Editing Battle of the Coral Sea (section)

====Afternoon operations====
The U.S. aircraft returned and landed on their carriers by 13:38. By 14:20, the aircraft were rearmed and ready to launch against the Port Moresby Invasion Force or Gotō's cruisers. Fletcher was concerned that the locations of the rest of the Japanese fleet carriers were still unknown. He was informed that Allied intelligence sources believed that up to four Japanese carriers might be supporting the ''MO'' operation. Fletcher concluded that by the time his scout aircraft found the remaining carriers it would be too late in the day to mount a strike. Thus, Fletcher decided to hold off on another strike this day and remain concealed under the thick overcast with fighters ready in defense. Fletcher turned TF&nbsp;17 southwest.<ref>{{harvnb|ONI|1943|p=17}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=206–207}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|p=61}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|pp=96–97}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=71–72}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=170}}. U.S. intelligence personnel at Pearl Harbor and with TF17 believed that Japanese carriers {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Kaga||2}} and ''Kasuga Maru'' ({{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Taiyō||2}}) might also be involved with the ''MO'' operation (Lundstrom 2006, pp. 196–197). According to {{harvnb|Prados|1995|p=309}}, the Japanese carriers' aircraft homing signals were detected by ''Yorktown''{{'}}s radio intelligence unit, led by Lieutenant Forrest R. Baird. Baird later stated that he pinpointed the location of Takagi's carriers, but Fletcher disbelieved the intelligence after learning that ''Lexington''{{'}}s unit, led by Lieutenant Commander Ransom Fullinwider, had not detected the homing signals (Prados).</ref>

Apprised of the loss of ''Shōhō'', Inoue ordered the invasion convoy to temporarily withdraw to the north and ordered Takagi, at this time located {{convert|225|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} east of TF&nbsp;17, to destroy the U.S. carrier forces. As the invasion convoy reversed course, it was bombed by eight U.S. Army B-17s, but was not damaged. Gotō and Kajioka were told to assemble their ships south of Rossel Island for a night surface battle if the U.S. ships came within range.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=207–208}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=132}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=169}}; {{harvnb|Gillison|1962|p=519}}.</ref>

At 12:40, a Deboyne-based seaplane sighted and reported Crace's detached cruiser and destroyer force on a bearing of 175°, {{convert|78|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} from Deboyne. At 13:15, an aircraft from Rabaul sighted Crace's force but submitted an erroneous report, stating the force contained two carriers and was located, bearing 205°, {{convert|115|nmi|km|abbr=on}} from Deboyne. Based on these reports, Takagi, who was still awaiting the return of all of his aircraft from attacking ''Neosho'', turned his carriers due west at 13:30 and advised Inoue at 15:00 that the U.S. carriers were at least {{convert|430|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} west of his location and that he would therefore be unable to attack them that day.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=207–208}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|p=65}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=175}}. Lieutenant Hideo Minematsu, commander of the Deboyne seaplane base, studied all the day's sighting reports and worked out the true positions of Crace's and Fletcher's ships and notified his headquarters at 14:49. Inoue's staff appears to have ignored Minematsu's report (Lundstrom 2005b, p. 208).</ref>
[[File:TG17.3 and HMAS Australia under attack Coral Sea.jpg|thumb|left|HMAS ''Australia'' (center) and TG17.3 under air attack on 7 May]]

Inoue's staff directed two groups of attack aircraft from Rabaul, already airborne since that morning, towards Crace's reported position. The first group included 12 torpedo-armed G4M bombers and the second group comprised 19 [[Mitsubishi G3M]] land attack aircraft armed with bombs. Both groups found and attacked Crace's ships at 14:30 and claimed to have sunk a "{{USS|California|BB-44|2}}-type" battleship and damaged another battleship and cruiser. In reality, Crace's ships were lightly damaged and shot down four G4Ms. A short time later, three U.S. Army B-17s mistakenly bombed Crace, but caused no damage.<ref>{{harvnb|Salecker|2001|pp=180–181}}; {{harvnb|Gill|1968|pp=49–50}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=208–209}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=66–69}}; {{harvnb|Tagaya|2001|pp=40–41}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=63–66}}; {{harvnb|Pelvin|2017}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=159, 171–174}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|pp=38–39}}. The Type 1s, armed with [[Type 91 torpedo]]es, were from the IJN's [[4th Air Group]] (4th [[Kōkūtai]]) and launched from Vunakanau airfield, Rabaul, at 09:15 escorted by 11 Zeros from the Tainan Air Group based at Lae, New Guinea (Lundstrom 2006, p. 171). Perhaps low on fuel, the Zeros turned back to Lae shortly before the bombers attacked Crace's ships. The Type 96s, each armed with a pair of {{convert|250|kg|lb|abbr=on}} bombs, were from the IJN's [[Genzan Air Group]] and were originally assigned to bomb Port Moresby. All were operating as part of the 25th Air Flotilla under the command of [[Sadayoshi Yamada]] at Rabaul (Millot). One of the destroyed Type 1s was commanded by the formation leader, Lieutenant Kuniharu Kobayashi, who was killed. In addition to the four shot down at sea, one Type 1 crash-landed at Lae with serious damage and another ditched in the water at Deboyne with one dead crewman (Tagaya). Two crewmen in ''Chicago'' were killed and five wounded in the Japanese air attack (Hoyt, p. 68). According to Hoyt (p. 69) and Morison (pp. 20 & 39), MacArthur's air commander, Lieutenant General [[George Brett (military)|George Brett]], later flatly denied any of his B-17s could have attacked Crace and prohibited further discussion of the incident. Millot and Gill incorrectly state the bombers were [[Martin B-26 Marauder|B-26s]] from the [[19th Airlift Wing|19th Bomb Group]] based at Townsville, Australia. The three B-17s were led by Captain John A. Roberts (Lundstrom 2006, p. 172). {{harvtxt|Gillison|1962|p=520}} states MacArthur's fliers were not informed until after the battle was over that Allied warships were operating in the Coral Sea area. Salecker states that the B-17s attacked because they misidentified the Japanese bombers as U.S. B-25 or B-26 bombers. One of the three B-17s ran out of fuel on its return to base and was destroyed in the resulting crash, but the crew bailed-out and survived (Salecker, p. 181).</ref> At the conclusion of the attack, the detachment of cruisers suffered several wounded and a few men killed aboard the ''Chicago''.

Crace at 15:26 radioed Fletcher he could not complete his mission without air support. Crace retired southward to a position about {{convert|220|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} southeast of Port Moresby to increase the range from Japanese carrier- or land-based aircraft while remaining close enough to intercept any Japanese naval forces advancing beyond the Louisiades through either the Jomard Passage or the [[China Strait]]. Crace's ships were low on fuel, and as Fletcher was maintaining radio silence (and had not informed him in advance), Crace had no idea of Fletcher's location, status, or intentions.<ref>{{harvnb|Gill|1968|pp=50–51}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=208–209}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=66–69}}; {{harvnb|Tagaya|2001|pp=40–41}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=63–66}}; {{harvnb|Pelvin|2017}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=159, 171–174}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|pp=38–39}}. Crace later said of his situation at sunset on 7&nbsp;May, "I had received no information from [Fletcher] regarding his position, his intentions or what had been achieved during the day" (Lundstrom 2006, p. 174; Gill, p. 50).</ref>

Shortly after 15:00, ''Zuikaku'' monitored a message from a Deboyne-based reconnaissance aircraft reporting (incorrectly) that Crace's force had altered course to 120° true (southeast). Takagi's staff assumed the aircraft was shadowing Fletcher's carriers and determined if the Allied ships held that course, they would be within striking range shortly before nightfall. Takagi and Hara were determined to attack immediately with a select group of aircraft, minus fighter escort, even though it meant the strike would return after dark.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|p=209}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=61–62}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|p=74}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=175}}. The aircraft which made this report was probably an {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Aoba||2}} floatplane staging through Deboyne. The report was incorrect; neither Crace nor Fletcher was heading southeast at that time (Lundstrom 2006, p. 175).</ref>

To try to confirm the location of the U.S. carriers, at 15:15 Hara sent a flight of eight torpedo bombers as scouts to sweep {{convert|200|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} westward. About that same time, the dive bombers that had attacked ''Neosho'' returned and landed. Six of the weary dive bomber pilots were told they would be immediately departing on another mission. Choosing his most experienced crews, including Takahashi, Shimazaki and Lieutenant [[Tamotsu Ema]], at 16:15 Hara launched 12 dive bombers and 15 torpedo planes with orders to fly on a heading of 277° to {{convert|280|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}. The eight scout aircraft reached the end of their {{convert|200|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} search leg and turned back without seeing Fletcher's ships.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|p=209}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=61–62}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=74–75}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=175–176}}. Two of the dive bombers returning from hitting ''Neosho'' crashed while attempting to land, but the crews apparently survived. Lieutenant Tamotsu Ema, commander of ''Zuikaku''{{'}}s dive bomber squadron, was one of the pilots selected for the evening strike mission.</ref>

At 17:47, TF&nbsp;17 – operating under thick overcast {{convert|200|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} west of Takagi – detected the Japanese strike on radar heading in their direction, turned southeast into the wind, and vectored 11 CAP Wildcats, led by Lieutenant Commanders [[Paul H. Ramsey]] and [[James H. Flatley]], to intercept. Taking the Japanese formation by surprise, the Wildcats shot down seven torpedo bombers and one dive bomber, and heavily damaged another torpedo bomber (which later crashed), at a cost of three Wildcats lost.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=209–212}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=62–63}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|pp=99–100}}; {{harvnb|Woolridge|1993|pp=38–39}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|p=75}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=176–177}}. Five of the downed torpedo bombers were from ''Zuikaku'' and the other two were from ''Shōkaku'', as was the damaged torpedo plane. The dive bomber was from ''Zuikaku''. The dead Japanese aircrews included the commanding officer of ''Zuikaku''{{'}}s torpedo bomber squadron, Lieutenant Yoshiaki Tsubota, and two division leaders, Lieutenants Yoshito Murakami (''Zuikaku'') and Tsutomu Hagiwara (''Shokaku''). The pilot of the damaged torpedo bomber was killed, so the middle-seat observer took over the controls and ditched near ''Shōkaku''; both he and the rear gunner were killed. Two of the Wildcat pilots, Paul G. Baker from VF-2 on ''Lexington'' and Leslie L. B. Knox from VF-42 on ''Yorktown'', were killed in action. Another CAP Wildcat, piloted by [[John Drayton Baker]] from ''Yorktown''{{'}}s VF-42, was apparently unable to locate TF-17 in the deepening gloom after the action and vanished without a trace (Lundstrom and Cressman). [[William Wolfe Wileman]] was one of the Wildcat pilots who survived the action.</ref>

[[File:Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless USN Early (December 23 1941-May 8 1942) 2-S-12.tif|thumb|2-S-12 From Scouting Squadron 2 on board the USS ''Lexington'']]

Having taken heavy losses in the attack, which also scattered their formations, the Japanese strike leaders canceled the mission after conferring by radio. The Japanese aircraft all jettisoned their ordnance and reversed course to return to their carriers. The sun set at 18:30. Several of the Japanese dive bombers encountered the U.S. carriers in the darkness, around 19:00, and briefly confused as to their identity, circled in preparation for landing before anti-aircraft fire from TF&nbsp;17's destroyers drove them away. By 20:00, TF&nbsp;17 and Takagi were about {{convert|100|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} apart. Takagi turned on his warships' searchlights to help guide the 18 surviving aircraft back and all were recovered by 22:00.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=214–218}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=63–64}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|pp=100–101}}; {{harvnb|Woolridge|1993|p=39}}; {{harvnb|Hoehling|1971|pp=45–47}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=75–76}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=176–180}}. Cressman says that some of the Japanese carrier aircraft did not land until after 23:00. Hoehling and Woolridge report that up to eight Japanese aircraft may have lined up to land on the U.S. carriers after sunset, but Lundstrom and Cressman explain that the number of aircraft was probably fewer than that. Millot states the postwar belief that 11 more Japanese aircraft were lost while landing on their carriers, but Lundstrom, citing Japanese sources, disagrees, stating that the 18 surviving aircraft all returned safely. In addition to his carriers' lights, Takagi's cruisers and destroyers illuminated the two carriers with their searchlights (Lundstrom 2006, p. 178).</ref>

In the meantime, at 15:18 and 17:18 ''Neosho'' was able to radio TF&nbsp;17 she was drifting northwest in dire straits. ''Neosho''{{'}}s 17:18 report gave wrong coordinates, which hampered subsequent U.S. rescue efforts to locate the oiler. More significantly, the news informed Fletcher his only nearby available fuel supply was gone.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=173–174}}. ''Tippecanoe'' was sent to Efate to give her remaining fuel to the ships of a supply convoy. One other oiler, ''E. J. Henry'', was at Suva and therefore several days away from the Nouméa area (Lundstrom 2006, p. 173).</ref>

As nightfall ended aircraft operations for the day, Fletcher ordered TF&nbsp;17 to head west and prepared to launch a 360° search at first light. Crace also turned west to stay within striking range of the Louisiades. Inoue directed Takagi to make sure he destroyed the U.S. carriers the next day, and postponed the Port Moresby landings to 12&nbsp;May. Takagi elected to take his carriers {{convert|120|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} north during the night so he could concentrate his morning search to the west and south and ensure that his carriers could provide better protection for the invasion convoy. Gotō and Kajioka were unable to position and coordinate their ships in time to attempt a night attack on the Allied warships.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=219–220}}; {{harvnb|Hoyt|2003|pp=64, 77}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|p=101}}; {{harvnb|Hoehling|1971|p=47}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=78–79}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=132}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=171, 180–182}}.</ref>

Both sides expected to find each other early the next day, and spent the night preparing their strike aircraft for the anticipated battle as their exhausted aircrews attempted to get a few hours' sleep. In 1972, U.S. Vice Admiral H. S. Duckworth, after reading Japanese records of the battle, commented, "Without a doubt, May&nbsp;7, 1942, vicinity of Coral Sea, was the most confused battle area in world history."<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2005b|pp=219–220}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|p=101}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|pp=180–182}}. Fletcher contemplated launching a carrier nocturnal attack or sending his cruisers and destroyers after Takagi's ships during the night, but decided it would be better to preserve his forces for battle the next day ({{harvnb|ONI|1943|p=19}}; Cressman, p. 101 and Lundstrom 2006, pp. 179–180). During the night, three Japanese Type 97 aircraft armed with torpedoes hunted Crace but failed to locate him (Lundstrom 2006, p. 182).</ref> Hara later told Yamamoto's chief of staff, Admiral [[Matome Ugaki]], he was so frustrated with the "poor luck" the Japanese experienced on 7 May that he felt like quitting the navy.{{sfn|Chihaya|1991|p=128}}