Editing Battle of Monte Cassino (section)

== Second battle (Operation Avenger) ==
{{Further|Second Battle of Monte Cassino order of battle February 1944}}
[[File:Cassino2nd en.svg|thumb|Second battle: plan of attack]]

===Background===
Freyberg, with U.S. VI Corps under heavy threat at Anzio, was under equal pressure to launch a relieving action at Cassino. Once again, therefore, the battle began without the attackers being fully prepared. Furthermore, Corps HQ did not fully appreciate the difficulty in getting the 4th Indian Infantry Division into place in the mountains and supplying them on the ridges and valleys north of Cassino. This was evidenced in the writings of Maj. Gen. [[Howard Kippenberger]], commander of New Zealand's 2nd Division, after the war:

{{blockquote|Poor [[Harry Kenneth Dimoline|Dimoline]] (acting commander of 4th Indian Division) was having a dreadful time getting his division into position. I never really appreciated the difficulties until I went over the ground after the war.|Kippenberger<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=128}}</ref>}}

Freyberg's plan was a continuation of the first battle: an attack from the north along the mountain ridges and an attack from the southeast along the railway line, and to capture the railway station across the Rapido less than {{convert|1|mi}} south of Cassino town. Success would squeeze out Cassino town and open up the Liri valley. Freyberg had informed his superiors that he estimated that the offensive had a 50 percent chance of success, given the circumstances.<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=107}}</ref>

===Destruction of the abbey===
Allied officers increasingly focused on the abbey of Monte Cassino, which was believed to be used as a German artillery observation point. The abbey was presumed to have prevented the breach of the 'Gustav Line'.

The British press and [[C. L. Sulzberger]] of ''[[The New York Times]]'' wrote about German observation posts and artillery positions inside the abbey, but their claims were not substantiated.<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 161</ref> The commander in chief of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Lieutenant General [[Ira C. Eaker]], accompanied by Lieutenant General [[Jacob L. Devers]] (deputy to General Sir [[Henry Maitland Wilson]], the Supreme Allied Commander of the [[AFHQ|Mediterranean Theater]]), personally observed during a fly-over "a radio mast&nbsp;... German uniforms hanging on a clothesline in the abbey courtyard; [and] machine gun emplacements {{convert|50|yd}} from the abbey walls."<ref name="H+R185">Hapgood & Richardson, p. 185.</ref>{{refn|group="nb"|There is an inconsistency between the description of this event by historian Albert Simpson in the Official History of the Army Air Force published in 1951<ref>Simpson, [https://books.google.com/books?id=jTXWGhwBacAC pp. 362 & 363]</ref> and that described in Hapgood & Richardson (based on a taped interview with Eaker by co-author D. W. Richardson).<ref name="H+R185"/> The Official History says the flight took place in a [[Piper J-3|Piper Cub]] at a height of "less than 200 feet" while the later publication states the flight took place in an [[L-5 Sentinel]] at an altitude of between 1,200 and 1,500 feet and that the generals' flight was escorted by three fighter-bombers flying {{convert|1,000|ft|m}} above them. The confusion between the J-3 and L-5 is easy to understand since they are very similar aircraft. It is possible that the difference in height is explained by the one being a height above the abbey and the other a height above the valley floor.}} U.S. II Corps commander [[Geoffrey Keyes]] flew over the monastery several times and reported to Fifth Army G-2 that he had not seen evidence of German troops in the abbey. When informed of others' claims of having seen enemy troops there, he stated, "They've been looking so long they're seeing things."<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 169.</ref> US Army Artillery Pilot Spotter [[Hughes Rudd]] saw German positions at the Abbey.<ref>[http://www.americanheritage.com/content/when-i-landed-war-was-over When I landed the War Was over American Heritage Magazine]</ref>

Kippenberger of the New Zealand Corps HQ believed that the monastery was probably being used as the Germans' main vantage point for artillery spotting because of its strategic location, but there was no clear evidence. From a military point of view, whether the monastery was being used as an observation point was immaterial.

{{blockquote|If not occupied today, it might be tomorrow and it did not appear it would be difficult for the enemy to bring reserves into it during an attack or for troops to take shelter there if driven from positions outside. It was impossible to ask troops to storm a hill surmounted by an intact building such as this, capable of sheltering several hundred infantry in perfect security from shellfire and ready at the critical moment to emerge and counter-attack.&nbsp;... Undamaged it was a perfect shelter but with its narrow windows and level profiles an unsatisfactory fighting position. Smashed by bombing it was a jagged heap of broken masonry and debris open to effective fire from guns, mortars and strafing planes as well as being a death trap if bombed again. On the whole I thought it would be more useful to the Germans if we left it unbombed.<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|pp=121–122}}</ref>}}
[[File:B17overAbbey.jpg|thumb|A [[Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress|B-17 Flying Fortress]] over Monte Cassino, 15 February 1944]]

Major General [[Francis Tuker]], whose 4th Indian Division would have the task of attacking Monastery Hill, had made his own appraisal of the situation. In the absence of detailed intelligence at Fifth Army HQ, he found a book dated 1879 in a Naples bookshop that gave details of the construction of the abbey. In his memorandum to Freyberg, he concluded that regardless of whether the monastery was currently occupied by the Germans, it should be demolished to prevent its effective occupation. He also pointed out that with {{convert|150|ft|m|adj=on}} high walls made of masonry at least {{convert|10|ft|m}} thick, there were no practical means for field engineers to deal with the place and that bombing with [[blockbuster bomb|"blockbuster" bombs]] ("high capacity" bombs of 2,000 and 4,000 lb) would be the only solution since 1,000-pound bombs would be "next to useless".<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|pp=114–115}}</ref> Tuker stated that he could only attack if the garrison was weakened by continuous bombing by air and artillery.<ref>Holmes ''Battlefields of the Second World War'' (2001) BBC Worldwide p. 113</ref> Tuker's own opinion was that instead of continuing to batter against Cassino, attacks should be elsewhere where terrain was more favourable and so isolating the area and thus forcing the Germans to retreat but, if the attack was to be against Cassino,then all German positions on the Cassino massif including Point 593- not just the abbey - should be attacked and the ground attack should immediately follow it.<ref name=":1">James Holland, <nowiki>''We Have Ways''</nowiki> podcast.  Episode 756 "Capturing Cassino Part 4" 4 April 2024. Goalhanger Productions</ref> Initially Freyberg had accepted Tuker's suggestion for the attack but with Tuker absent from 2 February he started to have doubts and fell back on the idea of another direct attack on Cassino.<ref name=":0" /> 

On 11 February 1944, the acting commander of the 4th Indian Division, Brigadier General Dimoline (usually the Commander Royal Artillery in 4th Indian), requested a bombing raid. Tuker reiterated his case again from a hospital bed in [[Caserta]], where he was suffering a severe attack of a recurrent [[rheumatoid arthritis]].<ref name=":0" /> Freyberg transmitted his request on 12 February for fighter bombers armed with 1,000 lb bombs.<ref name=":1" /> The request, however, was greatly expanded by air force planners and probably supported by Eaker and Devers, who sought to use the opportunity to showcase the abilities of U.S. Army air power to support ground operations.<ref>{{harvnb|Laurie|2003|p=14}}</ref> Clark and his chief of staff, Major General [[Alfred Gruenther]], remained unconvinced of the "military necessity". When handing over the U.S. II Corps position to the New Zealand Corps, Brigadier General J.A. Butler, deputy commander of the U.S. 34th Division, said, "I don't know, but I don't believe the enemy is in the convent. All the fire has been from the slopes of the hill below the wall".<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=122}}</ref> Finally, Clark, "who did not want the monastery bombed",<ref>{{harvnb|Gooderson|2003|p=81}}</ref> pinned down the Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies in Italy, Alexander, to take the responsibility: "I said, 'You give me a direct order and we'll do it,' and he did."<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 173</ref>

The bombing mission in the morning of 15 February 1944 involved 142 [[Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress]] heavy bombers, followed by 47 [[North American B-25 Mitchell]] and 40 [[Martin B-26 Marauder]] medium bombers. In all, they dropped 1,150 tonnes of high explosives and incendiary bombs on the abbey, reducing the entire summit of Monte Cassino to a smoking mass of rubble. Between bomb runs, the II Corps artillery pounded the mountain.<ref>{{harvnb|Laurie|2003|pp=14–15}}</ref> Many Allied soldiers and war correspondents cheered as they observed the spectacle. Eaker and Devers watched; Juin was heard to remark, "no, they'll never get anywhere this way."<ref>{{harvnb|Gooderson|2003|p=84}}</ref> Clark and Gruenther refused to be on the scene and stayed at their headquarters. That same afternoon and the next day, an aggressive follow-up of artillery and a raid by 59 fighter bombers wreaked further destruction. The German positions on Point 593 above and behind the monastery were untouched.<ref>Holmes (2001) p. 114</ref>

Damningly, the air raid had not been coordinated with ground commands, and an immediate infantry follow-up failed to materialise. Its timing had been driven by the Air Force, which viewed it as a separate operation, considering the availability of good weather and requirements on other fronts and theatres without reference to ground forces. The brigade commanders of the 4th Indian division were having a morning planning meeting and were surprised to see the bombers go overhead.<ref name=":1" />   Many of the troops had only taken over their positions from II Corps two days previously, and besides the difficulties in the mountains, preparations in the valley had also been held up by difficulties in supplying the newly installed troops with sufficient material for a full-scale assault because of incessantly foul weather, flooding, and waterlogged ground. As a result, Indian troops on the Snake's Head were taken by surprise,<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=142}}</ref> while the New Zealand Corps was two days away from being ready to launch their main assault.

===After the bombing===
[[File:The ruined monastery at Cassino, Italy, 19 May 1944. NA15141.jpg|thumb|left|Monte Cassino in ruins.]]
[[Pope Pius XII]] was silent after the bombing; however, his [[Cardinal Secretary of State]], [[Luigi Maglione]], bluntly stated to the senior U.S. diplomat to the Vatican, [[Harold Tittmann]], that the bombing was "a colossal blunder … a piece of a gross stupidity".<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 225</ref>

From every investigation that followed since the event, it is certain that the only people killed in the monastery by the bombing were 230 Italian civilians seeking refuge in the abbey.<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 211</ref> There is no evidence that the bombs dropped on the Monte Cassino monastery that day killed any German troops. However, given the imprecision of bombing in those days (it was estimated that only 10 percent of the bombs from the heavy bombers, bombing from a high altitude, hit the monastery), bombs did fall elsewhere and kill German and Allied troops alike, although that would have been [[friendly fire|unintended]]. Indeed, sixteen bombs hit the Fifth Army compound at [[Presenzano]], {{convert|17|mi|km}} from Monte Cassino, and exploded only yards away from the trailer where Clark was doing paperwork at his desk.<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 203.</ref>

On the day after the bombing, at first light, most of the civilians still alive fled the ruins. Only about 40 people remained: the six monks who survived in the deep vaults of the abbey; their 79-year-old abbot, [[:it:Gregorio Diamare|Gregorio Diamare]]; three tenant farmer families; orphaned or abandoned children; the badly wounded; and the dying. After artillery barrages, renewed bombing, and attacks on the ridge by the 4th Indian Division, the monks decided to leave their ruined home with the others who could move at 07:30 on 17 February. The old abbot was leading the group down the mule path towards the Liri valley, reciting the rosary. After they arrived at a German first-aid station, some of the badly wounded who had been carried by the monks were taken away in a military ambulance. After meeting with a German officer, the monks were driven to the monastery of [[Sant'Anselmo all'Aventino]]. On 18 February, the abbot met the commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, Lieutenant-General [[Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin]].<ref>Hapgood & Richardson, p. 221</ref> One monk, Carlomanno Pellagalli, returned to the abbey; when he was later seen wandering the ruins, the German paratroopers thought he was a ghost. After 3 April, he was not seen again.{{citation needed|date=January 2023}}

It is now known that the Germans had an agreement not to use the abbey for military purposes.{{refn|The Germans concluded an agreement with the Vatican in December 1943 giving assurance that German troops would not occupy the abbey.<ref>Molony, Vol. V, p. 480</ref> The British official history, first published in 1973, states that the German commanders considered the "Cassino Position" to be the keystone of the defensive line<ref>Molony, Vol. V, p. 694</ref> but concludes that "There is abundant and convincing evidence that the Germans made no military use whatever of the abbey's buildings until after the Allies had wrecked them by bombing."<ref>Molony, Vol. V, p. 695</ref>|group="nb"}} Following its destruction, paratroopers of the [[German 1st Parachute Division]] then occupied the ruins of the abbey and turned it into a fortress and observation post, which became a serious problem for the attacking Allied forces.

===Battle===
On the night following the bombing, a company of the 1st Battalion, [[Royal Sussex Regiment]] (one of the British elements in the 4th Indian Division) serving in the [[7th Indian Infantry Brigade]] attacked key point 593 from their position {{convert|70|yd}} away on Snakeshead Ridge. The assault failed, with the company sustaining 50 percent casualties.

The following night, the Royal Sussex Regiment was ordered to attack in battalion strength. There was a calamitous start. Artillery could not be used in direct support targeting point 593 because of the proximity and risk of shelling friendly troops. It was therefore planned to shell point 575, which had been providing supporting fire to the defenders of point 593. The topography of the land meant that shells fired at 575 had to pass very low over Snakeshead Ridge, and in the event that some fell among the gathering assault companies. After reorganising, the attack went in at midnight. The fighting was brutal and often hand-to-hand, but the determined defence held and the Royal Sussex battalion was beaten off, once again sustaining over 50 percent casualties. Over the two nights, the Royal Sussex Regiment lost 12 out of 15 officers and 162 out of 313 men who took part in the attack.<ref>Holmes (2001) p. 115</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-577-1917-08, Monte Cassino, Fallschirmjäger mit Granatwerfer.jpg|thumb|German paratroopers at Monte Cassino]]

On the night of 17 February, the main assault took place. The 4/[[6th Rajputana Rifles]] would take on the assault on Point 593 along Snakeshead Ridge with the depleted Royal Sussex Regiment held in reserve. 1/[[9th Gurkha Rifles]] were to attack Point 444.<ref>Holmes p. 115</ref> In the meantime, the [[2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles)|1/2nd Gurkha Rifles]] were to sweep across the slopes and ravines in a direct assault on the monastery. This latter was across appalling terrain, but it was hoped that the Gurkhas, so expert in mountain terrain, would succeed. This proved a faint hope. Once again, the fighting was brutal, but no progress was made and casualties were heavy. The Rajputanas lost 196 officers and men, the 1/9th Gurkhas 149 and the 1/2nd Gurkhas 96. It became clear that the attack had failed and on 18 February Dimoline and Freyberg called off the attacks on Monastery Hill.

In the other half of the main assault, the two companies from the [[Māori Battalion|28th (Māori) Battalion]] from the New Zealand Division forced a crossing of the Rapido and attempted to gain the railway station in Cassino town. The intention was to create a perimeter that would allow engineers to build a causeway for armoured support. With the aid of a nearly constant smoke screen laid down by Allied artillery that obscured their location from the German batteries on Monastery Hill, the Māori were able to hold their positions for much of the day. Their isolation and lack of both armoured support and anti-tank guns made for a hopeless situation, however, when an armoured counterattack by two tanks came in the afternoon on 18 February.<ref>{{harvnb|Cody|1956|p= 362}}.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|McGibbon|2000|p=251}}.</ref> They were ordered to pull back to the river when it became clear to headquarters that both attempts to break through (in the mountains and along the causeway) would not succeed. It had been very close. The Germans had been very alarmed by the capture of the station, and from a recorded conversation between Kesselring and von Vietinghoff, they had not expected their counterattack to succeed.<ref>{{harvnb|Majdalany|1957|p=161}}</ref>

After the war, regarding the second battle, Senger admitted that when he was contemplating the prospects of a renewed frontal assault on Cassino that "what I feared even more was an attack by Juin's corps with its superb Moroccan and Algerian divisions".<ref>{{harvnb|Ellis|2003|p=209}}</ref><ref>Frido von Senger und Etterlin, ''Neither Fear Nor Hope''. Presidio. 1989. [https://books.google.com/books?id=eyNyAAAAIAAJ&q=%22was+an+attack+by+juin%27s+corps%22 p. 206].</ref>