Editing Accountability (section)

=== Civil societies ===
In democracies, voluntary associations, interest groups, and associational activity can improve the performance of the government.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Posner|first2=Daniel N.|s2cid=4503343|date=October 1998|title=Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=28|issue=4|pages=686–693|doi=10.1017/s0007123498000313|issn=0007-1234}}
|2={{Cite journal|last1=EDWARDS|first1=BOB|last2=FOLEY|first2=MICHAEL W.|date=September 1998|title=Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=42|issue=1|pages=124–139|doi=10.1177/0002764298042001010|s2cid=144681913|issn=0002-7642}}
|3={{Cite book|title=Civil Society: The critical History of an Idea|last=Ehrenberg|first=John|publisher=New York University Press|year=1999}}
|4={{Cite book|title=Making Democracy Work|last1=Putnam|first1=Robert D.|last2=Leonardi|first2=Robert|last3=Nonetti|first3=Raffaella Y.|s2cid=155009926|date=27 May 1994|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-2074-0|doi = 10.2307/j.ctt7s8r7}}
}}</ref> One study showed that civil society organizations such as [[Non-governmental organization|NGOs]] can increase the performance of local government according to the central government's standards by monitoring and disclosing information about local government performance in authoritarian regimes like China.<ref name=":24" /> Solidarity groups in rural China, in which members share moral obligations and interests, can hold local officials accountable as well<ref name=":25" /> when (i) the solidarity group encompasses everyone under the local government's jurisdiction, and (ii) local officials are embedded in the group as members. The social standing and recognition of these groups encourages local officials to perform well, as they value high moral standing in the group.<ref name=":25" />

At the local level, various accountability measures exist that impact the job performance of elected officials.<ref name=":6">{{cite journal|last=Ofosu|first=George Kwaku|date=2 August 2019|title=Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=113|issue=4|pages=963–979|doi=10.1017/s0003055419000479|s2cid=201385531|issn=0003-0554|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101596/1/ofosu_fairelections.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{cite journal|last=Carreri|first=Maria|s2cid=160023663|date=2018|title=Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3239492|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{cite journal|last1=Berry|first1=Christopher R.|last2=Howell|first2=William G.|date=August 2007|title=Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=69|issue=3|pages=844–858|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00579.x|s2cid=42972242|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> In Uganda, civil society organizations (CSOs) that divulge to the public how well an incumbent is performing their job duties, in a district with an upcoming competitive election, increase the performance of the politician for the rest of their term.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Grossman|first1=Guy|last2=Michelitch|first2=Kristin|s2cid=15659219|date=1 February 2018|title=Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=112|issue=2|pages=280–301|doi=10.1017/s0003055417000648|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> In contrast to these works, a [[meta-analysis]] released in 2019 uncovers no effects from CSO voter information campaigns on political accountability after examining the results from seven trials across six countries.<ref>{{cite book |date=4 July 2019|editor-last=Dunning|editor-first=Thad|editor2-last=Grossman|editor2-first=Guy|editor3-last=Humphreys|editor3-first=Macartan|editor4-last=Hyde|editor4-first=Susan D.|editor5-last=McIntosh|editor5-first=Craig|editor6-last=Nellis|editor6-first=Gareth|title=Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning|doi=10.1017/9781108381390|isbn=9781108381390|s2cid=243627947}}</ref> In Ghana, election-day monitoring of polling centers for district-level positions, as well as an increase in the awareness of monitoring in an upcoming election, increases job performance among incumbents, who spend more of their annual [[Constituency Development Fund]] allocations from the central government on public goods for the electorate.<ref name=":6" /> In locales with weaker institutions, when citizens elect leaders with higher levels of competency, these officials have a greater ability to overcome the barriers of bad informal institutions, and deliver more goods and long-term investment projects for the constituency without needing to raise taxes.<ref name=":7" /> Additionally, many local elections are for positions that involve performing jobs with a single function, such as a school board member or a [[sheriff]]. These elected officials are held accountable to their positions mainly through information provided to the public through the media.<ref name=":8" /> When the media focuses attention on data trends associated with these positions, constituents are then able to use this information to retrospectively vote for or against an incumbent based on their performance in office.<ref name=":8" />