Editing Avicenna (section)

== Philosophy ==

Avicenna wrote extensively on [[early Islamic philosophy]], especially the subjects [[logic]], [[ethics]] and [[metaphysics]], including treatises named ''Logic'' and ''Metaphysics''. Most of his works were written in Arabic, then the language of science in the Muslim world, and some in Early New Persian. Of linguistic significance even to this day are a few books that he wrote in Persian, particularly the ''[[Danishnama]]''. Avicenna's commentaries on Aristotle often criticized the philosopher,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stroumsa |first=Sarah |date=1992 |title=Avicenna's Philosophical Stories: Aristotle's Poetics Reinterpreted |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4057059 |journal=Arabica |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=183–206 |doi=10.1163/157005892X00166 |jstor=4057059 |issn=0570-5398 |access-date=13 October 2022 |archive-date=13 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221013112327/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4057059 |url-status=live }}</ref> encouraging a lively debate in the spirit of [[ijtihad]].

Avicenna's [[Platonism in Islamic Philosophy|Neoplatonic scheme]] of emanations became fundamental in kalam in the 12th century.<ref>Nahyan A.G. Fancy (2006), pp.&nbsp;80–81, "Pulmonary Transit and Bodily Resurrection: The Interaction of Medicine, Philosophy and Religion in the Works of Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 1288)", ''Electronic Theses and Dissertations'', [http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-11292006-152615 University of Notre Dame] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150404020329/http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-11292006-152615/ |date=4 April 2015 }} {{page needed|date=February 2015}}</ref>

''The Book of Healing'' became available in Europe in a partial Latin translation some fifty years after its composition under the title ''Sufficientia'', and some authors have identified a "Latin Avicennism" as flourishing for some time paralleling the more influential Latin [[Averroism]], but it was suppressed by the [[Condemnations of 1210–1277|Parisian decrees of 1210 and 1215]].<ref><!--there is apparently a whole body of scholarly controversy behind this, and you shouldn't just drop this stuff in passing as if it were factual. Google "Latin Avicennism" and you get material for a giant and involved article in its own right-->
cf. e.g.
Henry Corbin, ''History of Islamic Philosophy'', Routledge, 2014, [https://books.google.com/books?id=l9bgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA174 p. 174].
Henry Corbin, ''Avicenna and the Visionary Recital'', Princeton University Press, 2014, [https://books.google.com/books?id=1P3_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA103 p. 103].</ref>

Avicenna's psychology and theory of knowledge influenced the theologian [[William of Auvergne]]<ref name="IEP">{{Cite web |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/avicenna.htm#H5 |title=The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c. 980–1037) |date=6 January 2006 |publisher=Iep.utm.edu |access-date=19 January 2010 |archive-date=6 April 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090406100921/http://iep.utm.edu/a/avicenna.htm#H5 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Albertus Magnus]],<ref name=IEP /> while his metaphysics influenced the thought of [[Thomas Aquinas]].<ref name=IEP />

=== Metaphysical doctrine ===
{{Technical|section|date=January 2014}}
Early Islamic philosophy and [[Islamic metaphysics]], imbued as it is with kalam, distinguishes between essence and existence more clearly than Aristotelianism. Whereas existence is the domain of the contingent and the accidental, essence endures within a being beyond the accidental. The philosophy of Avicenna, particularly that part relating to metaphysics, owes much to al-Farabi. The search for a definitive Islamic philosophy separate from [[Occasionalism]] can be seen in what is left of his work.

Following [[al-Farabi]]'s lead, Avicenna initiated a full-fledged inquiry into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence ({{langx|ar|ماهية|māhiya|link=no}}) and existence ({{langx|ar|وجود|wujūd|link=no}}). He argued that the fact of existence cannot be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves cannot interact and originate the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Existence must, therefore, be due to an [[causality|agent-cause]] that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must be an existing thing and coexist with its effect.<ref name="Islam in Britannica">{{Cite encyclopedia |year=2007 |title=Islam |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica Online |url=https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-69190/Islam |access-date=27 November 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071222082832/https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-69190/Islam |archive-date=22 December 2007 |url-status=live}}</ref>
====Impossibility, contingency, necessity====
{{see also|Necessity and sufficiency|Contingency (philosophy)|Metaphysical necessity|Potentiality and actuality}}
{{further|Modal logic}}
Avicenna's consideration of the essence-attributes question may be elucidated in terms of his ontological analysis of the modalities of being; namely impossibility, contingency and necessity. Avicenna argued that the impossible being is that which cannot exist, while the contingent in itself (''mumkin bi-dhatihi'') has the potentiality to be or not to be without entailing a contradiction. When actualized, the contingent becomes a 'necessary existent due to what is other than itself' (''wajib al-wujud bi-ghayrihi''). Thus, contingency-in-itself is potential beingness that could eventually be actualized by an external cause other than itself. The metaphysical structures of necessity and contingency are different. Necessary being due to itself (''wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi'') is true in itself, while the contingent being is 'false in itself' and 'true due to something else other than itself'. The necessary is the source of its own being without borrowed existence. It is what always exists.<ref>Avicenna, ''Kitab al-shifa', Metaphysics II'', (eds.) G.C. Anawati, Ibrahim Madkour, Sa'id Zayed (Cairo, 1975), p. 36</ref><ref>[[Nader El-Bizri]], "Avicenna and Essentialism," ''Review of Metaphysics'', Vol. 54 (2001), pp.&nbsp;753–778</ref>

====Differentia====
{{see also|Differentia}}
The Necessary exists 'due-to-Its-Self', and has no quiddity/essence other than existence. Furthermore, It is 'One' (''wahid ahad'')<ref>Avicenna, ''Metaphysica of Avicenna'', trans. Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1973), p. 43.</ref> since there cannot be more than one 'Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself' without differentia (fasl) to distinguish them from each other. Yet, to require differentia entails that they exist 'due-to-themselves' as well as 'due to what is other than themselves'; and this is contradictory. <!--However, i-->If no differentia distinguishes them from each other, then, in no sense are these 'Existents' not the same.<ref name="Nader El-Bizri 2000">Nader El-Bizri, ''The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger'' (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000)</ref> Avicenna adds that the 'Necessary-Existent-due-to-Itself' has no genus (''jins''), nor a definition (''hadd''), nor a counterpart (''nadd''), nor an opposite (''did''), and is detached (''bari'') from matter (''madda''), quality (''kayf''), quantity (''kam''), place (''ayn''), situation (''wad'') and time (''waqt'').<ref>Avicenna, ''Kitab al-Hidaya'', ed. Muhammad 'Abdu (Cairo, 1874), pp.&nbsp;262–263</ref><ref>Salem Mashran, ''al-Janib al-ilahi 'ind Ibn Sina'' (Damascus, 1992), p. 99</ref><ref>Nader El-Bizri, "Being and Necessity: A Phenomenological Investigation of Avicenna's Metaphysics and Cosmology," in ''Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology on the Perennial Issue of Microcosm and Macrocosm'', ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2006), pp.&nbsp;243–261</ref>
====Reception====
Avicenna's theology on metaphysical issues (''ilāhiyyāt'') has been criticized by some [[Islamic scholars]], among them [[al-Ghazali]], [[ibn Taymiyya]], and [[ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya]].<ref>Ibn al-Qayyim, ''Eghaathat al-Lahfaan'', Published: Al Ashqar University (2003) Printed by International Islamic Publishing House: Riyadh.</ref>{{page needed|date=April 2016}} While discussing the views of the theists among the Greek philosophers, namely [[Socrates]], [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] in ''Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal'' "Deliverance from Error", al-Ghazali noted: 
{{quote|[the Greek philosophers] must be taxed with unbelief, as must their partisans among the Muslim philosophers, such as Avicenna and al-Farabi and their likes. None, however, of the Muslim philosophers engaged so much in transmitting Aristotle's lore as did the two men just mentioned. [...] The sum of what we regard as the authentic philosophy of Aristotle, as transmitted by al-Farabi and Avicenna, can be reduced to three parts: a part which must be branded as unbelief; a part which must be stigmatized as innovation; and a part which need not be repudiated at all.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/reading_selections/CVSP%20202/Al-ghazali.pdf |title=al-Munqidh min al-Dalal |last=Ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī |first=Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad |publisher=American University of Beirut |year=1980 |location=Boston |page=10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304095350/https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/cvsp/Documents/reading_selections/CVSP%20202/Al-ghazali.pdf |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=dead}}</ref>}}

=== Argument for God's existence ===
{{Main|Proof of the Truthful}}
Avicenna made an [[argument]] for the [[existence of God]] which would be known as the "[[Proof of the Truthful]]" (''wajib al-wujud''). Avicenna argued that there must be a Proof of the Truthful, an entity that cannot ''not'' exist{{sfn|Adamson|2013|p=170}} and through a series of arguments, he identified it with [[God in Islam]].{{sfn|Adamson|2013|p=171}} Present-day [[History of philosophy|historian of philosophy]] [[Peter Adamson (philosopher)|Peter Adamson]] called this argument one of the most influential medieval arguments for God's existence, and Avicenna's biggest contribution to the history of philosophy.{{sfn|Adamson|2013|p=170}}

=== Al-Biruni correspondence ===
Correspondence between ibn Sina with his student Ahmad ibn ʿAli al-Maʿsumi and [[al-Biruni]] has survived in which they debated Aristotelian [[natural philosophy]] and the Peripatetic school. al-Biruni began by asking eighteen questions, ten of which were criticisms of Aristotle's ''[[On the Heavens]]''.<ref>Rafik Berjak and Muzaffar Iqbal, "Ibn Sina—Al-Biruni correspondence", ''Islam & Science'', June 2003.</ref>

=== Theology ===
Ibn Sina was a devout Muslim and sought to reconcile rational philosophy with Islamic theology. He aimed to prove the existence of God and His creation of the world scientifically and through [[reason]] and [[logic]].<ref name="Goodman-8-9">Lenn Evan Goodman (2003), ''Islamic Humanism'', pp.&nbsp;8–9, [[Oxford University Press]], {{ISBN|0-19-513580-6}}.</ref> His views on Islamic theology and philosophy were enormously influential, forming part of the core of the curriculum at Islamic religious schools until the 19th century.<ref>James W. Morris (1992), "The Philosopher-Prophet in Avicenna's Political Philosophy", in C. Butterworth (ed.), ''The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy'', {{ISBN|978-0-932885-07-4}}, Chapter 4, Cambridge [[Harvard University Press]], pp. 152–198 [p. 156].</ref>

Avicenna wrote several short treatises dealing with Islamic theology. These included treatises on the [[prophets and messengers in Islam]], whom he viewed as "inspired philosophers", and also on various scientific and philosophical interpretations of the Quran, such as how [[Cosmology in medieval Islam|Quranic cosmology]] corresponds to his philosophical system. In general, these treatises linked his philosophical writings to Islamic religious ideas; for example, the body's afterlife.

There are occasional brief hints and allusions in his longer works, however, that Avicenna considered philosophy as the only sensible way to distinguish real prophecy from illusion. He did not state this more clearly because of the political implications of such a theory if prophecy could be questioned, and also because most of the time he was writing shorter works which concentrated on explaining his theories on philosophy and theology clearly, without digressing to consider [[epistemological]] matters which could only be properly considered by other philosophers.<ref>James W. Morris (1992), "The Philosopher-Prophet in Avicenna's Political Philosophy", in C. Butterworth (ed.), ''The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy'', Chapter 4, Cambridge [[Harvard University Press]], pp. 152–198 [pp. &nbsp;160–161].</ref>

Later interpretations of Avicenna's philosophy split into three different schools; those (such as [[Nasir al-Din al-Tusi|al-Tusi]]) who continued to apply his philosophy as a system to interpret later political events and scientific advances; those (such as [[Fakhr al-Din al-Razi|al-Razi]]) who considered Avicenna's theological works in isolation from his wider philosophical concerns; and those (such as [[al-Ghazali]]) who selectively used parts of his philosophy to support their own attempts to gain greater spiritual insights through a variety of mystical means. It was the theological interpretation championed by those such as al-Razi which eventually came to predominate in the [[madrasah]]s.<ref>James W. Morris (1992), "The Philosopher-Prophet in Avicenna's Political Philosophy", in C. Butterworth (ed.), ''The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy'', Chapter 4, Cambridge [[Harvard University Press]], pp. 152–198 [pp.&nbsp;156–158].</ref>

Avicenna memorized the Quran by the age of ten, and as an adult, wrote five treatises commenting on [[surah]]s of the Quran. One of these texts included the ''Proof of Prophecies'', in which he comments on several Quranic verses and holds the Quran in high esteem. Avicenna argued that the Islamic prophets should be considered higher than philosophers.<ref>Jules Janssens (2004), "Avicenna and the Qur'an: A Survey of his Qur'anic commentaries", ''MIDEO'' '''25''', p.&nbsp;177–192.</ref>

Avicenna is generally understood to have been aligned with the Hanafi school of Sunni thought.<ref name="Aisha Khan">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B8k3fsvGRyEC&pg=PA38 |title=Avicenna (Ibn Sina): Muslim physician and philosopher of the eleventh century |last=Aisha Khan |publisher=The Rosen Publishing Group |year=2006 |isbn=978-1-4042-0509-3 |page=38}}</ref><ref name="Janssens91" /> Avicenna studied Hanafi law, many of his notable teachers were Hanafi jurists, and he served under the Hanafi court of Ali ibn Mamun.<ref>{{Citation |last=DIMITRI GUTAS |publisher=Istituto per l'Oriente C. A. Nallino|jstor=25802612 |title=Avicenna's "maḏhab" with an Appendix on the Question of His Date of Birth |journal=Quaderni di Studi Arabi |volume=5/6 |pages=323–336 |year=1987 }}</ref><ref name="Aisha Khan" /> Avicenna said at an early age that he remained "unconvinced" by Ismaili missionary attempts to convert him.<ref name="Aisha Khan" />

Medieval historian Ẓahīr al-dīn al-Bayhaqī (d. 1169) believed Avicenna to be a follower of the [[Brethren of Purity]].<ref name="Janssens91">{{Cite book |last=Janssens |first=Jules L. |title=An annotated bibliography on Ibn Sînâ (1970–1989): including Arabic and Persian publications and Turkish and Russian references |publisher=Leuven University Press |year=1991 |isbn=978-90-6186-476-9 |pages=89–90}} excerpt: "...&nbsp;Dimitri Gutas's ''Avicenna's maḏhab'' convincingly demonstrates that I.S. was a sunnî-Ḥanafî."[https://books.google.com/books?id=3KizrKA5YJ8C&q=ibn%20sina%20hanafi&pg=PA90] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627124106/https://books.google.com/books?id=3KizrKA5YJ8C&pg=PA90&q=ibn%20sina%20hanafi|date=27 June 2022}}</ref>

=== Thought experiments ===
{{Main|Floating man}}
While he was imprisoned in the castle of Fardajan near Hamadhan, Avicenna wrote his famous "[[floating man]]"—literally falling man—a [[thought experiment]] to demonstrate human [[self-awareness]] and the substantiality and immateriality of the soul. Avicenna believed his "Floating Man" thought experiment demonstrated that the soul is a substance, and claimed humans cannot doubt their own consciousness, even in a situation that prevents all sensory data input. The thought experiment told its readers to imagine themselves created all at once while suspended in the air, isolated from all [[Wikt:sensation|sensations]], which includes no sensory contact with even their own bodies. He argued that, in this scenario, one would still have [[self-consciousness]]. Because it is conceivable that a person, suspended in air while cut off from [[empirical evidence|sense experience]], would still be capable of determining his own existence, the thought experiment points to the conclusions that the soul is a perfection, independent of the body, and an immaterial substance.<ref>See a discussion of this in connection with an analytic take on the philosophy of mind in: [[Nader El-Bizri]], 'Avicenna and the Problem of Consciousness', in ''Consciousness and the Great Philosophers'', eds. S. Leach and [[James Tartaglia|J. Tartaglia]] (London: Routledge, 2016), 45–53</ref> The conceivability of this "Floating Man" indicates that the soul is perceived intellectually, which entails the soul's separateness from the body. Avicenna referred to the living human [[nous|intelligence]], particularly the [[active intellect]], which he believed to be the [[hypostatic abstraction|hypostasis]] by which God communicates [[truth]] to the human mind and imparts order and intelligibility to nature. Following is an English translation of the argument:

{{blockquote|One of us (i.e. a human being) should be imagined as having been created in a single stroke; created perfect and complete but with his vision obscured so that he cannot perceive external entities; created falling through air or a void, in such a manner that he is not struck by the firmness of the air in any way that compels him to feel it, and with his limbs separated so that they do not come in contact with or touch each other. Then contemplate the following: can he be assured of the existence of himself? He does not have any doubt in that his self exists, without thereby asserting that he has any exterior limbs, nor any internal organs, neither heart nor brain, nor any one of the exterior things at all; but rather he can affirm the existence of himself, without thereby asserting there that this self has any extension in space. Even if it were possible for him in that state to imagine a hand or any other limb, he would not imagine it as being a part of his self, nor as a condition for the existence of that self; for as you know that which is asserted is different from that which is not asserted and that which is inferred is different from that which is not inferred. Therefore the self, the existence of which has been asserted, is a unique characteristic, in as much that it is not as such the same as the body or the limbs, which have not been ascertained. Thus that which is ascertained (i.e. the self), does have a way of being sure of the existence of the soul as something other than the body, even something non-bodily; this he knows, this he should understand intuitively, if it is that he is ignorant of it and needs to be beaten with a stick [to realize it].|Ibn Sina|Kitab Al-Shifa, On the Soul<ref name="Nader El-Bizri 2000" /><ref>Ibn Sina, ''الفن السادس من الطبيعيات من كتاب الشفاء القسم الأول'' (Beirut, Lebanon.: M.A.J.D Enterprise Universitaire d'Etude et de Publication S.A.R.L)
{{blockquote|{{lang|ar|يجب أن يتوهم الواحد منا كأنه خلق دفعةً وخلق كاملاً لكنه حجب بصره عن مشاهدة الخارجات وخلق يهوى في هواء أو خلاء هوياً لا يصدمه فيه قوام الهواء صدماً ما يحوج إلى أن يحس وفرق بين أعضائه فلم تتلاق ولم تتماس ثم يتأمل هل أنه يثبت وجود ذاته ولا يشكك في إثباته لذاته موجوداً ولا يثبت مع ذلك طرفاً من أعضائه ولا باطناً من أحشائه ولا قلباً ولا دماغاً ولا شيئاً من الأشياء من خارج بل كان يثبت ذاته ولا يثبت لها طولاً ولا عرضاً ولا عمقاً ولو أنه أمكنه في تلك الحالة أن يتخيل يداً أو عضواً آخر  لم يتخيله جزء من ذاته ولا  شرطاً في ذاته وأنت تعلم أن المثبت غير الذي لم يثبت والمقربه غير الذي لم يقربه فإذن للذات التي أثبت وجودها خاصية على أنها هو بعينه غير جسمه وأعضائه التي لم تثبت فإذن المثبت له سبيل إلى أن يثبته على وجود النفس شيئاً غير الجسم بل غير جسم وأنه عارف به مستشعر له وإن كان ذاهلاً عنه يحتاج إلى أن يقرع عصاه.}}|Ibn Sina|Kitab Al-Shifa, On the Soul}}</ref>}}

However, Avicenna posited the brain as the place where reason interacts with sensation. Sensation prepares the soul to receive rational concepts from the universal Agent Intellect. The first knowledge of the flying person would be "I am," affirming his or her essence. That essence could not be the body, obviously, as the flying person has no sensation. Thus, the knowledge that "I am" is the core of a human being: the soul exists and is self-aware.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West |last=Hasse |first=Dag Nikolaus |publisher=Warburg Institute |year=2000 |location=London |page=81}}</ref> Avicenna thus concluded that the idea of the [[self (philosophy)|self]] is not logically dependent on any physical [[Object (philosophy)|thing]], and that the soul should not be seen in [[relative term]]s, but as a primary given, a [[substance theory|substance]]. The body is unnecessary; in relation to it, the soul is its perfection.<ref name="Nader El-Bizri 2000 pp. 149-171" /><ref name="elbizri67-89" /><ref>{{Cite book |title=History of Islamic philosophy |last1=Nasr |first1=Seyyed Hossein |first2=Oliver|last2=Leaman |publisher=Routledge |year=1996 |isbn=978-0-415-05667-0 |pages=315, 1022–1023}}</ref> In itself, the soul is an immaterial substance.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West |last=Hasse |first=Dag Nikolaus |publisher=Warburg Institute |year=2000 |location=London |page=92}}</ref>