Editing Belief (section)

=== Belief-in and belief-that ===
Traditionally, philosophers have mainly focused in their inquiries concerning belief on the notion of ''belief-that''.<ref name="Price">{{cite journal |last1=Price |first1=H. H. |title=Belief 'In' and Belief 'That' |journal=Religious Studies |date=1965 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=5–27 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500002304 |s2cid=170731716 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIBIA |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601043007/https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIBIA |url-status=live }}</ref> Belief-that can be characterized as a [[propositional attitude]] to a claim which is either true or false. ''Belief-in'', on the other hand, is more closely related to notions like trust or faith in that it refers usually to an attitude to persons.<ref name="Price"/> ''Belief-in'' plays a central role in many [[religious traditions]] in which ''belief in God'' is one of the central virtues of their followers.<ref name="Williams">{{cite journal |last1=Williams |first1=John N. |title=Belief-in and Belief in God |journal=Religious Studies |date=1992 |volume=28 |issue=3 |pages=401–406 |doi=10.1017/s0034412500021740 |s2cid=170864816 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WILBAB-3 |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=19 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210519211421/https://philpapers.org/rec/WILBAB-3 |url-status=live }}</ref> The difference between belief-in and belief-that is sometimes blurry since various expressions using the term "belief in" seem to be translatable into corresponding expressions using the term "belief that" instead.<ref name="Macintosh2">{{cite journal |last1=Macintosh |first1=J. J. |title=Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams |journal=Religious Studies |date=1994 |volume=30 |issue=4 |pages=487–503 |doi=10.1017/S0034412500023131 |s2cid=170786861 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MACBRA-4 |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=29 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200929102145/https://philpapers.org/rec/MACBRA-4 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, a ''belief in'' fairies may be said to be a ''belief that'' fairies exist.<ref name="Williams"/> In this sense, belief-in is often used when the entity is not real, or its existence is in doubt. Typical examples would include: "he believes in witches and ghosts" or "many children believe in [[Santa Claus]]" or "I believe in a deity".<ref name="Macintosh"/> Not all usages of belief-in concern the existence of something: some are ''commendatory'' in that they express a positive attitude towards their object.<ref name="Macintosh">{{cite book |last1=Macintosh |first1=Jack |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Belief-in |access-date=2 March 2021 |archive-date=29 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129082636/https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Price"/> It has been suggested that these cases can also be accounted for in terms of belief-that. For example, a ''belief in'' marriage could be translated as a ''belief that'' marriage is good.<ref name="Williams"/> Belief-in is used in a similar sense when expressing [[self-confidence]] or faith in one's self or one's abilities.

Defenders of a reductive account of belief-in have used this line of thought to argue that ''belief in God'' can be analyzed in a similar way: e.g. that it amounts to a belief that God exists with his characteristic attributes, like [[omniscience]] and [[omnipotence]].<ref name="Williams"/> Opponents of this account often concede that belief-in may entail various forms of belief-that, but that there are additional aspects to belief-in that are not reducible to belief-that.<ref name="Macintosh2"/> For example, a ''belief in'' an ideal may involve the ''belief that'' this ideal is something good, but it additionally involves a positive evaluative attitude toward this ideal that goes beyond a mere propositional attitude.<ref name="Williams"/> Applied to the ''belief in'' God, opponents of the reductive approach may hold that a ''belief that'' God exists may be a necessary pre-condition for ''belief in'' God, but that it is not sufficient.<ref name="Williams"/><ref name="Macintosh2"/>