Editing Strategic bombing (section)

==Enemy morale==
One of the aims of war is to demoralize the enemy; facing continual death and destruction may make the prospect of peace or surrender preferable. The proponents of strategic bombing between the world wars, such as General Douhet, expected that direct attacks upon an enemy country's cities by strategic bombers would lead to a rapid collapse of civilian morale so that political pressure to sue for peace would lead to a rapid conclusion. When such attacks were tried in the 1930s—in the [[Spanish Civil War]] and the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]—they were ineffective. Commentators observed the failures and some air forces, such as the [[Luftwaffe]], concentrated their efforts upon direct support of the troops.<ref>{{harvnb|National Review|1938|p=51}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|The Round Table|1937|p=515}}</ref> As World War Two progressed, the focus by the Allies on the enemy's morale was modified. Observation of the effect of the Blitz on British industrial war production showed that it was difficult to put factories out of action by bombing, but, in comparison, destroying the housing of the workforce had a much more disruptive effect. Morale collapse was expected to affect war industries, rather than, as in the pre-war theories, initiating political pressure for war leaders to sue for peace.<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|2013|pp=256-258}}</ref>