Editing Batavian Republic (section)

===Staatsbewind and the Peace of Amiens===
{{main|Staatsbewind|Treaty of Amiens}}

====Pressure for constitutional reform====
Though Napoleon had a warlike reputation, his policies in his first years as [[First Consul]] were aimed at restoring peace in Europe, albeit at terms favorable to France. The animus of the members of the [[Second Coalition]] was mostly against the French Revolution, its ideas and its consequences. By this time Napoleon himself was convinced of their perfidy. Talleyrand and Napoleon therefore saw a possibility of a compromise, in which France would retain its chain of docile client states, but with the "revolutionary" sting removed, to appease the Allies. That unrevolutionary docility was to be assured by constitutions designed to eliminate not only domestic conflict (as was the new French political order), but also any flashes of impertinent nationalism. France therefore embarked on a program of constitutional reform in the dependent republics, first in the [[Helvetic Republic]], where Napoleon as Mediator imposed the [[Constitution of Malmaison]] in 1801 (followed by the [[Second Helvetic Constitution]] a year later), restoring the old confederal order.<ref>Schama, pp. 410–412.</ref>

A similar "solution" seemed appropriate for the Batavian Republic. The Batavian government, and its constitution, were particularly disliked by the Consul (no friend of democracy in any case), because of the snub that Amsterdam bankers gave in 1800 to his request for a big loan at the usual generous rate of interest the French expected as a matter of right.<ref>Schama, pp. 406–409, 412</ref> He blamed the ''Uitvoerend Bewind'' for this, and many other foibles, like undermining the boycott of British goods. To remedy these ills, a new Batavian constitution on the political principles of the Consulate (union, authority, political office for men of ability and social station) was needed. The new French ambassador [[Charles Louis Huguet, marquis de Sémonville]] he sent to The Hague in 1799 was just the man for this job.<ref>Schama, p. 407.</ref>

Meanwhile, even the minds of reformers like Gogel had become receptive to the need for change. The frustrations of the stalemate between unitarist reformers and democratically elected federalist obstructionists had caused a certain disillusionment with democratic politics in the former (the latter were already convinced). An alliance was therefore forming between the would-be reformers, who would like to finally push their reforms through, by "Bonapartist" means, if necessary, and the people who wished to restore the old federal order, in the hands of the old regent class. Director [[Augustijn Gerhard Besier|Besier]] in particular was amenable to a project that would extend executive power (and curtail that of the Assembly), and revert the constitution to federal devolution. With the help of Sémonville he now started to push a project of constitutional reform that followed the French [[Constitution of the Year VIII]] in important respects: a bicameral legislature would be appointed by a "National College" (akin to the French [[Sénat conservateur]]) from a list of names produced by a convoluted system of national elections. This met with little enthusiasm by two of the other Directors [[François Ermerins]] and [[Jean Henri van Swinden]], and by the Representative Assembly, that rejected the project on 11 June 1801, by fifty votes to twelve.<ref>Schama, pp. 415–416.</ref>

====Augereau-coup====
The majority in the ''Uitvoerend Bewind'' (Gerrit Pijman in particular) therefore amended the project in a sense that gave re-federalization even more emphasis. They unilaterally convened the primary assemblies by a proclamation on 14 September 1801, have a [[Batavian Republic constitutional referendum, 1801|referendum on this new draft constitution]]. The Assembly defiantly ruled this proclamation illegal on 18 September. Then General Augereau (he of the Fructidor-coup), now commander-in-chief of the French forces in the Netherlands, routinely closed the doors of the Assembly (by previous arrangement with Pijman) on 19 September, and arrested the dissident Directors. Despite this military putsch the campaign for the plebiscite took place in an atmosphere of political freedom unthinkable in France. Nevertheless, this did not result in great enthusiasm for the new constitution. When the votes were counted on 1 October, out of 416,619 voters only 16,771 voted in favor and 52,219 against. The Directors then used a sleight of hand that unfortunately would also become familiar in the Dutch constitutional politics of the successor states: they counted the 350,000 abstentions as "tacit affirmations".<ref>Schama, p. 418.</ref>

Unlike the coup of June 1798, the Augereau coup did present a sharp break with the recent past. The new constitution reduced the role of the legislative branch (which now did not have the right of initiative), and expanded the powers of the Executive, which  now became known as the ''Staatsbewind'' (Regency of State). The elective principle was reduced to a formality: the ''Staatsbewind'', originally consisting of the three directors taking part in the coup, expanded its membership by co-optation to twelve. This executive then appointed the first 35 members of the legislature. As vacancies arose, these were filled, as far as possible, on a provincial rota and according to national quotas of representatives of each province (much like the old States-General). Except for Holland, the old provinces were reconstituted. The local and provincial administrative organs continued to be elected – no longer by universal manhood suffrage, but by a system of [[Suffrage#Census suffrage|census suffrage]].<ref>Schama, pp. 419–420; the qualification for standing for office was 200 guilders in annual city taxes or 300 guilders in house rent; 10,000 guilders of real estate or 20,000 guilders worth of securities; Schama, p. 425.</ref>

Most important was the change in personnel of these organs, mostly as a consequence of this electoral change. The "democrats" were mostly replaced by Patriot regents, who had no patience with democracy, and by the old Orangist regents, who did not even have to disguise their allegiance as in early 1801 a convenient amnesty  was proclaimed. One surprising example is [[Egbert Sjuck Gerrold Juckema van Burmania Rengers]], the Orangist [[burgomaster]] of [[Leeuwarden]] before 1795, a notorious reactionary.<ref>Schama writes about him: "His activities both in 1787 and 1794 had earned Burmania Rengers an unsavoury reputation as one of the more enthusiastic bloodhounds of the old regime in Friesland, ..."; Schama, p. 420.</ref>

The coup represented a counter-revolution. This became clear in the way the [[iconography]] of the 1795 revolution disappeared: the [[Epigraph (literature)|epigraph]] ''Vrijheid, Gelijkheid, Broederschap'' (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) which had adorned all official publications, was henceforth removed, and the last [[Liberty Tree]]s were removed from the town squares. Soon the old ways were restored. For example, though the abolition of the guilds formally remained, in practice regulation of crafts and trades was reimposed by local ordinances.<ref>Schama, pp. 423–428.</ref>

====Peace negotiations====
[[File:Gillray - The First Kiss.jpg|thumb|left|In ''The first Kiss this Ten Years! —or—the meeting of Britannia & Citizen François'' (1803), [[James Gillray]] caricatured the peace between France and Britain.]]

Against this background the negotiations for the [[Treaty of Amiens]] started in October 1801. The minor participants in the negotiations between Great Britain and France (the Batavian Republic and Spain) were immediately presented with faits accomplis: the preliminary agreement ceded [[Dutch Ceylon|Ceylon]], and guaranteed free British shipping to the [[Cape of Good Hope]], without the Dutch even being consulted. The Dutch ambassador in France, [[Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck]], who acted as the Dutch [[plenipotentiary]], vainly protested that the Treaty of The Hague had guaranteed the Dutch colonies, and that France had promised not to make a separate peace. After this separate peace had been concluded, the British were left to negotiate with the minor French allies separately. This did not mean that the Dutch were completely left to their own devices: whenever French interests seemed to be in danger, France decisively intervened on its own behalf, as in the attempt to deduct the value of the [[Batavian Navy|Dutch fleet]], surrendered in 1799, that the British had purchased from the Stadtholder, from the [[Indemnity|indemnification]] of the Prince of Orange.<ref>Schama, pp. 437–438.</ref>

That indemnification was an important sideshow in the negotiations. The consequence of the peace treaty was that the Batavian Republic now received international recognition, even by the British, and that the old Dutch Republic was now irreversibly dead. This put an end to all pretensions of the Stadtholder and his heirs, such as they were. It may be important to note that these pretensions were dubious to begin with. The Stadtholder was never the sovereign power in the Netherlands, despite understandable misconceptions by foreigners, who may have thought that a country needed a head of state, and the Stadtholder was it. Instead he was an officeholder, appointed by the provincial States, who also was captain-general and admiral-general of the Union (there was originally no stadtholder on the confederal level).

In the [[Orangist revolution]] of 1747 this office had been revamped to "Stadhouder-generaal" and made hereditary, and after the Prussian intervention of 1787 the powers of the Stadtholder had become dictatorial. But formally the States General had been sovereign since 1588, and the Stadtholder was merely their "first servant".  The British may have entertained certain fantasies about his formal status, but never seriously considered it.<ref>Israel, p. 1127.</ref> An example of this would the British acceptance of the surrender of the Batavian fleet in the name of the Stadtholder in 1799, as though he was a sovereign prince. But this was all make-believe, and it ended with the peace of 1802 (though it was revived in 1813).<ref>Schama, p. 438.</ref>

The Prince had reason to feel aggrieved by this. He did have large patrimonial estates in the Netherlands that now were forfeit. Besides, the loss of his hereditary offices entailed a loss of income. According to his own calculations the arrears in all these incomes since 1795 amounted to 4 million guilders. The ''Staatsbewind'' refused to pay this, or any sum, point blank, and the peace treaty specifically exempted the Dutch from paying anything. Instead, an arrangement between the French, British and Prussians (the former stadtholder's champions{{Efn|The Prussian king was the stadtholder's brother-in-law and his sister continually pleaded with her brother on her husband's behalf.<ref>Schama, p. 452.</ref>}}) in the matter was reached that in return for dropping any and all claims William was to be compensated with the abbatial domains of [[Princely Abbey of Fulda|Fulda]] and [[Corvey Abbey]] (see also [[Principality of Nassau-Orange-Fulda]]).<ref>Schama, pp. 452–453.</ref>

====Short interlude of peace====
The Treaty restored most of the colonies that had been captured by the British since 1795, except [[Dutch Ceylon|Ceylon]], but including the [[Cape Colony]]. This now made the attempts in the Asiatic Council,<ref>''Raad van Aziatische Bezittingen en Etablissementen'' (Council of Asian Possessions and Establishments).</ref> which had replaced the Directorate of the [[Dutch East India Company|VOC]] in 1799, to reform the management of the colonies, more urgent. [[Dirk van Hogendorp (1761–1822)|Dirk van Hogendorp]] was commissioned to write a proposal, that met with considerable enthusiasm from the more progressive elements on the council, like [[Samuel Iperusz. Wiselius]] and [[Johannes Neethling|J.H.Neethling]]. He proposed to abolish all [[perquisites]] and [[sinecure]]s; to permit private trade; to permit native subjects to own private property; to substitute the "land levies" by a regulated land tax; and the abolition of all [[Heerlijkheid#Heerlijkheid rights|seigneurial rights]] in the colonies. This met with overwhelming resistance from vested interests. When a new Charter for the colonies was promulgated, Hogendorp's proposals had been whittled down to insignificance. The vestigial democrats on the Council were now purged in favor of Orangist reactionaries like [[Hendrik Mollerus]], and [[Hendrik Van Stralen]]. In any case, the Republic did not enjoy the possession of its colonies for long. After the resumption of hostilities in 1803 the returned colonies in most cases were soon recaptured by the British. [[Java]], however, remained Dutch until 1811.<ref>Schama, pp. 449–450.</ref>
[[File:Knötel. Batavische Republik. 1. Leichtes Dragoner-Regiment und 2. Leichtes Dragoner-Regiment. 1804 (NYPL b14896507-99329).jpg|thumb|1st Batavian Light Dragoons]]
Another potentially important consequence of the peace might have been that a number of provisions of the Treaty of The Hague, that had been conditional on a peace, like the reduction of the French army of occupation, would now have become operational. However, the First Consul proved reluctant to reduce the numbers of French troops, or return the port of Flushing, for the good of the Dutch as he pointed out, as they needed many of their own troops in their restored colonies, so the "protection" of the French troops was considered necessary. On the other hand, the departure of the French troops was an indispensable point for the British as they could not allow the Netherlands to be dominated by a hostile power, and the Batavian Republic was incapable of defending its own neutrality. This was to be an insoluble dilemma in the coming years.<ref>Schama, p. 439.</ref>

Real advantages of the peace came in the economic field.<ref>See for a discussion of the economic developments in the Republic [[Economic history of the Netherlands (1500–1815)]].</ref> As an [[open economy]], the Republic needed unhindered trade. It was heavily dependent on exports of agricultural products to the British markets, and on its services sector (especially its large merchant fleet, and the banking sector), whereas its industry (whatever remained of it after a century of being confronted by foreign [[protectionism]]) also was dependent on exports. All these sectors had suffered enormously from the war: the British blockade and French and British [[privateer]]ing had almost brought marine trade to a standstill, whereas a commercial treaty with France (which would have ended French discrimination of Dutch trade in industrial goods) proved an ever-receding [[Fata Morgana (mirage)|fata morgana]]. True, much of the trade had shifted to [[flags of convenience]] (especially that of the US and European [[Neutral country|neutrals]] like Prussia), but the peace made the resurgence of the Dutch carrying trade fully practicable. Nevertheless, some changes proved irreversible, like the shift of trade patterns to German ports, and the decline of the fisheries.<ref>Schama, p. 436.</ref>

====Invasion preparations and economic warfare====
[[File:MUSTERING THE BATAVIAN FLEET IN VLISSINGEN HARBOUR, 1804.jpg|thumb|The Batavian fleet in [[Vlissingen]], 1804]]
The peace turned out to be of short duration. On 18 May 1803, slightly more than a year after the peace, war resumed. Napoleon was now intent on the destruction of Great Britain by culminating in an ambitious [[Napoleon's planned invasion of the United Kingdom|planned invasion]]. The French expected the Batavian Republic to play a major supporting role in this. As the Franco-Batavian alliance's embodiment, the ''Staatsbewind'' was forced to assent to a Convention bringing the total of French and Batavian forces in the Netherlands to 35,000. In addition, 9,000 Batavian troops were slated for the proposed overseas expedition. Even more importantly, the Dutch were to supply five ships-of-the-line, five frigates, 100 gunboats, and 250 flat-bottomed transport craft, capable of holding 60–80 men by December 1803.  In total the Dutch were meant to provide transport for 25,000 men and 2,500 horses, the major part of Napoleon's invasion armada, and all at Dutch expense. Napoleon's imposed real burdens on the finances of the Republic and on its economy.<ref>Schama, p. 442.</ref>

Another real burden was the [[economic warfare]] that Napoleon launched against the British, which was answered by a British counter-boycott. This foreshadowed the [[Continental System]] which was written into law in 1806.  However already in 1803 it started to choke off Dutch trade. Ostensibly, the ''Staatsbewind'' did its part by prohibiting the import of all goods from the enemy on 5 July 1803. Later it banned cheese exports and butter. These measures were of little practical effect, since in 1804 the volume of general exports to Britain was nearly equal to that in the last year of peace in 1802. British goods reached Dutch destinations via neutral German ports or disguised as "American cargo". The republic was therefore an important "keyhole into Europe" that undermined the French economic sanctions against Britain. Since the members of the ''Staatsbewind'', and their friends, often profited from this clandestine trade directly, the patience of the French was wearing thin.{{Efn|In the old Republic trading with the enemy had been looked upon as a necessary evil. The Admiralties had been partially financed with so-called ''[[Admiralty of Amsterdam#"Convooi" and "Licent"|licenten]]'', license fees for allowing such trade.}} Matters came to a head when the French commander in the Republic, [[Auguste de Marmont]], ordered in November 1804 that French naval patrols and customs officials were to take over the responsibility for the surveillance of cargoes in Dutch ports, with powers of confiscation without reference to Dutch authorities.  The''Staatsbewind'' forbade any Batavian official to take orders from the French on 23 November 1804.<ref>Schama, pp.463–464.</ref>