Editing Battle of Shiloh (section)

===Fighting starts at Fraley Field===
[[File:Battle of Shiloh starts V3.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Powell found the Confederate Army near Fraley Field|alt=Map showing Union patrol finding large Confederate force at Fraley Field]]
The Confederate Third Brigade of Hardee's Third Corps was southwest of Powell's patrol. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier General [[S. A. M. Wood]], and he had sent forward 280 skirmishers from Major Aaron B. Hardcastle's Third Mississippi Battalion.<ref name="Daniel143-144">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|pp=143–144}}</ref> Hardcastle kept most of his men in the southeast corner of James J. Fraley's 40-acre (16 ha) cotton field, while two sets of pickets were positioned closer to the Union camps.<ref name="Daniel143-144"/> Around 5:00{{nbsp}}am (April 6), Confederate pickets fired at Powell's men before returning to the battalion. When Powell advanced within {{convert|200|yd}} of Hardcastle's main force, the Confederates opened fire.<ref name="Daniel144">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=144}}</ref> The battle began with these two small forces fighting for over an hour.<ref name="NPSFraleyField">{{cite web
|title=Fraley Field – Tour Stop #7
|publisher=National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior
|url=https://www.nps.gov/places/fraley-field-tour-stop-7.htm
|access-date=2022-06-16}}</ref>

Around 5:30{{nbsp}}am, Confederate leaders heard the commotion at Fraley Field, and Johnston ordered a general attack.<ref name="Daniel144"/> Johnston instructed Beauregard to stay in the rear and direct men and supplies as needed. Johnston rode to the front to lead the men on the battle line, and this arrangement effectively ceded control of the battle to Beauregard.<ref name="Eicher226">{{harvnb|Eicher|2001|p=226}}</ref>{{#tag:ref|Johnston was under tremendous pressure to perform well after the losses in Tennessee.<ref name="McPherson405"/> He felt that he could make his army more effective by inspiring his inexperienced troops in person.<ref name="Esposito34">{{harvnb|Esposito|1959|p=34}}</ref>|group=Note}} On the Union side, Powell sent a message to Colonel Peabody that he was being driven back by an enemy force of several thousand.<ref name="Daniel145">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=145}}</ref> Hearing the fighting, Prentiss soon learned that Peabody had sent out a patrol without authorization. Prentiss was outraged and accused Peabody of provoking a major engagement in violation of Grant's orders. However, he soon understood that he was facing a large Confederate force and sent reinforcements.<ref name="Daniel147">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=147}}</ref> Peabody's patrol, with Powell leading, partially ruined the planned Confederate surprise and gave thousands of Union soldiers time (although brief) to prepare for battle.<ref name="Cunningham154">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=154}}</ref> Although Peabody's patrol had alerted the Union army, some Union leaders were not convinced that they were under attack. Sherman was not convinced until he was slightly wounded, and one of his orderlies shot dead, after a 7:00{{nbsp}}am ride to investigate the commotion near Rea Field.<ref name="Daniel158">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=158}}</ref>

After Johnston's 5:30 order for a general attack, it took an hour before all Confederate troops were ready. Another hour was lost skirmishing at Seay Field (close to Fraley Field). This reduced the Confederate advantage from the unexpected attack.<ref name="Daniel149">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=149}}</ref> The Confederate army alignment was another issue that helped reduce the attack's effectiveness. The corps of Hardee and Bragg began the assault with their divisions in one line that was nearly {{convert|3|mi|km}} wide.<ref name="Cunningham200">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=200}}</ref> At about 7:30{{nbsp}}am Beauregard ordered the corps of Polk and Breckinridge forward on the left and right of the line, which only extended the line and diluted the effectiveness of the two attacking corps.<ref name="Esposito34"/> It became impossible to control the intermingled units, so the corps commanders decided to divide the battlefield, and each commander led their battlefield portion instead of their own corps.<ref name="Cunningham200"/> The attack went forward as a [[frontal assault]].<ref name="Eicher224-226">{{harvnb|Eicher|2001|pp=224–226}}</ref> Johnston and Beauregard did not put more strength on the east side, which meant they did not focus on their objective of turning the Union left.<ref name="Daniel119">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=119}}</ref>