Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

==Background==
{{See also|Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975)|Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula}}

=== Arab–Israeli conflict ===
The war was part of the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]], an ongoing dispute that has included many battles and wars since the [[Israeli Declaration of Independence|founding of the State of Israel]] in 1948. During the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's [[Sinai Peninsula]], roughly half of Syria's [[Golan Heights]], and the territories of the [[West Bank]] which had been [[Jordanian annexation of the West Bank|held by Jordan since 1948]].{{sfnp|Ben-Ami|2005}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories.{{sfnp|Herzog|1989|p=253}}<ref>{{cite news |author=Seth S. King |title=Israeli aims tied to 6 vital areas |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/30/83128870.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=30 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Drew Middleton |title=Latin nations bid Israel withdraw |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/01/83130813.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=1 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref> This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister [[Abba Eban]] has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Raz |first=Avi |date=2013 |title=The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44254276 |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=85–108 |doi=10.1093/dh/dhs004 |jstor=44254276 |issn=0145-2096}}</ref> The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |date=2014 |title=The Iron Wall – Israel and the Arab World |publisher=Penguin Books |edition=paperback 2014 |page=270 |isbn=978-0-14-103322-8 |quote=The decision of 19 June read, "Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel." The international border placed the Gaza strip within Israel's territory. ... it makes no mention of a request by Eban to transmit these terms to Egypt and Syria. ... One is left with the impression that Eban was more interested in using the cabinet decision of 19 June to impress the Americans than to engage the governments of Egypt and Syria in substantive negotiations}}</ref><ref>{{harvp|Ben-Ami|2005|p=125}}: "But was there on 19 June 1967 an Israeli peace overture towards Syria and Egypt? Did the Israeli cabinet end its deliberations on that day with a decision to convey concrete peace proposals to its Arab neighbors along the lines as discussed in the Cabinet, or perhaps ask the American administration to do so on its behalf? Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. At the meeting of 19 June the Israeli government developed policy guidelines; it did not discuss a peace initiative, nor did it ever formalise it as such."</ref> Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments.<ref>{{cite news |last=Smith |first=Terrebce |date=15 August 1967 |title=A Mediated Peace Rejected by Eban |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/08/15/90390826.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=New York Times |access-date=16 September 2015}}</ref>

The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the [[Khartoum Resolution|Khartoum Arab Summit]], was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three nos": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King [[Hussein of Jordan]] had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Eban rejects aid in settling crisis |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/26/83125500.html?pageNumber=3 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=27 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015|page=3}}</ref>

Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the [[War of Attrition]], an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gavriely-Nuri|first=Dalia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qc-xfP6b3gsC&q=%2522War%2520of%2520Attrition%2522%25201967&pg=PA107|title=The Normalization of War in Israeli Discourse, 1967–2008|date=2013|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7391-7260-5|page=107|language=en}}</ref> In December 1970, Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]] had signaled in an interview with ''[[The New York Times]]'' that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council of the United Nations]]."<ref name="Podeh" /> On 4 February 1971, Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly outlining a proposal under which Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula along with other occupied Arab territories.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gazit |first=Mordechai |date=January 1997 |title=Egypt and Israel – Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971? |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200949703200107 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=97–115 |doi=10.1177/002200949703200107 |s2cid=159846721 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>

Swedish diplomat [[Gunnar Jarring]] coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on 8 February 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the [[Gaza Strip]], for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]]. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.<ref name="Podeh">{{cite book |last1=Podeh |first1=Elie |title=Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict |date=2015 |publisher=[[University of Texas Press]] |location=Austin, TX |isbn=978-1-4773-0561-4 |pages=104–105 |edition=first |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ecyGCgAAQBAJ}}</ref>

Israeli Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]] reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.<ref>Podeh, p. 106.</ref>

The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs [[Joseph J. Sisco|Joseph Sisco]] informed Israeli ambassador [[Yitzhak Rabin]] that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan on 26 February by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the [[Green Line (Israel)|pre-5 June 1967 lines]].<ref name="auto2">Podeh p. 107.</ref> Explicating the response, Eban told the [[Knesset]] that the pre-5 June 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression".<ref>{{cite news |title=Sinai Pull-Back Rejected |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2002&dat=19710215&id=27EiAAAAIBAJ&pg=981,4282183 |access-date=4 July 2019 |agency=Beaver County Times |date=15 February 1971}}</ref> Jarring was disappointed and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name="auto2" />

The U.S. considered Israel an ally in the [[Cold War]] and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. U.S. National Security Advisor [[Henry Kissinger]] believed that the regional [[Balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen Soviet influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.<ref>{{cite journal |issn=1531-3298 |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=3–40 |last=Hughes |first=Geraint |s2cid=57566713 |title=Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 |journal=[[Journal of Cold War Studies]] |access-date=2 July 2018 |date=11 June 2008 |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/237150 |doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.2.3}}</ref>

Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=13}} Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on 24 October 1972, with his [[Supreme Council of the Armed Forces]], Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=25}}

In February 1973, Sadat made a final peace overture that would have included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that he relayed to Kissinger via his adviser [[Mohammed Hafez Ismail|Mohammad Hafez Ismail]], which Kissinger made known to Meir. Meir rejected the peace proposal despite knowing that the only plausible alternative was going to war with Egypt.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bar-Joseph |first=Uri |date=July 2006 |title=Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022009406064668 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=545–556 |doi=10.1177/0022009406064668 |s2cid=154116645 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>

===Lead up to the war===
[[File:Anwar Sadat cropped.jpg|thumb|upright|Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]]]]
Four months before the war broke out, Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but he never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.<ref name="Kissinger2011p254"/>

Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory.{{sfnp|Morris|2001|p=390}} From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] jet fighters, [[SA-2 Guideline|SA-2]], [[SA-3 Goa|SA-3]], [[SA-6 Gainful|SA-6]] and [[SA-7 Grail|SA-7]] antiaircraft missiles, [[T-55]] and [[T-62]] tanks, [[RPG-7]] antitank weapons, and the [[9M14 Malyutka|AT-3 Sagger]] [[anti-tank guided missile]] from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.{{sfnp|Heikal|1975|p=22}}

The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would incur massive losses. Both the Soviets and Americans were at that time pursuing [[détente]] and had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with American President [[Richard Nixon]], Soviet leader [[Leonid Brezhnev]] had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=39}}

Between May and August 1973, the Egyptian Army conducted military exercises near the border, and [[Ashraf Marwan]] inaccurately warned that Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack in the middle of May. The Israeli Army mobilized with their Blue-White Alert, in response to both the warnings and exercises, at considerable cost. These exercises led some Israelis to dismiss the actual war preparations—and Marwan's warning right before the attack was launched—as another exercise.<ref name="Uri">{{cite book |last1=Bar-Joseph |first1=Uri |title=The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel |date=2016 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York |isbn=978-0-06-242013-8 |pages=166–176, 221–222}}</ref>

In the week leading up to [[Yom Kippur]], the Egyptian Army staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were also detected, as were the cancellation of leaves and a call-up of reserves in the Syrian army. These activities were considered puzzling but not a threat because Israeli intelligence suggested they would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived. Despite this belief, Israel sent reinforcements to the Golan Heights. These forces were to prove critical during the early days of the war.<ref name=Uri/>{{rp|190–191, 208}}

On 27 to 30 September, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian Army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on 4 October, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during 27 September to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the ''[[Umrah]]'' (pilgrimage) to Mecca.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=207|Gawrych|1996|2p=24}}

According to Egyptian General El-Gamasy, "On the initiative of the operations staff, we reviewed the situation on the ground and developed a framework for the planned offensive operation. We studied the technical characteristics of the Suez Canal, the ebb and the flow of the tides, the speed of the currents and their direction, hours of darkness and of moonlight, weather conditions, and related conditions in the Mediterranean and Red sea."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} He explained further by saying: "Saturday 6 October 1973 (10 Ramadan 1393) was the day chosen for the September–October option. Conditions for a crossing were good, it was a fast day in Israel, and the moon on that day, 10 Ramadan, shone from sunset until midnight."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} The war coincided that year with the Muslim month of [[Ramadan]], when many Muslim soldiers [[Fasting|fast]]. On the other hand, the fact that the attack was launched on Yom Kippur may have ''helped'' Israel to more easily marshal reserves from their homes and synagogues because roads and communication lines were largely open, easing the mobilization and transportation of the military.{{sfnp|Schiff|2013|p=12}}

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=51}}

On the night of 25 September, Hussein secretly flew to [[Tel Aviv]] to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would cooperate.{{'"}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=50}} This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that Hussein had not said anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, [[Mossad]] Director-General [[Zvi Zamir]] continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}} Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of war]."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}}

Several days before the war began, Lieutenant Colonel Aviezer Ya'ari, head of the Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq desk of Israeli military intelligence, suggested that the Egyptian and Syrian military exercises which were underway might be preparations for a combined attack. He was reprimanded and later told the [[Agranat Commission]] that he subsequently became more cautious in his estimates.<ref name=tomatoes>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sadat-is-not-worth-tomatoes-graphologist-assured-israels-military-intelligence-before-1973-war/ Egypt's Sadat is 'not worth tomatoes,' reservist professor assured Israel's military intelligence before 1973 war]</ref>

On the day before the war, General [[Ariel Sharon]] was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by [[Yehoshua Sagi|Yehoshua Saguy]], his divisional intelligence officer. Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General [[Shmuel Gonen]], who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Zamir's concern grew on 4–5 October, as additional signs of an impending attack were detected. Soviet advisers and their families left Egypt and Syria, transport aircraft thought to be laden with military equipment landed in [[Cairo]] and [[Damascus]], and aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were at an unprecedented high. According to declassified documents from the Agranat Commission, Brigadier General Yisrael Lior (Meir's military secretary/attaché) claimed that Mossad knew from Marwan that an attack was going to occur under the guise of a military drill a week before it occurred, but the process of passing along the information to the prime minister's office failed.<ref name=mishandle>{{cite web |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/newly-released-papers-detail-depth-of-mishandling-of-yom-kippur-war-warnings/ |title=Mossad's tip-off ahead of Yom Kippur War did not reach prime minister, newly released papers show |first=Mitch |last=Ginsburg |website=The Times of Israel}}</ref>

On the night of 5–6 October, Marwan incorrectly informed Zamir that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack would take place at sunset.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13iht-edblum.1.6645021.html |work=The New York Times |first=Howard |last=Blum |title=Who killed Ashraf Marwan? |date=13 July 2007}}</ref> It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli High Command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli [[Military reserves|reserves]].<ref name="Agranat">{{cite web|publisher=The Jewish Agency for Israel|url=http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|date=27 November 2005|title=Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973|author=Doron Geller|series=Inside the Israeli Secret Service|access-date=14 November 2016|archive-date=13 May 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080513121838/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>

===Israeli preparation===
[[File:Golda Meir2.jpg|thumb|Upon learning of the impending attack, [[Prime Minister of Israel]] [[Golda Meir]] made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.]]
Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense [[Moshe Dayan]] and Chief of General Staff [[David Elazar]] met at 8:05&nbsp;am on the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war began.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}} Elazar proposed a mobilization of the entire air force and four armored divisions, or 100,000 to 120,000 troops, while Dayan favored a mobilization of the air force and two armored divisions, or around 70,000 troops. Meir chose Elazar's proposal.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|p=27}} Elazar argued in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00&nbsp;pm, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00&nbsp;pm: 
{{blockquote|When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it would not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody,' she said.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}}}}

Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war,<ref name="Quandt1977">{{cite book |author=William B. Quandt |title=Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 |url=https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will |url-access=registration |date=1977 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-03469-3 |page=[https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will/page/169 169] |quote=Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Israel that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war}}</ref> and on 6 October 1973, Kissinger sent a further dispatch discouraging a preemptive strike.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf|title=The national security archive, declassified archival records, The October War and U.S. Policy.}}</ref><ref name=Sachar755>Sachar, Howard M. ''A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time''. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 755.</ref> Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply and sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. At 10:15&nbsp;am, Meir met with American ambassador [[Kenneth Keating]] to inform him that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war and asked that American efforts be directed at preventing war.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|pp=104–105}}<ref>{{cite web |url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=77417&dt=1573&dl=823 |title=Government of Israel Concern about possible Syrian and Egyptian attack today |access-date=11 August 2010 |publisher=[[United States Department of State]] |date=6 October 1973}}</ref>

Kissinger urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=105}} According to Kissinger, had Israel struck first it would not have received "so much as a nail" in support from the United States.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=454}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Rabinovich|first1=Abraham|title=Three years too late, Golda Meir understood how war could have been avoided|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/three-years-too-late-golda-meir-understood-how-war-could-have-been-avoided/|access-date=15 April 2017|work=The Times of Israel|date=12 September 2013}}</ref>