Editing Approval voting (section)

=== Overview ===
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Approval voting allows voters to select all the candidates whom they consider to be reasonable choices.

''Strategic approval'' differs from [[ranked voting]] (aka preferential voting) methods where voters are generally forced to ''reverse'' the preference order of two options, which if done on a larger scale can cause an unpopular candidate to win. Strategic approval, with more than two options, involves the voter changing their approval threshold. The voter decides which options to give the ''same'' rating, even if they were to have a preference order between them. This leaves a tactical concern any voter has for approving their second-favorite candidate, in the case that there are three or more candidates. Approving their second-favorite means the voter harms their favorite candidate's chance to win. Not approving their second-favorite means the voter helps the candidate they least desire to beat their second-favorite and perhaps win.

Approval technically allows for but is strategically immune to [[Tactical voting#Push-over|push-over]] and [[Tactical voting#Burying|burying]].

Bullet voting occurs when a voter approves ''only'' candidate "a" instead of ''both'' "a" and "b" for the reason that voting for "b" can cause "a" to lose. The voter would be satisfied with either "a" or "b" but has a moderate preference for "a". Were "b" to win, this hypothetical voter would still be satisfied. If supporters of both "a" and "b" do this, it could cause candidate "c" to win. This creates the "[[chicken dilemma]]", as supporters of "a" and "b" are [[playing chicken]] as to which will stop strategic voting first, before both of these candidates lose.

Compromising occurs when a voter approves an ''additional'' candidate who is otherwise considered unacceptable to the voter to prevent an even worse alternative from winning.