Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== Background ==
{{section-split|Suez Emergency|date=April 2025}}
=== Construction of the Suez Canal ===
{{See also|History of Israel|History of Egypt}}
[[File:Canal de Suez.jpg|thumb|The location of the [[Suez Canal]], which connects the [[Mediterranean]] and the [[Indian Ocean]] via the [[Red Sea]].]]

The [[Suez Canal]] was opened in 1869, after ten years of work financed by the French and Egyptian governments.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=21–24}}</ref> The canal was operated by the [[Suez Company (1858–1997)|Suez Company]], an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory and the only land-bridge between Africa and Asia.

The canal instantly became strategically important, as it provided the shortest ocean link between the [[Mediterranean Sea]] and the [[Indian Ocean]]. The canal eased commerce for trading nations and particularly helped European colonial powers to gain and govern their colonies.

In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, Egypt was forced to sell its shares in the operating company to the British government. They were willing buyers and obtained a 44% share in the company for £4&nbsp;million (equivalent to £{{Inflation|UK|4|1875|r=0}}&nbsp;million in {{Inflation/year|UK}}). This maintained the majority shareholdings of the mostly-French private investors. With the 1882 [[Anglo-Egyptian War|invasion and occupation of Egypt]], the UK took ''de facto'' control of the country as well as the canal, its finances and operations.

=== Convention of Constantinople ===
The 1888 [[Convention of Constantinople]] declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection.<ref name="SIS: Suez Canal">{{Cite web |title=Suez Canal |url=http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Land&people/50th/031700000000000002.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070220163200/http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Land%26people/50th/031700000000000002.htm |archive-date=20 February 2007 |access-date=18 March 2007 |publisher=Egyptian State Information Service}}</ref> In ratifying it, the [[Ottoman Empire]] agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.<ref name="Sachar">{{Harvnb|Sachar|1996}}{{Page needed|date=December 2014}}<!-- since the page is missing, why not use a newer edition? --></ref> The Convention came into force in 1904, the same year as the ''[[Entente Cordiale]]'' between Britain and France.

Despite this convention, the strategic importance of the canal and its control were proven during the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of 1904–05, after Japan and Britain entered into a separate bilateral agreement. Following the Japanese attack on the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Russian Pacific Fleet]] at [[Lüshunkou|Port Arthur]], the Russians sent reinforcements from their fleet in the [[Baltic Sea]]. The British denied the [[Baltic Fleet|Russian Baltic Fleet]] use of the canal after the [[Dogger Bank incident]] and forced it to steam around the [[Cape of Good Hope]] in Africa, giving the [[Imperial Japanese Armed Forces]] time to consolidate their position.

The importance of the canal as a strategic intersection was again apparent during the First World War, when Britain and France closed the canal to non-[[Allies of World War I|Allied]] shipping. The attempt by the German-led [[Fourth Army (Ottoman Empire)|Ottoman Fourth Army]] to [[Raid on the Suez Canal|storm the canal]] in 1915 led the British to commit 100,000 troops to the defence of Egypt for the rest of the war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=11}}</ref>

==== Oil shipments ====
The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War for oil shipment.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 12">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=12}}</ref> Petroleum historian [[Daniel Yergin]] wrote: "In 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale. ... [British] control over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defence either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role—as the highway not of empire, but of oil. ... By 1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it".<ref>{{Harvnb|Yergin|1991|p=480}}</ref>

Western Europe then imported two million barrels per day from the Middle East, 1,200,000 by tanker through the canal, and another 800,000 via pipeline from the Persian Gulf ([[Trans-Arabian Pipeline]]) and Kirkuk ([[Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline]]) to the Mediterranean<!-- which was also cut -->, where tankers received it. The US imported another 300,000 barrels daily from the Middle East.<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824597,00.html State of Business: Middle-East Echoes] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110805063536/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,824597,00.html |date=5 August 2011}}, ''Time'', 12 November 1956</ref> Though pipelines linked the oil fields of the [[Kingdom of Iraq]] and the [[Arab states of the Persian Gulf|Persian Gulf states]] to the Mediterranean, these routes were prone to suffer from instability, which led British leaders to prefer to use the sea route through the canal.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 12"/> The rise of [[Oil tanker|super-tankers]] for shipping Middle East oil to Europe, which were too big to use the canal, meant British policymakers greatly overestimated the importance of the canal.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 12"/> By 2000, only 8% of the imported oil in Britain arrived via the Suez Canal with the rest coming via the Cape route.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 12"/>

In August 1956 the [[Royal Institute of International Affairs]] published a report "Britain and the Suez Canal" revealing government perception of the Suez area. It reiterated the strategic necessity of the canal to the UK, including the need to meet military obligations under the [[Manila Pact]] in the Far East and the [[Baghdad Pact]] in Iraq, Iran, or Pakistan. The report noted the canal had been used in wartime to transport materiel and personnel from and to the UK's close allies in Australia and New Zealand, and might be vital for such purposes in future. The report cites the amount of material and oil that passes through the canal to the UK, and the economic consequences of the canal being put out of commission, concluding:
{{Blockquote|The possibility of the Canal being closed to troopships makes the question of the control and regime of the Canal as important to Britain today as it ever was.<ref>{{Cite book |first=Donald |last=Watt |title=Britain and the Suez Canal |publisher=Royal Institute of International Affairs |date=1956 |page=8}}</ref>}}

=== After World War II ===
In the [[Aftermath of World War II|aftermath of the Second World War]], Britain's military strength was spread throughout the region, including the vast military complex at Suez with a garrison of 80,000, making it one of the largest military installations in the world. The Suez base was an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, it became a source of growing tension in [[Egypt–United Kingdom relations|Anglo-Egyptian relations]].<ref name="Darwin 207"/>

Egypt's domestic politics were experiencing a radical change, prompted by economic instability, inflation, and unemployment. Unrest began to manifest in the growth of radical political groups, such as the [[Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt]], and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and its presence. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the [[Mandatory Palestine|creation of Israel]].<ref name="Darwin 207">{{Harvnb|Darwin|1988|loc=p. 207 "Nothing could have been better calculated to lash popular Muslim feeling to new fury ... and to redouble Egyptian hostility to Britain on whose 'betrayal' of the Palestine Arabs the catastrophe could easily be blamed."}}</ref>

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the [[Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936]], the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years.<ref>{{Harvnb|Butler|2002|p=111}}</ref> Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights, as well as the presence of the Suez garrison. The price of such action was an escalation in violent hostility towards Britain and its troops in Egypt, which the Egyptian authorities did little to curb.{{Cn|date=October 2022}}

In January 1952, British forces attempted to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in [[Ismailia]], resulting in the deaths of 41 Egyptians.<ref name="Darwin 208">{{Harvnb|Darwin|1988|p=208}}</ref> This led to [[Cairo fire|anti-Western riots]] in [[Cairo]] resulting in damage to property and the deaths of foreigners, including 11 British citizens.<ref name="Darwin 208"/> This proved to be a catalyst for the removal of the [[Kingdom of Egypt|Egyptian monarchy]]. On 23 July 1952 a [[Egyptian Revolution of 1952|military coup]] by the Egyptian nationalist '[[Free Officers Movement (Egypt)|Free Officers Movement]]'—led by [[Muhammad Neguib]] and future Egyptian President [[Gamal Abdul Nasser]]—overthrew King [[Farouk of Egypt|Farouk]] and established an Egyptian republic.{{Cn|date=October 2022}}

=== After the 1952 Egyptian Revolution ===

In the 1950s, the Middle East was dominated by four interlinked conflicts:
* the [[Cold War]], the geopolitical battle for influence between the United States and [[Soviet Union]];
* the [[Arab Cold War]], the race between different Arab states for the leadership of the [[Arab world]];<ref name="Vakikiotis, P.J. pp. 230">{{Cite book |last=Vakikiotis |first=P. J. |title=Nasser and His Generation |pages=230–232}}</ref>
* the anti-colonial struggle of [[Arab nationalism|Arab nationalists]] against the two remaining imperial powers, Britain and France, in particular the [[Algerian War]];<ref>{{Cite book |last=Corum |first=James S. |title=Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency |date=15 Aug 2008 |publisher=Voyageur Press |page=66}}</ref>
* and the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]], the political and military conflict between Arab countries and Israel.

==== Egypt and Britain ====
Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw the country strive for rapprochement throughout 1953-54. Part of this process was the agreement, in 1953, to terminate British rule in Sudan by 1956, in return for Cairo's abandoning its claim to [[suzerainty]] over the Nile Valley. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the phased evacuation of [[British Armed Forces]] troops from the Suez base, the terms of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops within 20 months, maintenance of the base to be continued, and for Britain to hold the right to return for seven years.<ref>{{Harvnb|Butler|2002|p=112}}</ref> The [[Suez Company (1858–1997)|Suez Company]] was not due to revert to the Egyptian government until 1968 under the terms of the treaty.<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 July 1956 |title=1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm |work=BBC News}}</ref>

Britain's close relationship with the two [[Hashemite]] kingdoms of [[Iraq]] and [[Jordan]] were of particular concern to Nasser. In particular, Iraq's increasingly amicable relations with Britain were a threat to Nasser's desire to see Egypt as head of the Arab world. The creation of the [[Central Treaty Organisation|Baghdad Pact]] in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq, and sympathetic to Britain.<ref name="Darwin 210">{{Harvnb|Darwin|1988|p=210}}</ref> Nasser's response was a series of challenges to British influence in the region that would culminate in the Suez Crisis.

==== Egypt and the Arab League ====
In regard to the Arab leadership, particularly venomous was the feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, [[Nuri al-Said]], for Arab leadership, with the Cairo-based [[Voice of the Arabs]] radio station regularly calling for the overthrow of the government in Baghdad.<ref name="Vakikiotis, P.J. pp. 230"/> The most important factors that drove Egyptian foreign policy was a determination to see the entire Middle East as Egypt's rightful sphere of influence, and a tendency on the part of Nasser to fortify his [[Pan-Arabism|pan-Arabist]] and nationalist credibility by seeking to oppose all Western security initiatives in the Near East.<ref name="Vakikiotis, P.J. pp. 230"/>

Despite the establishment of such an agreement with the British, Nasser's position remained tenuous. The loss of Egypt's claim to Sudan, coupled with the continued presence of Britain at Suez for a further two years, led to domestic unrest including an assassination attempt against him in October 1954. The tenuous nature of Nasser's rule caused him to believe that neither his regime nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world.<ref>{{Harvnb|Barnett|1992|pp=82–83}}</ref> This would manifest in the challenging of British Middle Eastern interests throughout 1955.

==== Egypt and the Cold War ====
The US, while attempting to erect an alliance in the form of a Middle East Defense Organization to keep the Soviet Union out of the Near East, tried to woo Nasser into this alliance.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 168">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=168}}</ref> The central problem for American policy was that this region was perceived as strategically important due to its oil, but the United States, weighed down by defence commitments in Europe and the Far East, lacked sufficient troops to resist a Soviet invasion of the Middle East.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 167">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=167}}</ref> In 1952, General [[Omar Bradley]] of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] declared at a planning session about what to do in the event of a Soviet invasion of the Near East: "Where will the staff come from? It will take a lot of stuff to do a job there".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 167"/>

As a consequence, American diplomats favoured the creation of a NATO-type organisation in the Near East to provide the necessary military power to deter the Soviets from invading.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 167"/> The Eisenhower administration, even more than the Truman administration, saw the Near East as a huge gap into which Soviet influence could be projected, and accordingly required an American-supported security system.<ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, p. 90">{{Harvnb|Sayed-Ahmed|1993|p=90}}</ref> American diplomat [[Raymond A. Hare|Raymond Hare]] later recalled:
{{Blockquote|It's hard to put ourselves back in this period. There was really a definite fear of hostilities, of an active Russian occupation of the Middle East physically, and you practically hear the Russian boots clumping down over the hot desert sands.<ref name="Burns, William p. 11">{{Harvnb|Burns|1985|p=11}}</ref>}}
The projected Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was to be centered on Egypt.<ref name="Burns, William p. 11"/> A [[United States National Security Council]] directive of March 1953 called Egypt the "key" to the Near East and advised that Washington "should develop Egypt as a point of strength".<ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, p. 90"/>

A dilemma for American policy was that the two strongest powers in the Near East, Britain and France, were the nations whose influence many local nationalists most resented.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 167"/> From 1953 onwards, American diplomacy had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the powers involved in the Near East, local and imperial, to set aside their differences and unite against the Soviets.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=167–168}}</ref> The Americans took the view that, just as fear of the Soviet Union had helped to end the historic [[French–German enmity|Franco-German enmity]], so could [[Anti-communism|anti-Communism]] end the Arab–Israeli dispute. It was a source of constant puzzlement to American officials in the 1950s, that Arab states and Israelis had more interest in fighting each other, than uniting against the Soviet Union.{{Citation needed|reason=mistake|date=March 2015}} After his visit to the Middle East in May 1953 to drum up support for MEDO, the Secretary of State, [[John Foster Dulles]] found to his astonishment that the Arab states were "more fearful of [[Zionism]] than of the Communists".<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 43">{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=43}}</ref>

The policy of the United States was colored by uncertainty as to whom to befriend. American policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were major colonial powers, and to align [[Third World]] nationalists with the Free World camp.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=18–19, 195}}</ref> Though it would be false to describe the [[Farouk of Egypt#Overthrow|coup deposing King Farouk]] in July 1952 as a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) coup, Nasser and his Society of Free Officers were in contact with CIA operatives beforehand Nasser maintained links with potential allies, from the [[Egyptian Communist Party (1921)|Egyptian Communist Party]] to the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] on the right.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|pp=41–42}}</ref>

Nasser's friendship with CIA officers in Cairo led Washington to overestimate its influence in Egypt.<ref name="Burns, William p. 11"/> That Nasser was close to CIA officers led them to view Nasser as a CIA "asset".<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 177">{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=177}}</ref> In turn, the British who were aware of Nasser's CIA ties resented this relationship, which they viewed as an American attempt to push them out of Egypt.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 177"/> The reason for Nasser's courting of the CIA before the coup was his hope the Americans would act as a restraining influence on the British, should Britain decide on intervention to put an end to the revolution (until Egypt renounced it in 1951, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty allowed Britain the right of intervention against foreign and domestic threats).<ref>{{Harvnb|Thornhill|2004|pp=893–894}}</ref> In turn, many American officials, such as Ambassador [[Jefferson Caffery]], saw the British military presence in Egypt as anachronistic, and viewed the Revolutionary Command Council (as Nasser called his government) in a favourable light.<ref>{{Harvnb|Thornhill|2004|p=900}}</ref>

Caffery was consistently positive about Nasser in his reports to Washington, right up until his departure from Cairo in 1955. The regime of King Farouk was viewed in Washington as weak, corrupt, unstable, and anti-American, so the Free Officers' July coup was welcomed.<ref name="Burns, William p. 11"/> Nasser's contacts with the CIA were not necessary to prevent British intervention against the coup as Anglo-Egyptian relations had deteriorated so badly in 1951–52 that the British viewed any Egyptian government not headed by King Farouk as an improvement.<ref>{{Harvnb|Thornhill|2004|p=899}}</ref> In May 1953, during a meeting with Secretary Dulles, who asked Egypt to join an anti-Soviet alliance, Nasser responded by saying that the Soviet Union has

{{Blockquote|never occupied our territory ... but the British have been here for seventy years. How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife a thousand miles away?<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 168"/>}}
Dulles informed Nasser of his belief that the Soviet Union was seeking world conquest, that the principal danger to the Near East came from the Kremlin, and urged Nasser to set aside his differences with Britain to focus on countering the Soviet Union.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 168"/> In this spirit, Dulles suggested that Nasser negotiate a deal that would see Egypt assume sovereignty over the canal zone base, but then allow the British to have "technical control" in the same way Ford auto company provided parts and training to its Egyptian dealers.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 168"/>

Nasser did not share Dulles's fear of the Soviet Union and insisted vehemently he wanted to see the end of British influence in the Middle East.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 168"/> The CIA offered Nasser a $3 million bribe if he would join the proposed Middle East Defense Organization; Nasser took the money, but refused to join.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=169}}</ref> Nasser made it clear to the Americans he wanted an Egyptian-dominated Arab League to be the principal defence organisation in the Near East, which might be informally associated with the United States.

After he returned to Washington, Dulles advised Eisenhower that the Arab states believed "the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. Our basic political problem ... is to improve the Moslem states' attitudes towards Western democracies because our prestige in that area had been in constant decline ever since the war".<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 43"/> The immediate consequence was a new policy of "even-handedness" where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in disputes with Israel in 1953–54.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=43–44}}</ref> Moreover, Dulles did not share any sentimental regard for the Anglo-American "[[Special Relationship|special relationship]]", which led the Americans to lean towards the Egyptian side in the Anglo-Egyptian disputes.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=44–45}}</ref> During the difficult negotiations over the British evacuation of the Suez Canal base in 1954–55, the Americans supported Egypt, though trying hard to limit the extent of the damage this might cause to Anglo-American relations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Thornhill|2004|pp=906–907}}</ref>

In the same report of May 1953 to President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] calling for "even-handedness", Dulles stated that the Egyptians were not interested in joining the proposed MEDO; that the Arabs were more interested in their disputes with the British, French, Israelis and each other than in standing against the Soviets; and that the "Northern Tier" states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were more useful as allies than Egypt.<ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, p. 90"/> Accordingly, the best American policy towards Egypt was to work towards Arab–Israeli peace and the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the British Suez Canal base, as the best way of securing Egypt's ultimate adhesion to an American sponsored alliance centered on the "Northern Tier" states.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sayed-Ahmed|1993|p=91}}</ref>

The "Northern Tier" alliance was achieved in early 1955 with the creation of the Baghdad Pact comprising Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the UK.<ref name="Burns, William p. 24">{{Harvnb|Burns|1985|p=24}}</ref> The presence of the last two states was due to the British desire to continue to maintain influence in the Middle East, and Nuri Said's wish to associate his country with the West, as the best way of counterbalancing the aggressive Egyptian claims to regional predominance.<ref name="Burns, William p. 24"/> The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact occurred almost simultaneously with a dramatic Israeli [[Reprisal operations (Israel)|reprisal operation]] on the [[All-Palestine Protectorate|Gaza Strip]] on 28 February 1955 in retaliation for [[Palestinian Fedayeen insurgency|Palestinian ''fedayeen'' raids into Israel]], during which the Israeli [[Unit 101]] commanded by [[Ariel Sharon]] did damage to [[Egyptian Army]] forces.<ref name="Burns, William p. 24"/>

The close occurrence of the two events was mistakenly interpreted by Nasser as part of coordinated Western effort to push him into joining the Baghdad Pact.<ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, pp. 91">{{Harvnb|Sayed-Ahmed|1993|pp=91–92}}</ref> The signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid marked the beginning of the end of Nasser's good relations with the Americans.<ref name="Sayed-Ahmed 1993, pp. 91"/> In particular, Nasser saw Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact as a Western attempt to promote his archenemy Nuri al-Said as an alternative leader of the Arab world.<ref>{{Harvnb|Sayed-Ahmed|1993|p=92}}</ref>

===== Nasser and the Soviet Union =====
Instead of siding with either superpower, Nasser took the role of the spoiler, and tried to play them off, to have them compete in attempts to buy his friendship.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=170–172}}</ref>

Under the new leadership of [[Nikita Khrushchev]], the Soviet Union was making a major effort to win influence in the so-called [[Third World]].<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=171}}</ref> As part of the diplomatic offensive, Khrushchev had abandoned Moscow's traditional line of treating all non-communists as enemies and adopted a tactic of befriending so-called "non-aligned" nations, which often were led by leaders who were non-Communists, but were hostile towards the West.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> Khrushchev had realised that by treating non-communists as being the same thing as being anti-communist, Moscow had needlessly alienated many potential friends over the years in the Third World.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> Under the banner of anti-imperialism, Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet Union would provide arms to any left-wing government in the Third World as a way of undercutting Western influence.<ref>{{Harvnb|Love|1969|pp=306–307}}</ref>

Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] met Nasser at the 1955 [[Bandung Conference]] and was impressed by him. Zhou recommended that Khrushchev treat Nasser as a potential ally.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> Zhou described Nasser to Khrushchev as a young nationalist who, though no Communist, could if used correctly do much damage to Western interests in the Middle East. Marshal [[Josip Broz Tito]] of [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], who also came to know Nasser at the [[Bandung Conference]] told Khrushchev in a 1955 meeting that "Nasser was a young man without much political experience, but if we give him the benefit of the doubt, we might be able to exert a beneficial influence on him, both for the sake of the Communist movement, and ... the Egyptian people".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> Traditionally, most of the equipment in the Egyptian military had come from Britain, but Nasser's desire to break British influence in Egypt meant that he was desperate to find a new source of weapons to replace Britain. Nasser had first broached the subject of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=170–171}}</ref>

===== Nasser and the United States =====
Most of all, Nasser wanted the United States to supply arms on a generous scale to Egypt.<ref name="Burns, William p. 24"/> Nasser refused to promise that any U.S. arms he might buy would not be used against Israel, and rejected out of hand the American demand for a [[Military Assistance Advisory Group]] to be sent to Egypt as part of the arms sales.<ref name="Burns, William pp. 16">{{Harvnb|Burns|1985|pp=16–17, 18–22}}</ref>

Nasser's first choice for buying weapons was the United States. However his frequent [[Anti-Zionism|anti-Zionist]] speeches and sponsorship of the [[Palestinian fedayeen|Palestinian ''fedayeen'']], who made frequent raids into Israel, rendered it difficult for the [[Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower administration]] to get the approval of Congress necessary to sell weapons to Egypt. American public opinion was deeply hostile towards selling arms to Egypt that might be used against Israel. Moreover, Eisenhower feared doing so could trigger a Middle Eastern arms race.<ref name="Burns, William pp. 16"/> Eisenhower very much valued the [[Tripartite Declaration of 1950|Tripartite Declaration]] as a way of keeping peace in the Near East. In 1950, in order to limit the extent that the Arabs and the Israelis could engage in an [[arms race]], the three nations which dominated the arms trade in the non-Communist world, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France, had signed the Tripartite Declaration, where they had committed themselves to limiting how much arms they could sell in the Near East, and also to ensuring that any arms sales to one side was matched by arms sales of equal quantity and quality to the other.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=73}}</ref> Eisenhower viewed the Tripartite Declaration, which sharply restricted how many arms Egypt could buy in the West, as one of the key elements in keeping the peace between Israel and the Arabs, and believed that setting off an arms race would inevitably lead to a new war.

The Egyptians made continuous attempts to purchase heavy arms from [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic|Czechoslovakia]] years before the 1955 deal.<ref name="Laron-p16">{{Cite web |last=Laron |first=Guy |date=February 2007 |title=Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal |url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/cutting-the-gordian-knot-the-post-wwii-egyptian-quest-for-arms-and-the-1955-czechoslovak |publisher=wilsoncenter.org |page=16 |quote="Egyptian representatives were able to sign a new commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia on 24 October 1951, which included a secret clause stating that "the government of Czechoslovakia will provide the Egyptian government with arms and ammunition—to be selected by Egyptian experts—worth about 600 million Egyptian pounds, to be paid in Egyptian cotton." The Egyptian experts requested 200 tanks, 200 armored vehicles, 60 to 100 MIG-15 planes, 2,000 trucks, 1,000 jeeps, and other items.... Czechoslovakia would not be able to supply weapons to Egypt in 1952. And each year, from then until 1955, Prague kept finding new reasons to delay the shipments "}}</ref>

Nasser had let it be known, in 1954–55, that he was considering buying weapons from the Soviet Union, and thus coming under Soviet influence, as a way of pressuring the Americans into selling him the arms he desired.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> Khrushchev, who very much wanted to win the Soviet Union influence in the Middle East, was more than ready to arm Egypt if the Americans proved unwilling.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/> During secret talks with the Soviets in 1955, Nasser's demands for weapons were more than amply satisfied as the Soviet Union had not signed the Tripartite Declaration.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=93–94}}</ref> The news in September 1955 of the Egyptian purchase of a huge quantity of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was greeted with shock and rage in the West, where this was seen as a major increase in Soviet influence in the Near East.<ref>Goldman, Marshal ''Soviet Foreign Aid'', New York: Fredrich Prager, 1968, p. 60.</ref> In Britain, the increase of Soviet influence in the Near East was seen as an ominous development that threatened to put an end to British influence in the oil-rich region.<ref>{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|p=450}}</ref>

==== France and Egypt's support for Algerian rebels ====
{{See also|Algerian War}}
Over the same period, the French Premier [[Guy Mollet]] was facing an increasingly serious rebellion in [[Algeria]], where the Algerian [[National Liberation Front (Algeria)|National Liberation Front (FLN)]] rebels were being verbally supported by Egypt via transmissions of the [[Voice of the Arabs]] radio, financially supported with Suez Canal revenue<ref>p. 102 Alexander, Anne ''Nasser'' Haus Publishing, 1 Sep 2005</ref> and clandestinely owned Egyptian ships were shipping arms to the FLN.<ref>Sirrs, Owen L. ''The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009'' Routledge, 25 Feb 2010</ref> Mollet came to perceive Nasser as a major threat.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 115">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=115}}</ref> During a visit to London in March 1956, Mollet told Eden his country was faced with an Islamic threat to the very soul of France supported by the Soviet Union.<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 115"/> Mollet stated: "All this is in the works of Nasser, just as Hitler's policy was written down in ''[[Mein Kampf]]''. Nasser has the ambition to recreate the [[Spread of Islam|conquests of Islam]]. But his present position is largely due to the policy of the West in building up and flattering him".<ref name="Kyle, Keith, p. 115"/>

In a May 1956 gathering of French veterans, [[Louis Mangin]] spoke in place of the unavailable Minister of Defence and gave a violently anti-Nasser speech, which compared the Egyptian leader to Hitler. He accused Nasser of plotting to rule the entire Middle East and of seeking to annex Algeria, whose "people live in community with France".<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|pp=116–117}}</ref> Mangin urged France to stand up to Nasser, and being a strong friend of Israel, urged an alliance with that nation against Egypt.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=117}}</ref>

==== Fluctuation of the Egyptian–Israeli relationship ====
Prior to 1955, Nasser had pursued efforts to reach peace with Israel and had worked to prevent cross-border Palestinian attacks.<ref name="Nasr1996p40">{{Cite book |last=Nasr |first=Kameel B. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QRXURzwdXS4C&pg=PA39 |title=Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936–1993 |date=1 December 1996 |publisher=McFarland |isbn=978-0-7864-3105-2 |pages=39–40 |quote=Nasser was personally furious; the raid, using sophisticated weapons, had no provocation. Seeing that peace was impossible ... he also allowed Palestinians, who held sizeable demonstrations in Gaza and Cairo after the attack, to organize raids. ... These incursions paved the way for the 1956 Suez War...}}</ref> In February 1955, [[Unit 101]], an Israeli unit under [[Ariel Sharon]], [[Operation Black Arrow|conducted a raid]] on the Egyptian Army headquarters in Gaza in retaliation for a ''[[Palestinian fedayeen]]'' attack that killed an Israeli civilian.<ref>[[Benny Morris]], ''Righteous Victims'', p. 283</ref> As a result of the incident, Nasser began allowing raids into Israel by the Palestinian militants.<ref name="Nasr1996p40"/> Egypt established fedayeen bases not just in Gaza but also in Jordan and Lebanon, from which incursions could be launched with a greater amount of plausible deniability on the part of Nasser's Egypt.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Oren |first=Michael B. |date=April 1989 |title=Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949–56 |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200948902400208 |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |language=en |volume=24 |issue=2 |pages=347–375 |doi=10.1177/002200948902400208 |issn=0022-0094 |s2cid=153741710 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref> The raids triggered a series of Israeli [[reprisal operations]], which ultimately contributed to the Suez Crisis.<ref name="Vatikiotis, P.J. pp. 252">{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|pp=252–253}}</ref><ref name="Nasr1996p40"/>

==== Emergence of a French–Israeli alliance ====
Starting in 1949 owing to shared nuclear research, France and Israel started to move towards an alliance.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=160}}</ref> Following the outbreak of the Algerian War in late 1954, France began to ship more and more arms to Israel.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=160–161}}</ref> In November 1954, the Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Defense [[Shimon Peres]] visited Paris, where he was received by the French Defense Minister [[Marie-Pierre Kœnig]], who told him that France would sell Israel any weapons it wanted to buy.<ref name="Neff, Donald pp. 162">{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=162–163}}</ref> By early 1955, France was shipping large amounts of weapons to Israel.<ref name="Neff, Donald pp. 162"/> In April 1956, following another visit to Paris by Peres, France agreed to totally disregard the [[Tripartite Declaration of 1950|Tripartite Declaration]], and supply even more weapons to Israel.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=234–236}}</ref> During the same visit, Peres informed the French that Israel had decided upon war with Egypt in 1956.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 235">{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=235}}</ref> Peres claimed that Nasser was a genocidal maniac intent upon not only destroying Israel, but also exterminating its people, and as such, Israel wanted a war before Egypt received even more Soviet weapons, and there was still a possibility of victory for the Jewish state.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 235"/>

==== Frustration of British influence in the Middle East ====
Throughout 1955 and 1956, Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser saw Iraq's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact as indicating that the United States and Britain had sided with his much hated archenemy [[Nuri al-Said]]'s efforts to be the leader of the Arab world, and much of the motivation for Nasser's turn to an active anti-Western policy starting in 1955 was due to his displeasure with the Baghdad Pact.<ref>{{Harvnb|Burns|1985|pp=24–25, 26–27}}</ref> For Nasser, attendance at such events as the [[Bandung Conference|Bandung conference]] in April 1955 served as both the means of striking a posture as a global leader, and of playing hard to get in his talks with the Americans, especially his demand that the United States sell him vast quantities of arms.<ref>{{Harvnb|Burns|1985|pp=27–28}}</ref>

Nasser "played on the widespread suspicion that any Western defence pact was merely veiled colonialism and that Arab disunity and weakness—especially in the struggle with Israel—was a consequence of British machinations."<ref name="Darwin 210"/> He also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of [[Saudi Arabia]]—whose [[House of Saud|rulers]] were hereditary enemies of the [[Hashemites]]—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw [[Syria]], Jordan and [[Lebanon]] into the orbit of the [[Baghdad Pact]]. Nasser struck a further blow against Britain by negotiating an arms deal with communist [[Czechoslovakia]] in September 1955.<ref>{{Harvnb|Darwin|1988|p=211}}</ref>