Editing Battle of Gettysburg (section)

===Plans and movement to battle===
[[File:Gettysburg Day2 Plan.png|thumb|[[Confederate States Army|Confederate]] general [[Robert E. Lee]]'s plan for the [[Battle of Gettysburg, second day|second day]] of the Battle of Gettysburg, fought on July 2, 1863]]
[[File:The First Minnesota by Don Troiani (4101092782).jpg|thumb|A bayonet charge by the [[1st Minnesota Infantry Regiment]] against a Confederate brigade on the battle's second day]]
Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Two of Longstreet's divisions were on the road: Brigadier General [[George Pickett]], had begun the {{convert|22|mi|km|adj=on}} march from Chambersburg, while Brigadier General [[Evander M. Law]] had begun the march from Guilford. Both arrived late in the morning. Law completed his {{convert|28|mi|km|adj=on}} march in eleven hours.<ref>Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 365</ref>

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly {{convert|2|mi|km|sigfig=1|spell=in|abbr=out}} along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Map Study of the Battle of Gettysburg {{!}} Historical Society of Pennsylvania |url=https://hsp.org/education/unit-plans/a-map-study-of-the-battle-of-gettysburg/a-map-study-of-the-battle-of-gettysburg |access-date=2022-12-17 |website=[[Historical Society of Pennsylvania]]}}</ref> Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation.<ref>Eicher, p. 521; Sears, pp. 245-246.</ref>

The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about {{convert|1|mi|m|spell=in|abbr=out}} to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Union army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly {{convert|5|mi|km|0|spell=in}} long.<ref>Clark, p. 74; Eicher, p. 521.</ref>

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for a general assault of Meade's positions. On the right, Longstreet's First Corps was to position itself to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the [[Emmitsburg]] Road, and to roll up the Union line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. [[John Bell Hood]]'s and [[Lafayette McLaws]]'s divisions, followed by Major General [[Richard H. Anderson (general)|Richard H. Anderson]]'s division of Hill's Third Corps.<ref name=":0">James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. (Philadelphia, PA: J. R. Lippincott company, 1896), p. 365.</ref>

On the left, Lee instructed Ewell to position his Second Corps to attack Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill when he heard the gunfire from Longstreet's assault, preventing Meade from shifting troops to bolster his left. Though it does not appear in either his or Lee's Official Report, Ewell claimed years later that Lee had changed the order to simultaneously attack, calling for only a "diversion", to be turned into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.<ref>Sears, p. 255; Clark, p. 69.</ref><ref name="Edward Porter Alexander 1907 p. 408">Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 408</ref>

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning, he did not visit Longstreet's position on the Confederate right. Even so, Lee rejected suggestions that Longstreet move beyond Meade's left and attack the Union flank, capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade's escape route.<ref>Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 368</ref>

Lee did not issue orders for the attack until 11:00&nbsp;a.m.<ref name=":0"/>{{#tag:ref|Claims have been made that Lee intended for there to be an attack at sunrise, or at another point earlier in the day, but that the attack was delayed by Longstreet.  Lee allegedly stated "What can detain Longstreet" not long after 9:00&nbsp;am that morning, and Longstreet has been attributed as saying that "[Lee] wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett"; some writers have interpreted these statements as an indication that Lee intended the attack to take place earlier.  Eicher rejects claims that Lee intended for the attack to begin at sunrise, although allowing that it is possible that Lee may have intended for an earlier attack. Eicher concludes that "preparations for the attack did not get underway until between 11 A.M. and noon". Sears notes that Lee "was said to be exasperated" by the late start of the attack, but also states that "having made plain by his orders to McLaws that he was assuming tactical command of the operation, Lee had not issued any earlier start-up order".<ref>Eicher, p. 522; Sears, p. 257</ref> |group=fn}} About noon, General Anderson's advancing troops were discovered by General Sickles's outpost guard and the Third Corps—upon which Longstreet's First Corps was to form—did not get into position until 1:00&nbsp;pm.<ref>Longstreet, From Mannassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 366</ref>

Hood and McLaws, after their long march, were not yet in position and did not launch their attacks until just after 4:00{{nbsp}}p.m. and 5:00{{nbsp}}p.m., respectively.<ref>Pfanz, ''Second Day'', pp. 119–123.</ref>