Editing Adlai Stevenson II (section)

==Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961 to 1965==
[[File:Adlai Stevenson shows missiles to UN Security Council with David Parker standing.jpg|thumb|Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations]]
At the United Nations, Stevenson worked hard to support [[Foreign relations of the United States|U.S. foreign policy]], even when he personally disagreed with some of President Kennedy's actions. However, he was often seen as an outsider in the Kennedy administration, with one historian noting "everyone knew that Stevenson's position was that of a bit player".<ref>(Baker, p. 408)</ref> Kennedy told his adviser [[Walt Rostow]] that "Stevenson wouldn't be happy as president. He thinks that if you talk long enough you get a soft option and there are very few soft options as president."<ref>(Baker, p. 409)</ref>

===Bay of Pigs incident===

In April 1961 Stevenson suffered the greatest humiliation of his diplomatic career in the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]]. After hearing rumors that "a lot of refugees wanted to go back and overthrow Castro", Stevenson voiced his skepticism about an invasion, but "he was kept on the fringes of the operation, receiving...nine days before the invasion, only an unduly vague briefing by [[Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.]]" and the CIA.<ref name="Dallek, p. 142">(Dallek, p. 142)</ref> Senior CIA official [[Tracy Barnes]] told Stevenson and his staff that "there was going to be a clandestine operation in Cuba...it was strictly a Cuban affair. It would have some American cooperation, but only with the training and financing."<ref>(Wyden, pp. 156–157)</ref> According to historian Peter Wyden, Barnes did not tell Stevenson that there would be a large-scale invasion of Cuba, nor did he provide details about the full extent of American support for, and involvement with, the Cuban rebels, nor did he tell Stevenson about the planned air strikes to destroy Castro's air force.<ref name="Wyden, p. 157">(Wyden, p. 157)</ref> Kennedy Library historian Sheldon Stern interviewed Ambassador [[Charles W. Yost]], Stevenson's deputy, who attended the meeting and confirmed that Yost had been suspicious of the story from the start. Yost agreed that this was another one of the CIA's "clumsy tricks". Assistant Secretary of State [[Harlan Cleveland]], who attended the briefing, felt that Barnes was too evasive in his description of the operation, and that it was clear that Stevenson was not to be given the full details of the invasion plan.<ref name="Wyden, p. 157"/> Historian [[Garry Wills]] has written that "news of the invasion was leaking out...Castro knew the landings would occur; only Adlai Stevenson was kept in the dark" about the invasion by President Kennedy and his aides.<ref>(Wills, p. 228)</ref>

Kennedy, anticipating that Stevenson might be angered at being left out of the discussions over whether to invade Cuba, told Schlesinger that "the integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our great national assets. I don't want to do anything to jeopardize that", and he asked Schlesinger to let Stevenson know that the president was shielding him from many of the details to protect him in case the clandestine operation failed.<ref>(Wyden, p. 156)</ref> Instead, as [[Robert Dallek]] has written, "by leaving him out of the discussion it led to his humiliation". Unaware that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles landing at the [[Bay of Pigs]] were being armed and assisted directly by the CIA and US Navy, and that American pilots were participating in bombing raids of Cuban targets, Stevenson unwittingly "repeated a CIA cover story in a speech before the UN General Assembly".<ref name="Dallek, p. 142"/> He argued that the rebels were not assisted in any way by the U.S. government; when this claim was proven to be false Stevenson complained that "I took this job on the understanding that I would be consulted and kept fully informed on everything. Now my credibility has been compromised and therefore my usefulness."<ref>(Baker, p. 416)</ref> When he told his friend Harlan Cleveland that his own government had "deliberately tricked" him into believing there was no direct American involvement in the invasion, Cleveland replied "I feel as betrayed as you do."<ref>(Wyden, p. 190)</ref> Stevenson seriously considered resigning, but was convinced by his friends and President Kennedy to stay.<ref>(Baker, pp. 416–417)</ref>

===Cuban Missile Crisis===

During the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] in October 1962, Stevenson gave a presentation at an emergency session of the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]].<ref>(McKeever, pp. 526–528)</ref> In his presentation, which attracted national television coverage, he forcefully asked Soviet UN representative [[Valerian Zorin]] if his country was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, and when Zorin appeared reluctant to reply, Stevenson punctuated with the demand "Don't wait for the translation, [answer] 'yes' or 'no'!"<ref name="McKeever, p. 527">(McKeever, p. 527)</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Cuban Missile Crisis |website = [[YouTube]]| date=April 10, 2009 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSV9_J8Csts | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211103/MSV9_J8Csts| archive-date=2021-11-03 | url-status=live|access-date=November 2, 2020}}{{cbignore}}</ref> When Zorin replied that "I am not in an American court of law, and therefore do not answer a question put to me in the manner of a prosecuting counsel...you will have your answer in due course", Stevenson retorted, "I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over."<ref name="McKeever, p. 527"/> Stevenson then showed photographs taken by a [[Lockheed U-2|U-2]] spy plane which proved the existence of nuclear missiles in Cuba, just after Zorin had implied they did not exist.<ref>(McKeever, pp. 527–528)</ref>

Stevenson also attended several meetings of the [[EXCOMM]] at the White House during the Missile Crisis, where he boldly proposed to make an exchange with the Soviets: if they would remove their missiles from Cuba, the United States would agree to remove its obsolete Jupiter missiles from [[Turkey]]. However, he faced strong opposition from some other EXCOMM members, who regarded such an exchange as a sign of weakness. According to Kennedy adviser and Stevenson friend [[George W. Ball]], who was present, these members "intemperately upbraided Stevenson...[and were] outraged and shrill".<ref>(McKeever, p. 520)</ref> However, President Kennedy remarked "You have to admire Adlai, he sticks to his position even when everyone is jumping on him", and Robert Kennedy wrote that "Stevenson has since been criticized for the position he took at the meeting...although I disagreed strongly with his recommendations, I thought he was courageous to make them, and I might add that they made as much sense as some others considered during that period of time."<ref>(McKeever, p. 521)</ref> Stevenson remarked "I know that most of those fellows will consider me a coward for the rest of my life for what I said today, but perhaps we need a coward in the room when we are talking about nuclear war."<ref>(Baker, p. 420)</ref> In fact, the Kennedy Administration did remove the Jupiter-class MRBMs from Italy and Turkey some six months after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, and there is evidence that President Kennedy privately agreed that, if the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba, he would remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy at a later date.<ref>(Johnson, Dominic D. P. Failing to Win p. 105)</ref> The deal was kept a secret for many years, however, and Stevenson was thus given no credit for his original suggestion.<ref>(McKeever, p. 535)</ref>

In December 1962 journalists [[Stewart Alsop]] and [[Charles L. Bartlett (journalist)|Charles Bartlett]] published an article about the Missile Crisis in the ''[[Saturday Evening Post]].'' The article quoted a "non-admiring official" who claimed that Stevenson "Wanted a [[Munich Agreement|Munich]]. He wanted to trade U.S. bases for Cuban bases" and generally portrayed Stevenson's behavior and actions during the Missile Crisis as weak and inept.<ref name="Aldous, p. 300">(Aldous, p. 300)</ref> Stevenson was deeply angered by the article, especially as it was widely believed that the "non-admiring" official who criticized Stevenson was President Kennedy himself – "Kennedy had fed the Stevenson story to Alsop and Bartlett, partly because it enabled him to look strong" in comparison to Stevenson.<ref name="Aldous, p. 300"/> However, a number of Stevenson's friends and supporters, such as historian and White House aide Arthur Schlesinger Jr., came to Stevenson's defense. Schlesinger told Kennedy "The suggestion in the Alsop-Bartlett story that Stevenson favored a Caribbean Munich is grossly unfair and shows the number of people who still have their knives out for him."<ref>(Aldous, p. 301)</ref> Stevenson, knowing that Bartlett was a close friend of President Kennedy, assumed that the article had been written with Kennedy's permission and let the president know through friends that if Kennedy had wanted him to resign, "he did not have to go about it in such a roundabout fashion."<ref>(McKeever, p. 532)</ref> Kennedy told Stevenson that he did not want him to resign and had his Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, release a letter to the press praising Stevenson's performance during the Missile Crisis.<ref>(McKeever, p. 534)</ref> Although the letter did "cause the public furor to die down... for months Washington continued to buzz over what everyone saw as an effort to force Adlai's resignation", and Stevenson friend George Ball later said that the "injury inflicted by the magazine article lingered on and on... After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Adlai was only going through the motions. From then on, he knew he was not going to have an impact on foreign policy."<ref>(McKeever, p. 536)</ref>

===Kennedy assassination and Vietnam War===

During his time as UN ambassador, Stevenson often traveled around the country promoting the United Nations in speeches and seminars. On these trips, he frequently faced opposition and protests from groups skeptical of the United Nations, such as the right-wing [[John Birch Society]]. On October 25, 1963, Stevenson spoke in [[Dallas, Texas]], where he was heckled and spat upon by unruly protestors led by retired General [[Edwin Walker]]'s "National Indignation Convention". At one point a woman hit Stevenson on the head with a sign, leading Stevenson to remark "is she animal or human?", and telling a policeman "I don't want her to go to jail, I want her to go to school."<ref>{{cite book|author=James McEnteer|title=Deep in the heart: the Texas tendency in American politics|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nc4mlgcCRa4C&pg=PA114|year=2004|publisher=Greenwood|page=114|isbn=9780275983062}}</ref> Afterwards, Stevenson warned President Kennedy's advisers about the "ugly and frightening" mood he had found in Dallas, but he did not discuss his concerns directly with Kennedy before the president's visit to Texas in late November 1963.<ref>(Baker, p. 429)</ref> On November 22, Stevenson was attending a luncheon held by the Chilean ambassador when he was informed that Kennedy had been shot in Dallas. He told friends and aides "That Dallas! Why, why, didn't I insist that he not go there?"<ref>(McKeever, po. 539)</ref>

After President Kennedy was assassinated, Stevenson continued to serve in his position as ambassador to the UN under President [[Lyndon Johnson]]. As the country moved toward the 1964 presidential election, the [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]] became an important campaign issue. The Republican presidential candidate, Arizona Senator [[Barry Goldwater]], advocated victory in Vietnam—a [[rollback]] strategy that Johnson denounced as tantamount to nuclear war. Stevenson was not a major player on the Vietnam issue. He did support Johnson publicly and in private because he believed in the [[containment]] of communism, but he also wanted to start negotiations with North Vietnam through the United Nations, which Johnson rejected.<ref>Seymour Maxwell Finger, ''Inside the World of Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Service in a Changing World'' (2001) p 63</ref>