Editing War of Attrition (section)

==Egyptian front==
[[Israel]]'s victory in the [[Six-Day War]] left the entirety of the Egyptian [[Sinai Peninsula]] up to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal under Israeli control.  Egypt was determined to regain Sinai, and also sought to mitigate the severity of its defeat. Sporadic clashes were taking place along the cease-fire line, and Egyptian missile boats sank the Israeli destroyer [[HMS Zealous (R39)|INS ''Eilat'']] on October 21 of the same year.

Egypt began shelling Israeli positions along the [[Bar Lev Line]], using heavy artillery, [[Mikoyan|MiG]] aircraft and various other forms of [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] assistance with the hope of forcing the [[Israeli government]] into concessions.<ref name="Britannica">{{cite encyclopedia
| url = http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-219430/Israel
| title = Israel: The War of Attrition
| access-date = March 3, 2007
| encyclopedia = Encyclopædia Britannica
}}</ref> Israel responded with aerial bombardments, airborne raids on Egyptian military positions, and aerial strikes against strategic facilities in Egypt. The strategic bombing of Egypt had mixed military and political results.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bar-Siman-Tov |first=Yaacov |date=July 1984 |title=The Myth of Strategic Bombing: Israeli Deep-Penetration Air Raids in the War of Attrition, 1969-70 |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200948401900308 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=549–570 |doi=10.1177/002200948401900308 |s2cid=159578814 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=15 October 2023}}</ref>

The international community and both countries attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The [[Jarring Mission]] of the United Nations was supposed to ensure that the terms of [[UN Security Council Resolution 242]] would be observed, but by late 1970, it was clear that this mission had been a failure. Fearing the escalation of the conflict into an "[[Warsaw Pact|East]] vs. [[NATO|West]]" [[World War III|confrontation]] during the tensions of the mid-[[Cold War]], the American president, [[Richard Nixon]], sent his Secretary of State, [[William P. Rogers|William Rogers]], to formulate the [[Rogers Plan]] in view of obtaining a ceasefire.

In August 1970, Israel, [[Jordan]], and Egypt agreed to an "in place" ceasefire under the terms proposed by the Rogers Plan. The plan contained restrictions on missile deployment by both sides, and required the cessation of raids as a precondition for peace. The Egyptians and their Soviet allies rekindled the conflict by violating the agreement shortly thereafter, moving their missiles near to the Suez Canal, and constructing the largest anti-aircraft system yet implemented at that point in history.<ref name=Britannica /><ref name="JewishVirtualLibrary">{{cite encyclopedia
| url = https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf8.html
| title = Myths & Facts Online: The War of Attrition, 1967–1970
| access-date =March 3, 2007
| last = Bard
| first = Mitchell
| encyclopedia = Jewish Virtual Library
}}</ref> The Israelis responded with a policy which their Prime Minister, [[Golda Meir]], dubbed "[[Asymmetric warfare|asymmetrical response]]", wherein Israeli retaliation was disproportionately large in comparison to any Egyptian attacks.<ref name=Britannica />

Following Nasser's death in September 1970, his successor, [[Anwar Al-Sadat]], continued the ceasefire with Israel, focusing on rebuilding the [[Egyptian army]] and planning a full-scale attack on the Israeli forces controlling the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. These plans would materialize three years later in the [[Yom Kippur War]]. Ultimately, Israel would return Sinai to Egypt after the two nations signed a [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty|peace treaty]] in 1979.

The Egyptian Air Force and Air Defense Forces performed poorly.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=95}} Egyptian pilots were rigid, slow to react and unwilling to improvise.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=96}} According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Egypt lost 109 aircraft, most in air-to-air combat, while only 16 Israeli aircraft were lost, most to anti-aircraft artillery or [[Surface-to-air missile|SAMs]].{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=96}} It took a salvo of 6 to 10 [[SA-2 Guideline|SA-2]] Egyptian anti-aircraft missiles to obtain a better than fifty percent chance of a hit.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=96}} [[Kenneth Pollack]] notes that Egypt's commandos performed "adequately" though they rarely ventured into risky operations on a par with the daring of Israel's commandos,{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=95}} Egypt's artillery corps encountered difficulty in penetrating the Bar-Lev forts and eventually adopted a policy of trying to catch Israeli troops in the exterior parts of the forts.{{sfn|Pollack|2002|page=94}}