Editing Alvin Plantinga (section)

=== Evolutionary argument against naturalism ===
{{Main|Evolutionary argument against naturalism}}
In Plantinga's [[evolutionary argument against naturalism]], he argues that if evolution is true, it undermines [[Metaphysical naturalism|naturalism]]. His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one's success at the four Fs: "feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing"), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man "[[image of God|in his image]]" by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

The argument does not assume any necessary correlation (or uncorrelation) between true beliefs and survival. Making the contrary assumption—that there is, in fact, a relatively strong correlation between truth and survival—if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a survival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true beliefs confer a survival advantage. Plantinga counters that, while there may be overlap between true beliefs and beliefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs are not the same, and he gives the following example with a man named Paul:

{{blockquote|Perhaps Paul very much ''likes'' the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief... Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it... Clearly there are any number of belief-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behaviour.<ref>Plantinga, Alvin ''Warrant and Proper Function'', (New York: Oxford University Press), 1993. pp. 225–226 ({{ISBN|978-0-19-507864-0}}).</ref>}}

The argument has received favorable notice from [[Thomas Nagel]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Nagel |first=Thomas |date=27 September 2012 |title=A Philosopher Defends Religion |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/09/27/philosopher-defends-religion/ |journal=The New York Review of Books |volume=59 |issue=14 }}</ref> and [[William Lane Craig]],<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.reasonablefaith.org/plantingas-evolutionary-argument-against-naturalism |title=Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism &#124; Reasonable Faith |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170804113752/http://www.reasonablefaith.org/plantingas-evolutionary-argument-against-naturalism |archive-date=2017-08-04}}</ref> but has also [[Evolutionary argument against naturalism#Fitelson and Sober's response|been criticized]] as seriously flawed, for example, by [[Elliott Sober]].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N2h_BAAAQBAJ&q=Although+the+argument+has+been+criticized+by+some+philosophers%2C+like+Elliott+Sober&pg=PT305 |title=Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |last2=Trakakis |first2=N. N. |date=2014-09-11 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-54638-2 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fitelson |first1=Branden |last2=Sober |first2=Elliott |year=1998 |title=Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FITPPA |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |volume=79 |issue=2 |pages=115–129 |doi=10.1111/1468-0114.00053}}</ref>