Editing Winter War (section)

==Background==
{{Main|Background of the Winter War}}{{See also|Timeline of the Winter War|Treaty of Tartu (Finland–Russia)}}

=== Finnish-Soviet relations and politics ===
{{Main|East Karelian uprising|Soviet–Finnish Non-Aggression Pact}}
{{See also|Independence of Finland}}
[[File:Northern europe november 1939.png|thumb|alt=A geopolitical map of Northern Europe in which Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark are tagged as neutral nations, and the Soviet Union is shown having military bases in the nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.|Geopolitical status in Northern Europe in November 1939<ref name="KR2007_10">[[#KilinRaunio2007|Kilin and Raunio (2007)]], p. 10</ref>{{sfnp|Hough|2019}}
{{legend|#98c807|Neutral countries}}{{legend|#636466|Germany and annexed countries}}{{legend|#d13814|Soviet Union and annexed countries}}{{legend|#ef9421|Neutral countries with military bases established by Soviet Union in October 1939}}]]
Until the early nineteenth century, Finland was the eastern part of the [[Kingdom of Sweden]]. From 21 February 1808 to 17 September 1809, the [[Russian Empire]] waged the [[Finnish War]] against the Kingdom of Sweden, ostensibly to protect the Russian capital, [[Saint Petersburg]]. Eventually Russia conquered and [[annexation|annexed]] Finland, and converted it into an [[autonomous entity|autonomous]] [[buffer state]].<ref name="Trotter2">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter 2002]], pp. 3–5</ref> The resulting [[Grand Duchy of Finland]] enjoyed wide autonomy within Russia until the end of the nineteenth century, when Russia began attempts [[Russification of Finland|to assimilate Finland]] as part of a general policy to strengthen the central government and unify the Empire by [[Russification]]. Those attempts were aborted because of Russia's internal strife, but they ruined Russia's relationship with Finland. In addition, support increased in Finland for self-determination movements.<ref name="Trotter_4-6">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 4–6</ref>

[[World War I]] led to the collapse of the Russian Empire during the [[Russian Revolution]] of 1917 and the [[Russian Civil War]]. On 15 November 1917, the [[Bolshevik]] Russian government [[Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia|declared that national minorities possessed the right of self-determination]], including the right to secede and form a separate state, which gave Finland a window of opportunity. On 6 December 1917, the [[Senate of Finland]] [[Finnish Declaration of Independence|declared the nation's independence]]. [[Soviet Russia]], later the [[Soviet Union]], recognised the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration.<ref name= "Trotter_4-6"/> Finland achieved full sovereignty in May 1918 after a [[Finnish Civil War|four-month civil war]] in which the conservative [[Whites (Finland)|Whites]] defeated the socialist [[Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic|Reds]] with the help of the [[German Army (German Empire)|Imperial German Army]], pro-German [[Jäger Movement|Jägers]], and some Swedish troops, in addition to the expulsion of Bolshevik troops.<ref name="JS2006_3">[[#Jow&Snod2006|Jowett & Snodgrass (2006)]], p. 3</ref>

Finland joined the League of Nations in 1920 and sought security guarantees, but Finland's primary goal was co-operation with the [[Scandinavian countries]], mainly Sweden, and it focused on the exchange of information and on defence planning (the joint defence of [[Åland]], for example), rather than on [[military exercises]] or on the stockpiling and the deployment of [[materiel]]. Nevertheless, Sweden carefully avoided committing itself to Finnish foreign policy.<ref name="Turtola1999a_21-24">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 21–24</ref> Finland's military policy included clandestine [[Finnish–Estonian defence cooperation|defence co-operation]] with [[Estonia]].<ref name="Turtola1999a_33-34">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 33–34</ref>

The period after the Finnish Civil War to the early 1930s was a politically unstable time in Finland because of the continued rivalry between the conservatives and the socialists. The [[Communist Party of Finland]] was declared illegal in 1931, and the nationalist [[Lapua Movement]] organised [[anticommunist]] violence, which culminated in a [[Mäntsälä rebellion|failed coup attempt]] in 1932. The successor of the Lapua Movement, the [[Patriotic People's Movement (Finland)|Patriotic People's Movement]], had a minor presence in national politics and never had more than 14 seats of the 200 in the [[Finnish Parliament]].<ref name="Edwards_26-27">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], pp. 26–27</ref> By the late 1930s, the export-oriented Finnish economy was growing and the nation's extreme political movements had diminished.<ref name="Edwards_18">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 18</ref>

[[File:Soviet-finnish-nonaggression-pact (protokol 1934).jpg|thumb|The [[Soviet–Finnish Non-Aggression Pact]] was signed by [[Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen]] and [[Maxim Litvinov]] in Moscow 1932.]]
After Soviet involvement in the Finnish Civil War in 1918, no formal peace treaty was signed. In 1918 and 1919, Finnish volunteers conducted two unsuccessful military incursions across the Soviet border, the [[Viena expedition|Viena]] and [[Aunus expedition]]s, to annex areas in [[Karelia]] that according to the [[Greater Finland]] ideology would combine all [[Baltic Finnic peoples]] into a single state. In 1920, Finnish communists based in Soviet Russia attempted to assassinate the former Finnish [[White Guard (Finland)|White Guard]] Commander-in-Chief, Marshal [[Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim]]. On 14 October 1920, Finland and Soviet Russia signed the [[Treaty of Tartu (Russian–Finnish)|Treaty of Tartu]], confirming the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia proper as the new Finnish–Soviet border. Finland also received [[Petsamo Province]], with its [[ice-free harbour]] on the Arctic Ocean.<ref>[[#Polvinen1987|Polvinen (1987)]], pp. 156–161, 237–238, 323, 454</ref><ref>[[#Engman07|Engman (2007)]], pp. 452–454</ref> Despite the signing of the treaty, relations between the two countries remained strained. The Finnish government allowed volunteers to cross the border to support the [[East Karelian uprising and Soviet–Finnish conflict of 1921–22|East Karelian uprising]] in Russia in 1921, and Finnish communists in the Soviet Union continued to prepare for revenge and staged a cross-border raid into Finland, the [[Pork mutiny|Pork Mutiny]], in 1922.<ref name="Turtola1999a_30-33">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 30–33</ref> In 1932, the [[Soviet–Finnish Non-Aggression Pact]] was signed between both countries, and it was reaffirmed for ten years in 1934.<ref name="Turtola1999a_30-33" /> Foreign trade in Finland was booming, but less than 1% of it was with the Soviet Union.<ref name="Edwards_31">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 31</ref> In 1934, the Soviet Union also joined the League of Nations.<ref name="Turtola1999a_30-33" />

=== Justification ===
[[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet General Secretary]] [[Joseph Stalin]] regarded it a disappointment that the Soviet Union could not halt the Finnish Revolution.<ref>[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], pp. 43–46</ref> He thought that the pro-Finland movement in Karelia posed a direct threat to [[Leningrad]] and that the area and defences of Finland could be used to invade the Soviet Union or restrict fleet movements.<ref>[[#VanDyke1997|Van Dyke (1997)]], p. 13</ref> Soviet propaganda then painted Finland's leadership as a "vicious and reactionary [[fascist]] clique". Field Marshal Mannerheim and [[Väinö Tanner]], the leader of the [[Finnish Social Democratic Party]], were targeted for particular scorn.<ref name="Edwards_32-33">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], pp. 32–33</ref> When Stalin gained absolute power through the [[Great Purge]] of 1938, the Soviets changed their foreign policy toward Finland and began to pursue the reconquest of the provinces of Tsarist Russia that had been lost during the chaos of the [[October Revolution|October Revolution of 1917]] and the Russian Civil War almost two decades earlier.<ref name="Murphy 2021 p. 7">[[#murphy2021|Murphy (2021)]], p. 7</ref> Soviet leaders believed that the old empire's extended borders provided territorial security and wanted Leningrad, only {{convert|32|km|mi|lk=off|sigfig=2|abbr=on}} from the Finnish border, to enjoy a similar level of security against the rising power of [[Nazi Germany]].<ref name="Lightbody_52">[[#Lightbody2004|Lightbody (2004)]], p. 52</ref><ref>[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], p. 15</ref>

=== Negotiations ===
{{Main|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact}}
[[File:Field Kitchen before Winter War.jpg|alt=During additional refresher training, a Finnish soldier has his breakfast served into a mess kit by another soldier from a steaming field kitchen in the forests of the Karelian Isthmus. More soldiers, two of them visible, wait in line for their turn behind him. It is early October, and the snow has not yet set in.|thumb|Finnish soldiers gather breakfast from a [[field kitchen]] during "additional [[Refresher training (military)|refresher training]]" at the Karelian Isthmus, on 10 October 1939.]]

In April 1938, [[NKVD]] agent [[Boris Yartsev]] contacted Finnish Foreign Minister [[Rudolf Holsti]] and Finnish Prime Minister [[Aimo Cajander]], stating that the Soviets did not trust Germany and that war was considered possible between the two countries. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy". Finnish representatives assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev suggested that Finland cede or lease some islands in the [[Gulf of Finland]] along the seaward approaches to Leningrad, but Finland refused.<ref name="Trotter_12-13">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 12–13</ref><ref name="Turtola1999a_32-33">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 32–33</ref>

Negotiations continued throughout 1938 without results. The Finnish reception of Soviet entreaties was decidedly cool, as the violent collectivisation and purges in Stalin's Soviet Union resulted in a poor opinion of the country. Most of the Finnish communist elite in the Soviet Union had been executed during the Great Purge, further tarnishing the Soviets' image in Finland. Meanwhile, Finland was attempting to negotiate a military co-operation plan with Sweden and hoping to jointly defend Åland.<ref name="Turtola1999a_34-35">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 34–35</ref>

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] in August 1939. It was publicly a [[non-aggression treaty]], but it included a secret protocol in which Central and Eastern European countries were divided into [[Sphere of influence|spheres of influence]]. Finland fell into the Soviet sphere. On 1 September 1939, Germany began its [[invasion of Poland]], and two days later, the United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany. On 17 September, the [[Soviet invasion of Poland]] began. After the fall of Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union exchanged occupied Polish lands to establish a new border in accordance with the provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Estonia, [[Latvia]] and [[Lithuania]] were soon [[Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940)|forced to accept treaties]] that allowed the Soviets to establish military bases on their soil.<ref name="EP1985_6">[[#Engle&Paan1985|Engle and Paananen (1985)]], p. 6</ref> Estonia accepted the [[ultimatum]] by signing the agreement on 28 September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October. Unlike the three Baltic countries, Finland started a gradual [[mobilisation]] under the guise of "additional [[refresher training]]".<ref name= "Turtola1999a_38-41">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 38–41</ref> The Soviets had already started intensive mobilisation near the Finnish border in 1938–39.<ref name="Murphy 2021 p. 7"/> Assault troops thought to be necessary for the invasion did not begin deployment until October 1939. Operational plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November.<ref name="Ries1988_55-56">[[#Ries1988|Ries (1988)]], pp. 55–56</ref><ref name="Manninen1999a_141-148">[[#Manninen1999a|Manninen (1999a)]], pp. 141–148</ref>

On 5 October 1939, the Soviets invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow for negotiations. [[Juho Kusti Paasikivi]], the Finnish envoy to Sweden, was sent to Moscow to represent the Finnish government<ref name="Turtola1999a_38-41" /> Furthermore, the negotiations were attended by Stalin in person, signalling the seriousness of the effort.<ref name="Kotkin_960">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 960</ref> Paasikivi would later recount his surprise over the friendly atmosphere in which the delegation was received, and mentioned the pleasant manners of Stalin towards them.<ref name="Kotkin_963">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 963</ref>

The meetings began on 12 October, with Molotov's offer of a mutual assistance pact, which the Finns immediately refused. To the Finns' surprise, Molotov dropped the offer and instead proposed an exchange of territory.<ref name="Kotkin_960"/> The offer stipulated that the Finnish-Soviet border on the [[Karelian Isthmus]] be moved westward to a point only {{convert|30|km|mi|abbr=on}} east of [[Viipuri]] ({{Langx|ru|Vyborg}}) and that Finland destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Likewise, the delegation demanded the cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as [[Rybachy Peninsula]] ({{langx|fi|Kalastajasaarento}}). The Finns would also have to lease the [[Hanko Peninsula]] for 30 years and to permit the Soviets to establish a [[military base]] there. In exchange, the Soviet Union would cede [[Repola]] and [[Porajärvi]] from [[Eastern Karelia]] (2120 square miles), an area twice the size as that of the territory demanded from Finland (1000 square miles).<ref name="Turtola1999a_38-41" /><ref name="Trotter_14-16">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 14–16</ref><ref name="Kotkin_962">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 962</ref>

The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government: [[Gustaf Mannerheim]] had argued for an agreement, being pessimistic of the Finnish prospects in a war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Kotkin_970">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 970</ref> But the Finnish government was reticent in reaching an agreement out of mistrust for Stalin: there was a fear of repeated follow-up demands, which would have put the future of Finnish sovereignty in danger. There were also those, such as Foreign Minister [[Eljas Erkko]] and Prime Minister [[Aimo Cajander]], and the Finnish intelligence in general, who mistook the demands and the Soviet military build-up as a mere bluff on the part of Stalin, and were thus disinclined to reach an agreement.<ref name="Kotkin_970"/>

The Finns made two counteroffers that would cede the [[Terijoki]] area to the Soviet Union. This would have doubled the distance between Leningrad and the Finnish border, but was far less than the Soviets had demanded.<ref name="Turtola1999a_41-43">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 41–43</ref> The Finns would also cede the islands in the Gulf of Finland, but they would not agree to lease any territory to the USSR for military purposes.<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]]</ref><ref name="Kotkin_964">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 964</ref>

On the next meeting on 23 October, Stalin lessened his demands: a reduction in the amount of land demanded in Karelia; a reduction of the Hanko garrison from 5000 to 4000 men; and reducing the length of lease from 30 years to whatever date the ongoing (second world) war in Europe would end.<ref name="Kotkin_965">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 965</ref> However, this sudden change, contrary to previous statements that Soviet demands were minimalist and thus unalterable, had surprised the Finnish government, and lead them to believe more concession may be forthcoming. Thus, Paasikivi's idea of reaching some sort of compromise by offering the Soviets the island of Jussarö and the fort of Ino were refused by Helsinki.<ref name="Kotkin_963_971">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 963, 971</ref>

On 31 October, Molotov publicly announced the Soviet demands to the [[Supreme Soviet]]. This surprised the Finns, and lent credibility to Soviet claims that their demands were minimalist and thus unalterable, as it would have been impossible to reduce them without a loss of prestige after having made them public.<ref name="Kotkin_966">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 966</ref> However, the Soviet offer was eventually rejected with respect to the opinion of the public and Parliament.<ref name="Turtola1999a_41-43"/>

At the meeting on 9 November, Paasikivi announced to the attending Stalin and Molotov the Finnish refusal to accept even their reduced demands. The Soviets were visibly surprised. Finnish Foreign Minister [[Vaino Tanner]] later wrote that "the eyes of our opposite numbers opened wide". Stalin had asked "You don't even offer Ino?"<ref name="Kotkin_971">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 971</ref> This would become the final meeting: the Soviets stopped responding to further Finnish letters and on 13 November, when the Finnish delegation was recalled from Moscow, no Soviet officials came to see them off.<ref name="Kotkin_973">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 973</ref> The Finns had left under the expectation that the negotiations would continue.<ref name="talvisodanpikkujattilainen-turtola12">{{cite book |last=Turtola | first=Martti |editor1-first=Jari |editor1-last=Leskinen |editor2-first=Antti |editor2-last=Juutilainen |title=Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen |date=1999 |pages=41–43 |chapter=Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla}}</ref> Instead, the Soviet Union ramped up its military preparations.<ref name="Kotkin_975">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 975</ref>

The negotiations had failed, as neither side was willing to substantially reduce their demands, nor was either side able to fully trust the other. The Finns were fearful of an encroachment on their sovereignty, while the Soviets were (claiming to be) fearful of a springboard for international enemies in Finland, in close proximity to Leningrad. No promises to the contrary managed to persuade the other.<ref name="Kotkin_961_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 961, 974</ref> Additionally, both sides had misunderstood the others position: the Finns had assumed that the Soviets had opened up on a maximalist demand, ready to be traded down smaller. The Soviets instead had stressed the minimalist nature of their demands, and were incredulous over Finnish reluctance to agree.<ref name="Kotkin_964"/> Finally, there was also Stalin's unwillingness or inability to accept that any territorial concessions on the part of Finland would have only been possible by a 4/5th majority in the Finnish parliament. He had mocked such a requirement, proposing that they count his and Molotov's votes, too.<ref name="Kotkin_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 974</ref>

===Shelling of Mainila and Soviet intentions===
{{Main|Shelling of Mainila}}

On 26 November 1939, an incident was reported near the Soviet village of [[Mainila]], near the border with Finland. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. Research conducted by several Finnish and Russian historians later concluded that the shelling was a [[false flag]] operation since there were no artillery units there, and it was carried out from the Soviet side of the border by an NKVD unit with the purpose of providing the Soviets with a ''[[casus belli]]'' and a pretext to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.<ref name="Ries1988_77-78">[[#Ries1988|Ries (1988)]], pp. 77–78</ref><ref>[[#murphy2021|Murphy (2021)]], p. 9</ref>{{refn|The Soviet role is confirmed in [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s memoirs, which states that Artillery Marshal [[Grigory Kulik]] had personally supervised the bombardment of the Soviet village.<ref name="Edwards_105">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 105</ref><ref name="Turtola1999a_44-45">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 44–45</ref>|group="F"}} Soviet war games held in March 1938 and 1939 had been based on a scenario in which border incidents taking place at the village of Mainila would spark the war.<ref>{{cite book |last=Leskinen | first=Jari |trans-title=Hushed bridge of Finland |title=Vaiettu Suomen silta |year=1997 |pages=406–407 |trans-chapter=Blockade of the Gulf of Finland and the Soviet Union |chapter=Suomenlahden sulku ja Neuvostoliitto |language=fi |isbn=951-710-050-7 |publisher=Hakapaino Oy |location=Helsinki}}</ref>

[[File:Press at Mainila.jpg|thumb|29 November 1939, foreign [[journalists]] at Mainila, where a [[Shelling of Mainila|border incident between Finland and the Soviet Union]] escalated into the Winter War.|alt=A group of foreign journalists observes something during snowfall in Mainila, where a border incident between Finland and the Soviet Union escalated into the Winter War.]]

Molotov claimed that the incident was a Finnish artillery attack. He demanded that Finland apologise for the incident and to move its forces beyond a line {{convert|20|-|25|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the border.<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]], pp. 85–86</ref> Finland denied responsibility for the attack, rejected the demands and called for a joint Finnish–Soviet commission to examine the incident. In turn, the Soviet Union claimed that the Finnish response was hostile, renounced the non-aggression pact and severed diplomatic relations with Finland on 28 November. In the following years, [[Soviet historiography]] described the incident as Finnish provocation. Doubt on the official Soviet version was cast only in the late 1980s, during the policy of ''[[glasnost]]''. The issue has continued to divide Russian historiography even after the [[end of the Soviet Union]] in 1991.<ref name="Kilin2007a_99-100">[[#Kilin2007a|Kilin (2007a)]], pp. 99–100</ref><ref>[[#Aptekar|Aptekar (2009)]]</ref>

====Soviet intentions====
In 2013, Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] stated at a meeting with military historians that the Soviets had launched the Winter War to "correct mistakes" made in determining the border with Finland after 1917.<ref>[[#Yle2013|Yle News (2013)]]</ref> Opinion on the scale of the initial Soviet invasion decision is divided. The puppet Finnish communist government and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocol is used as proof that the Soviet Union had intended to conquer all of Finland.{{refn|See the following sources:<ref name=":0"/><ref name=":1"/><ref name=":2"/><ref name=":3"/><ref name=":4"/>|group="F"}}

On 1 December 1939, the Soviet Union formed a [[puppet government]], named the [[Finnish Democratic Republic]], to govern Finland after Soviet conquest.{{refn|See the following sources:<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]], p. 114</ref><ref>[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 58, 61</ref><ref>[[#Kokoshin1998|Kokoshin (1998)]], p. 93</ref><ref name=Killham>[[#Killham1993|Killham (1993)]], p. 78</ref>|group="F"}} A declaration delivered via [[TASS]] stated:

{{Blockquote|The People's Government in its present composition regards itself as a provisional government. Immediately upon arrival in Helsinki, capital of the country, it will be reorganised and its composition enlarged by the inclusion of representatives of the various parties and groups participating in the people's front of toilers.<ref>[[#Coates1940|Coates (1940)]]</ref>}}

Soviet leaflets dropped over Helsinki on the first day of the war stated: "Finnish Comrades! We come to you not as conquerors, but as liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of the capitalists and the landlords".<ref>[[#Elliston1940|Elliston (1940)]], p. 237</ref><ref>[[#Sander2013|Sander (2013)]], pp. 38, 39</ref>

In 1939, Soviet military leadership had formulated a realistic and comprehensive plan for the occupation of Finland.<ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], p. 50</ref> However, Joseph Stalin was not pleased with the conservative pace that the operation required and demanded new plans be drawn up. With the new plans, the key deadline for Finland's capitulation was to be Stalin's 60th birthday on 21 December.<ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], pp. 50, 51</ref> Convinced of the invasion's forthcoming success, [[Andrei Zhdanov]], chairman of the highest legislative body in the Soviet Union, commissioned a celebratory piece of music from [[Dmitri Shostakovich]], ''[[Suite on Finnish Themes]]'', intended to be performed as the marching bands of the Red Army paraded through Helsinki.<ref name="Edwards_98">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 98</ref><ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], p. 51</ref>  The Soviets were confident that the Western powers would not come to Finland's aid. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the UK, said: "Who would help? The Swedes? The British? The Americans? There's no way in hell. There will be a fuss in the press, moral support, moaning and whining. But troops, aircraft, cannons, and machine guns – no."<ref>Rentola K. (2016): Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo. Otava, Helsinki.</ref>

Hungarian historian István Ravasz wrote that the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Central Committee]] had set out in 1939 that the former borders of the Tsarist Empire were to be restored, including Finland.<ref name=":2"/> American political scientist [[Dan Reiter]] stated that the Soviets "sought to impose a [[regime change]]" and thus "achieve absolute victory". He quoted Molotov, who had commented in November 1939 on the regime change plan to a Soviet ambassador that the new government "will not be Soviet, but one of a democratic republic. Nobody is going to set up Soviets over there, but we hope it will be a government we can come to terms with as to ensure the security of Leningrad".<ref name=":5"/> According to Russian historian [[Yuri Kilin]], the Soviet terms encompassed the strongest fortified approaches of the Finnish defences for a reason. He claimed that Stalin had little hope for such a deal but would play for time for the ongoing mobilisation. He stated the objective as being to secure Finland from being used as a staging ground by means of regime change.<ref>[[#Iltasanomat2019|Iltasanomat (2019)]]</ref>

Others argue against the idea of a complete Soviet conquest. American historian [[William R. Trotter]] asserted that Stalin's objective was to secure Leningrad's flank from a possible German invasion through Finland. He stated that "the strongest argument" against a Soviet intention of full conquest is that it did not happen in either 1939 or during the [[Continuation War]] in 1944 even though Stalin "could have done so with comparative ease".<ref name="Trotter_17"/> Bradley Lightbody wrote that the "entire Soviet aim had been to make the Soviet border more secure".<ref name="Lightbody_55"/> In 2002, Russian historian A. Chubaryan stated that no documents had been found in Russian archives that support a Soviet plan to annex Finland. Rather, the objective was to gain Finnish territory and to reinforce Soviet influence in the region.<ref name=":6"/>

Another American historian [[Stephen Kotkin]] also shares the position that the Soviet Union did not aim for annexation. He points out the different treatment Finland was given, compared to the Baltics: unlike the pacts of mutual assistance that the Baltics were pressured into, resulting in their total Sovietization, the Soviets demanded limited territorial concessions from Finland, and even offered land in return, which would not have made sense if full Sovietization was intended.<ref name="Kotkin_966_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 966, 974</ref> And according to Kotkin, Stalin seemed to be genuinely interested in reaching an agreement during the negotiations: he had personally attended six of the seven meetings with the Finns, and had multiple times reduced his demands.<ref name="Kotkin_974_975">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 974-975</ref> However, mutual mistrust and misunderstandings would mar the negotiations, producing an impasse.<ref name="Kotkin_961_974"/>