power being included in fate.<ref>[[Diogenianus]] in [[Eusebius of Caesarea|Eusebius]], ''[[Praeparatio evangelica]]'', vi. 8, quoted in {{harvnb|Inwood|Gerson|1997|p=190}}</ref></blockquote>
Thus our actions are predetermined, and are causally related to the overarching network of fate, but nevertheless the moral responsibility of how we respond to impressions remains our own.<ref>{{Harvnb|Brunschwig|Sedley|2003|p=172}}</ref> The one all-determining power is active everywhere, working in each particular being according to its nature, whether in rational or irrational creatures or in inorganic objects.<ref name="zeller179">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=179}}</ref> Every action is brought about by the co-operation of causes depending on the nature of things and the character of the agent.<ref name="zeller179"/> Our actions would only be involuntary if they were produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation – on the part of our wills – with external causes.<ref name="zeller179"/> Virtue and vice are set down as things in our power, for which, consequently, we are responsible.<ref name="zeller180">{{Harvnb|Zeller|1880|p=180}}</ref> Moral responsibility depends only on freedom of the will, and what emanates from our will is our own, no matter whether it is possible for us to act differently or not.<ref name="zeller180"/> This rather subtle position, which attempts to reconcile determinism with human responsibility, is known as soft-determinism, or as [[compatibilism]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gould|1970|p=152, note 3}}</ref>

===Divination===
[[File:Kleromanteia.jpg|right|thumb|[[Cleromancy]] in ancient Greece. Chrysippus accepted [[divination]] as part of the [[causal chain]] of [[Destiny|fate]].]]
Chrysippus also argued for the existence of fate based on [[divination]], which he thought there was good evidence for.<ref name="gould144-5">{{Harvnb|Gould|1970|pp=144–145}}</ref> It would not be possible for diviners to predict the future if the future itself was accidental.<ref name="zeller175"/> Omens and portents, he believed, are the natural symptoms of certain occurrences.<ref name="hicks947">{{Harvnb|Hicks|1911|p=947}}</ref> There must be countless indications of the course of providence, for the most part unobserved, the meaning of only a few having become known to humanity.<ref name="hicks947"/> To those who argued that divination was superfluous as all events are foreordained, he replied that both divination and our behaviour under the warnings which it affords are included in the chain of causation.<ref name="hicks947"/>

===God===
The Stoics believed that the universe is [[God]], and Chrysippus affirmed that "the universe itself is God and the universal outpouring of its soul."<ref name="cicerodenati15">Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', i. 15</ref> It is the guiding principle of the universe, "operating in mind and reason, together with the common nature of things and the totality which embraces all existence."<ref name="cicerodenati15"/> Based on these beliefs, physicist and philosopher [[Max Bernhard Weinstein]] identified Chrysippus as a [[Pandeist]].{{efn|"Dieser Pandeismus, der von Chrysippos (aus Soloi 280–208 v. Chr.) herrühren soll, ist schon eine Verbindung mit dem Emanismus; Gott ist die Welt, insofern als diese aus seiner Substanz durch Verdichtung und Abkühlung entstanden ist und entsteht, und er sich strahlengleich mit seiner Substanz durch sie noch verbreitet."<ref>Max Bernhard Weinsten, ''Welt- und Lebensanschauungen, Hervorgegangen aus Religion, Philosophie und Naturerkenntnis'' ("World and Life Views, Emerging From Religion, Philosophy and Perception of Nature") (1910), p. 233</ref>}}

Chrysippus sought to prove the [[existence of God]], making use of a [[teleological argument]]:
<blockquote>If there is anything that humanity cannot produce, the being who produces it is better than humanity. But humanity cannot produce the things that are in the universe{{snd}}the heavenly bodies, etc. The being, therefore, who produces them is superior to humanity. But who is there that is superior to humanity, except God? Therefore, God exists.<ref>Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', iii. 10. Cf. ii. 6 for the fuller version of this argument</ref></blockquote>
Chrysippus spoke of God and gods interchangeably. He interpreted the [[Greek gods|gods]] of traditional Greek religion by viewing them as different aspects of the one reality. [[Cicero]] tells us that "he further maintained that aether is that which people call [[Zeus]], and that the air which permeates the seas is [[Poseidon]], and that the earth is what is known by the name of [[Demeter]], and he treated in similar style the names of the other gods."<ref name="cicerodenati15"/> In addition, the universe exists for the benefit of the universal god:
<blockquote>We should infer in the case of a beautiful dwelling-place that it was built for its owners and not for [[mice]]; we ought, therefore, in the same way to regard the universe as the dwelling-place of the gods.<ref name="cicerodenatiii10">Cicero, ''De Natura Deorum'', iii. 10</ref></blockquote>

===Theodicy===
In response to the question of how [[evil]] could exist in a good universe, Chrysippus replied "evil cannot be removed, nor is it well that it should be removed."<ref>Plutarch, ''De Stoicorum Repugnantiis'', 1051 B</ref> Firstly, he argued, following [[Plato]], that it was impossible for good to exist without evil, for justice could not be known without injustice, courage without cowardice, temperance without intemperance or wisdom without foolishness.<ref name="gelliusvii1">Aulus Gellius, vii. 1</ref> Secondly, apparent evils exist as a consequent of nature's goodness, thus it was necessary for the human skull to be made from small and thin bones for reasons of utility, but this superior utility meant that the skull is vulnerable to blows.<ref name="gelliusvii1"/> Thirdly, evils are distributed according to the rational will of Zeus, either to punish the wicked or because they are important to the world-order as a whole.<ref>Plutarch, ''De Stoicorum Repugnantiis'', 1050 E; ''De Communibus Notitiis'', 1065 B</ref> Thus evil is good under disguise, and is ultimately conducive to the best. Chrysippus compared evil to the coarse jest in the [[Ancient Greek comedy|comedy]]; for, just as the jest, though offensive in itself, improves the piece as a whole, "so too you may criticize evil regarded by itself, yet allow that, taken with all else, it has its use."<ref>Plutarch, ''De Communibus Notitiis'', 1065 D</ref>