Editing Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow (section)

===Foreign interest===
Canada unsuccessfully tried to sell the Arrow to the US and Britain. The aircraft industry in both countries was considered a national interest and the purchase of foreign designs was rare.<ref name="Peden 1987, p. 72"/>

Nevertheless, from 1955 onwards, the UK had shown considerable interest in the Arrow. Desiring a high-performance interceptor like the Arrow, the [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] began the [[Operational Requirement F.155|F.155 program]] in 1955, projecting a service entry date of 1962. As the program continued, it was clear the aircraft would not be ready by that date. It was also clear that new versions of the Soviet M-4 bomber would be available in 1959 that would outperform their existing [[Gloster Javelin]]s, leaving a several-year gap where the RAF would have no effective anti-bomber force. Attention turned to interim designs that could be in service by the late 1950s to cover this period. At first, consideration was given to the [[thin-wing Javelin]] that would provide moderate supersonic performance, along with the extremely high performance but short range [[Saunders-Roe SR.177]].

A new round of development produced an improved Mach&nbsp;1.6 version of the thin-wing Javelin, and the Arrow was put aside for the time. But it was soon clear that the new Javelin would not enter service until at least 1961, too late to stop the new M-4s and with the F.155 designs coming on only two years later. In April 1956, the UK's [[Air Council]] recommended a purchase of 144 Arrows to fill the role of the thin-wing Javelin. These would be powered by UK engines; the [[Rolls-Royce Olympus|Bristol Olympus 7R]] – {{convert|17000|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} thrust dry, {{convert|23700|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} with [[Afterburning|reheat]], the [[Rolls-Royce Conway|Rolls-Royce Conway Stage 4]] – {{convert|18340|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} thrust dry, {{convert|29700|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} with reheat, or [[de Havilland Gyron]] – {{convert|19500|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} thrust dry, {{convert|28000|lbf|kN|abbr=on}} with reheat.

Procurement of the Arrow from Canada, and setting up a production line in the UK, was studied. The unit price per aircraft built in the UK was estimated at £220,000 each for a production run of 100 aircraft, as opposed to the estimate of £150,000 per aircraft for the thin wing Javelin.<ref>defe7-1409e06_06</ref> The CF-105 would serve as a stopgap until the F.155 project came to fruition, but with the F.155 due in 1963 and the Arrow not likely to reach the RAF before 1962, there was little point in proceeding.<ref>Whitcomb 2002, pp.&nbsp;84 and 215–216.</ref>

The infamous [[1957 Defence White Paper]],<ref>[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/films/1951to1964/filmpage_streaked.htm "1951–1964"]. Central Office of Information for Ministry of Defence. Retrieved: 29 June 2012.</ref> described as "the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times", led to the cancellation of almost all British manned fighter aircraft then in development,<ref>Slessor, Sir John. [http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fora35&div=56&id=&page= "British Defense Policy"]. ''Foreign Affairs'', 35(4), July 1957.</ref> and completely curtailed any likelihood of a purchase. In January 1959, the UK's final answer was no; Britain countered with an offer to sell Canada the [[English Electric Lightning]].<ref>Whitcomb 2002, p.&nbsp;220.</ref>

The French government expressed an interest in the Iroquois engine for an enlarged version of the [[Dassault Mirage IV]] bomber, the Mirage IVB. This was one of several engines being considered, including the Olympus, with an order for 300 Iroquois being considered. Acting on media speculation that the Iroquois engine program was also in jeopardy of being cancelled, the French government chose to end negotiations in October 1958<ref name = 'campagna110-111'>Campagna 1998, pp.&nbsp;110–111.</ref> and opted for an upgraded version of the indigenous [[Snecma Atar]], instead.<ref name="Stewart pp. 290–291">Stewart 1998, pp.&nbsp;290–291.</ref> There was never an explanation for this decision offered by the French government, even after Avro tried to offer the Iroquois as a private venture.<ref name="Stewart pp. 290–291"/>

In the US, the [[WS-201|1954 interceptor]] program was well underway, and would ultimately introduce the [[Convair F-106 Delta Dart]], an aircraft with many similarities to the Arrow. More advanced designs were also being considered, notably the Mach&nbsp;3 [[Republic XF-103]], and by the time the Arrow was flying, the much more advanced [[XF-108 Rapier|North American XF-108]]. Both of these programs were cancelled during the mock-up stage, as it was believed the need for a manned interceptor of very high performance simply did not exist as the Soviets were moving their strategic force to ICBMs. This argument added weight to the justification for cancelling the Arrow.<ref>Whitcomb 2002, pp.&nbsp;80, 181–182.</ref><ref name = 'campagna109-110'>Campagna 1998, pp.&nbsp;109–110.</ref> In 1958, Avro Aircraft Limited president and general manager [[Frederick Thomas Smye, Jr.|Fred Smye]] elicited a promise from the USAF to "supply, free, the fire control system and missiles and if they would allow the free use of their flight test centre at&nbsp;... Edwards AFB."<ref>Smye 2014, p.&nbsp;87.</ref>