Editing Strategic Defense Initiative (section)

==History==
===National BMD===
The [[US Army]] considered the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD) after [[World War II]]. Studies suggested that attacking a [[V-2 rocket]] would be difficult because the flight time was so short that it would leave little time to forward information through [[command and control]] networks to missile batteries. [[Bell Labs]] pointed out that although longer-range missiles flew much faster, their longer flight times would ease the timing issue and their high altitudes would ease long-range [[radar]] detection.{{sfn|Jayne|1969|p=29}}

This led to a series of projects including [[Nike Zeus]], [[Nike-X]], [[Sentinel program|Sentinel]] and ultimately the [[Safeguard Program]], all aimed at developing a system to defend against attacks by Soviet ICBMs. The programs proliferated because of the changing threat; the Soviets claimed to be producing missiles "like sausages", and ever-more missiles would be needed to defend against their fleet. Low-cost countermeasures such as [[penetration aids|radar decoys]] required additional interceptors. An early estimate suggested $20 spent on defense would be required for every $1 the Soviets spent on offense. The addition of [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRV]] in the late 1960s further moved the balance in favor of offensive systems. This massively skewed [[cost-exchange ratio]] prompted observers to propose that an [[arms race]] was inevitable.{{sfn|Kent|2008|p=49}}

[[File:LIM-49A Spartan mockup.png|thumb|The [[Nike-X|Extended Range Nike Zeus]]/[[LIM-49A Spartan|Spartan missile]] of the late-1960s was designed to provide full-country defense as part of the Sentinel-[[Safeguard Program|Safeguard]] programs. Projected to cost $40&nbsp;billion (${{inflation|US|40|1966}} billion in {{currentyear}}) it would have offered minimal protection and damage prevention in an all-out attack.{{sfn|Ritter|2010|p=154}}]]

President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] asked [[DARPA|ARPA]] to consider alternative concepts. Their Project Defender studied many approaches before concentrating on [[Project BAMBI]]. BAMBI used satellites carrying interceptors that would attack the Soviet ICBMs upon launch. This [[boost phase]] intercept rendered MIRV impotent; a successful attack would destroy all of the warheads. Unfortunately, the operational cost of such a system was so large that the [[US Air Force]] rejected the concepts. Development was cancelled in 1963.<ref>{{cite web |website=Astronautix.com |url=http://www.astronautix.com/b/bambi.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161227220849/http://astronautix.com/b/bambi.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 27, 2016 |title=Bambi}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/28/science/star-wars-traced-to-eisenhower-era.html |newspaper=The New York Times |title='STAR WARS' Traced to Eisenhower Era |first= William |last= Broad |date=October 28, 1986}}</ref>

During this period, the entire topic of BMD became increasingly controversial. Early deployment plans were met with little interest, but by the late 1960s, public meetings on the Sentinel system were met by thousands of angry protesters.<ref name=today>{{cite web |first=Sharon |last=Watkins Lang |url=https://www.army.mil/article/142123/SMDC_History__Today_in_Space_and_Missile_Defense_History/ |title=Today in Space and Missile Defense History |date=February 3, 2015 |website=US Army}}</ref> After thirty years of effort, only one such system was built; a single base of the original Safeguard system became operational in April 1975, but was closed in February 1976.<ref>{{cite news
|title=Safeguard ABM System to Shut Down
|newspaper=The New York Times
|date=November 25, 1975
|author=John W. Finney
|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/25/archives/safeguard-abm-system-to-shut-down-5-billion-spent-in-6-years-since.html
|quote=the utility of Safeguard to protect Minuteman will be essentially nullified in the future}}</ref>

A Soviet military [[A-35 anti-ballistic missile system]] was deployed around Moscow to intercept enemy [[ballistic missile]]s targeting the city or its surrounding areas. The A-35 was the only Soviet ABM system allowed under the 1972 [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]]. In development since the 1960s and in operation from 1971<ref name=astro>{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/a35.htm |title=A35 |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Astronautica |access-date=June 7, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070702003434/http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/a35.htm |archive-date=July 2, 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref> until the 1990s, it featured the nuclear-tipped [[ABM-1 Galosh|A350]] [[exoatmospheric]] interceptor missile.

===Lead up to SDI===
{{main|X-ray laser}}

[[Image:Tumbler_Snapper_rope_tricks.jpg|thumb|upright=1.0|The bright spikes extending below the initial fireball of one of 1952's [[Operation Tumbler–Snapper]] test shots, are known as the "[[rope trick effect]]". They are caused by the intense flash of ''thermal''/[[soft X-rays]] released by the explosion heating the steel tower guy-wires white hot. The development of the [[W71]] and the [[Project Excalibur]] x-ray laser were based on enhancing the destructive effects of these x-rays.]]

[[George Shultz]], Reagan's [[Secretary of State of the United States|secretary of state]], suggested that a 1967 lecture by physicist [[Edward Teller]] was an important precursor to SDI. In the lecture, Teller talked about the idea of defending against nuclear missiles using [[nuclear weapon]]s, principally the [[W65 (nuclear warhead)|W65]] and [[W71]], with the latter an enhanced thermal/X-ray device used on the [[LIM-49 Spartan|Spartan missile]] in 1975. Held at [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]] (LLNL), the 1967 lecture was attended by Reagan shortly after he became governor of California.<ref name=gps>{{Cite book |last=Shultz |first=George Pratt |authorlink=George P. Shultz |url={{google books|plainurl=yes|id=96LVnQEACAAJ|page=261}} |page=261|title=Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State |date=1993 |publisher=Scribner's |isbn=978-0-684-80332-6 |language=en}}</ref>

Development of [[laser weapon]]s in the [[Soviet Union]] began in 1964–1965.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/990600-bmd-rus.htm|work=[[Nevsky Bastion]]|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|author=A. Karpenko|title=ABM And Space Defense|year=1999|pages=2–47}}</ref> Though classified at the time, a detailed study on a Soviet space-based laser system began no later than 1976 with the [[Polyus (spacecraft)|Polyus]], a 1 MW [[Carbon dioxide laser]]-based orbital weapons platform prototype. Development was also started on the anti-satellite ''Kaskad'' in-orbit missile platform.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2394/2|title=The Space Review: Plagiarism in several space history articles (page 2)|date=October 8, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171008102950/http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2394/2|archive-date=October 8, 2017}}</ref><ref name="web.archive.org">{{cite web|url=http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/05/the-soviet-response-to-star-wars-that-never-was/2/|title=The secret laser-toting Soviet satellite that almost was – Ars Technica|date=September 26, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130926143351/http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/05/the-soviet-response-to-star-wars-that-never-was/2/|archive-date=September 26, 2013}}</ref>

A [[revolver cannon]] ([[Rikhter R-23]]) was mounted on the 1974 Soviet [[Salyut 3]] space station, a satellite that successfully test-fired its cannon in orbit.<ref name=Olberg>{{cite web| url = http://space.au.af.mil/books/oberg/ch02.pdf| title = James Olberg, ''Space Power Theory'', Ch. 2| access-date = June 17, 2013| archive-date = July 12, 2018| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180712205157/http://space.au.af.mil/books/oberg/ch02.pdf| url-status = dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18187/here-is-the-soviet-unions-secret-space-cannon/|title=Here Is the Soviet Union's Secret Space Cannon|date=November 16, 2015}}</ref>

In 1979, Teller contributed to a [[Hoover Institution]] publication where he claimed that the US would be facing an emboldened USSR due to their work on [[civil defense]]. Two years later at a conference in Italy, he made the same claims about their ambitions, now emboldened by new space-based weapons. According to popular opinion, shared by author [[Frances FitzGerald (journalist)|Frances FitzGerald]], no evidence validated that such research was carried out. Instead, Teller was promoting his latest weapon, the [[X-ray laser]] that was finding only limited funding, his speech in Italy was a new attempt to synthsize a [[missile gap]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=FitzGerald |first=Frances |url={{google books|plainurl=yes|id=nv2v0fCAONwC|page=128}} |title=Way Out There In the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War |date=2001-02-21 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-0-7432-0377-7 |pages=128 |language=en}}</ref>

In 1979, Reagan visited the [[NORAD]] command base, [[Cheyenne Mountain Complex]], where he was introduced to the extensive tracking and detection systems extending throughout the world and into space; however, he was struck by their comments that while they could track the attack down to the individual targets, they could not stop it. Reagan felt that in the event of an attack, this would place the president in a terrible position, having to choose between immediate counterattack or absorbing the attack while maintaining offensive dominance. Shultz suggested that this feeling of helplessness, coupled with Teller's defensive ideas combined to motivate SDI.<ref name=gps/>{{rp|261–62}}

In the fall of 1979, at Reagan's request, Lieutenant General [[Daniel O. Graham]], the former head of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]], briefed Reagan on an updated BAMBI he called High Frontier, a missile shield composed of multi-layered ground- and space-based weapons that could track, intercept, and destroy ballistic missiles, theoretically enabled by emerging technologies. It was designed to replace the [[mutual assured destruction|MAD]] doctrine.<ref>{{cite book|first=Daniel O. |last=Graham|authorlink=Daniel O. Graham |url=http://www.danielgraham.net/content/Chapter14.htm |title=Confessions of a Cold Warrior: An Autobiography|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070311033905/http://www.danielgraham.net/content/Chapter14.htm |archive-date=March 11, 2007 |publisher= Preview Press|year=1995|isbn=0-9644495-2-8}}</ref> In September 1981, Graham formed a small, Virginia-based [[think tank]] called High Frontier to continue research on the missile shield. [[The Heritage Foundation]] provided High Frontier with research space, and Graham published a 1982 report entitled, "High Frontier: A New National Strategy" that examined in greater detail how the system would function.<ref>{{Cite book |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780199759255.001.0001 |title=The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History |date=2013-01-01 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-975925-5 |editor-last=Lynch |editor-first=Timothy J. |volume=2 |pages=360 |chapter=Think Tanks and US Military and Diplomatic Affairs|doi=10.1093/acref/9780199759255.001.0001 }}</ref>

Since the late 1970s, another group had been pushing for the development of a high-powered orbital chemical laser  attack ICBMs, the Space Based Laser (SBL). New developments under [[Project Excalibur]] by Teller's "O-Group" at [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]](LLNL) suggested that a single [[X-ray laser]] could shoot down dozens of missiles with a single shot.<ref>{{cite news | title = 'Cold Fusion' Patents Sought | first = Broad | last = William J. | date = April 13, 1989 |work=The New York Times | url = https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/13/us/cold-fusion-patents-sought.html }}</ref> The groups began to meet in order to prepare their plans for the incoming president.

The group met with Reagan several times during 1981 and 1982, apparently with little effect, while the buildup of new offensive weaponry like the [[B-1 Lancer]] and [[MX missile]] continued. However, in early 1983, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] met with the president and outlined the reasons why they might consider shifting some of the funding from the offensive side to new defensive systems.

According to a 1983 US Interagency Intelligence Assessment, good evidence indicated that in the late 1960s the Soviets were devoting serious thought to both explosive and non-explosive nuclear power sources for lasers.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/m8310017.htm|title=Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative Interagency Intelligence Assessment.1983. "There is good evidence that in the late 1960s the Soviets were giving serious thought to both explosive and nonexplosive nuclear power sources for lasers of an unknown type."|access-date=April 4, 2015|archive-date=May 7, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150507003220/http://fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/m8310017.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>