Editing Special Operations Executive (section)

==History==

===Origins===
The organisation was formed from the merger of three existing secret departments, which had been formed shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. Immediately after Germany annexed Austria (the ''[[Anschluss]]'') in March 1938, the [[Foreign Office]] created a propaganda organisation known as [[Department EH]] (after [[Electra House]], its headquarters), run by Canadian newspaper [[magnate]] Sir [[Campbell Stuart]]. Later that month, the [[Secret Intelligence Service]] (SIS, also known as MI6) formed a section known as Section D (the "D" apparently standing for "Destruction"){{sfn|Smith|2019|p=25}} under Major Lawrence Grand, to investigate the use of sabotage, propaganda, and other irregular means to weaken an enemy. In the autumn of the same year, the [[War Office]] expanded an existing research department known as GS (R) and appointed Major J.&nbsp;C. Holland as its head to conduct research into [[guerrilla warfare]].{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|pp=33–34}} GS (R) was renamed Military Intelligence (Research) (MI(R)) in early 1939.

These three departments worked with few resources until the outbreak of war. There was much overlap between their activities. Section D and EH duplicated much of each other's work. On the other hand, the heads of Section D and MI(R) knew each other and shared information.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=12}} They agreed to a rough division of their activities; MI(R) researched irregular operations that could be undertaken by regular uniformed troops, while Section D dealt with truly undercover work.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=293}}{{Sfn|Atkin|2015|pp=Chapters 2–4}}

During the early months of the war, Section D was based first at [[St Ermin's Hotel]] in Westminster and then the [[Metropole Hotel, London|Metropole Hotel]] near [[Trafalgar Square]].<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.christopherlong.co.uk/pri/secpap.html |title='Pat Line' – An Escape & Evasion Line in France in World War II |last=Long |first=Christopher |publisher=Christopher Long |access-date=2017-08-23 |archive-date=29 June 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140629064708/http://christopherlong.co.uk/pri/secpap.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The Section attempted unsuccessfully to sabotage deliveries of vital [[strategic material]]s to Germany from neutral countries by mining the [[Iron Gate (Danube)|Iron Gate]] on the [[River Danube]].{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=15–16}} MI(R) meanwhile produced pamphlets and technical handbooks for guerrilla leaders. MI(R) was also involved in the formation of the [[Independent Company|Independent Companies]], autonomous units intended to carry out sabotage and guerrilla operations behind enemy lines in the [[Norwegian Campaign]], and the [[Auxiliary Units]], stay-behind commando units based on the [[Home Guard (United Kingdom)|Home Guard]] which would act in the event of an [[Axis Powers|Axis]] invasion of Britain, as seemed possible in the early years of the war.{{Sfn|Foot|1999|p=17}}

===Formation===
On 13 June 1940, at the instigation of newly appointed Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]], [[Maurice Hankey, 1st Baron Hankey|Lord Hankey]] (who held the Cabinet post of [[Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster]]) persuaded Section D and MI(R) that their operations should be coordinated. On 1 July, a Cabinet level meeting arranged the formation of a single sabotage organisation. On 16 July, [[Hugh Dalton]], the [[Minister of Economic Warfare]], was appointed to take political responsibility for the new organisation, which was formally created on 22 July 1940.  Dalton recorded in his diary that on that day the War Cabinet agreed to his new duties and that Churchill had told him, "And now go and set Europe ablaze."<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940–45|last=Dalton|first=Hugh|publisher=Jonathan Cape|year=1986|isbn=022402065X|pages=[https://archive.org/details/secondworldwardi0000dalt/page/62 62]|url=https://archive.org/details/secondworldwardi0000dalt/page/62}}</ref> Dalton used the [[Irish Republican Army (1917–22)|Irish Republican Army]] (IRA) during the [[Irish War of Independence]] as a model for the organisation.<ref name=Carr/>{{Sfn|Geraghty|2000|p=347}}<ref>Hugh Dalton letter to Lord Halifax 2 July 1940; quoted in M. R. D. Foot, ''SOE in France'', p. 8</ref>

[[Frank Nelson (British politician)|Sir Frank Nelson]] was nominated by SIS to be director of the new organisation,{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=76}} and a senior [[civil service|civil servant]], [[Gladwyn Jebb]], transferred from the Foreign Office to it, with the title of Chief Executive Officer.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=22}} Campbell Stuart left the organisation, and the flamboyant Major Grand was returned to the regular army. At his own request, Major Holland also left to take up a regular appointment in the [[Royal Engineers]]. (Both Grand and Holland eventually attained the rank of [[Major-general (United Kingdom)|major-general]].){{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=22}} However, Holland's former deputy at MI(R), Brigadier [[Colin Gubbins]], returned from command of the Auxiliary Units to be Director of Operations of SOE.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=76}}

One department of MI(R), MI R(C), which was involved in the development of weapons for irregular warfare, was not formally integrated into SOE but became an independent body codenamed [[MD1]].{{Sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|p=9}} Directed by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) [[Millis Jefferis]],{{Sfn|Milton|2016|pp=80–87, 163–167}} it was located at [[The Firs, Whitchurch|The Firs]] in [[Whitchurch, Buckinghamshire]] and nicknamed "Churchill's Toyshop" from the Prime Minister's close interest in it and his enthusiastic support.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tnaoAwAAQBAJ&q=The+Firs%2C+Whitchurch+Major&pg=PT96|title=Winston Churchill's Toyshop: The Inside Story of Military Intelligence|first=Stuart |last=MacRae|publisher=Amberley|year=2011|isbn= 978-1445603704}}</ref>

===Leadership===
The director of SOE was usually referred to by the initials "CD". Nelson, the first director to be appointed, was a former head of a trading firm in India, a [[Backbencher|back bench]] [[Conservative Party (United Kingdom)|Conservative]] Member of Parliament and [[Consul (representative)|Consul]] in [[Basel]], Switzerland, where he had also been engaged in undercover intelligence work.{{Sfn|Milton|2016|p=89}}

In February 1942 Dalton was removed as the political head of SOE (possibly because he was using SOE's phone tapping facility to listen to conversations of fellow [[Labour Party (United Kingdom)|Labour]] ministers,{{Sfn|Seymour-Jones|2013|p=113}} or possibly because he was viewed as too "communistically inclined" and a threat to SIS).{{Sfn|Stevenson|2006|pages=193-194}} He became [[President of the Board of Trade]] and was replaced as Minister of Economic Warfare by [[Roundell Palmer, 3rd Earl of Selborne|Lord Selborne]]. Selborne in turn retired Nelson, who had suffered ill health as a result of his hard work, and appointed Sir [[Charles Jocelyn Hambro|Charles Hambro]], head of [[Hambros Bank]], to replace him. He also transferred Jebb back to the Foreign Office.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=31}}

Hambro had been a close friend of Churchill before the war and had won the [[Military Cross]] in the [[First World War]]. He retained several other interests, for example remaining chairman of Hambros and a director of the [[Great Western Railway]]. Some of his subordinates and associates expressed reservations that these interests distracted him from his duties as director.{{Sfn|Hastings|2015|p=264}}{{Sfn|Milton|2016|pp=170–171}} Selborne and Hambro nevertheless cooperated closely until August 1943, when they fell out over the question of whether SOE should remain a separate body or coordinate its operations with those of the [[British Army]] in several theatres of war. Hambro felt that any loss of autonomy would cause a number of problems for SOE in the future. At the same time, Hambro was found to have failed to pass on vital information to Selborne. He was dismissed as director, and became head of a [[raw material]]s purchasing commission in [[Washington, D.C.]], which was involved in the exchange of nuclear information.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=32}}

[[File:ColinGubbins.jpg|right|thumb|upright|Major General [[Colin McVean Gubbins]], director of SOE from September 1943]]

As part of the subsequent closer ties between the [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff|Imperial General Staff]] and SOE (although SOE had no representation on the [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]]), Hambro's replacement as director from September 1943 was Gubbins, who had been promoted to [[Major-general (United Kingdom)|Major-general]]. Gubbins had wide experience of [[commando]] and [[clandestine operation]]s and had played a major part in MI(R)'s and SOE's early operations. He also put into practice many of the lessons he learned from the [[Irish Republican Army|IRA]] during the [[Irish War of Independence]].<ref name=Carr/>

===Organisation===
====Headquarters====
The organisation of SOE continually evolved and changed during the war. Initially, it consisted of three broad departments: SO1 (formerly Department EH, which dealt with propaganda); SO2 (formerly Section D, operations); and SO3 (formerly MI R, research).{{sfn|Smith|2019|p=24}} SO3 was quickly overloaded with paperwork{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=22}} and was merged into SO2. In August 1941, following quarrels between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the [[Ministry of Information (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Information]] over their relative responsibilities, SO1 was removed from SOE and became an independent organisation, the [[Political Warfare Executive]].{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=24–25}}

Thereafter, a single, broad "Operations" department controlled the Sections operating into enemy and sometimes neutral territory, and the selection and training of agents. Sections, usually referred to by code letters or groups of letters, were assigned to a single country. Some enemy-occupied countries had two or more sections assigned to deal with politically disparate resistance movements. (France had no less than six). For security purposes, each section had its own headquarters and training establishments.{{Sfn|Milton|2016|p=91}} This strict compartmentalisation was so effective that in mid-1942 five governments in exile jointly suggested that a single sabotage organisation be created, and were startled to learn that SOE had been in existence for two years.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=152}}

Four departments and some smaller groups were controlled by the director of scientific research, Professor [[Dudley Maurice Newitt]], and were concerned with the development or acquisition and production of special equipment.{{Sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|pp=23–45}} A few other sections were involved with finance, security, economic research and administration, although SOE had no central registry or filing system. When Gubbins was appointed director, he formalised some of the administrative practices which had grown in an ''ad hoc'' fashion and appointed an establishment officer to oversee the manpower and other requirements of the various departments.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=141}}

The main controlling body of SOE was its council, consisting of around fifteen heads of departments or sections. About half of the council were from the armed forces (although some were specialists who were only commissioned after the outbreak of war), the rest were various [[Civil Service (United Kingdom)|civil servants]], lawyers, or business or industrial experts. Most of the members of the council, and the senior officers and functionaries of SOE generally, were recruited by word of mouth among public school alumni and [[Oxbridge]] graduates,{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=30–35}}{{Sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|p=9}} although this did not notably affect SOE's political complexion.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=47, 148–156}}

====Subsidiary branches====
Several subsidiary SOE stations were set up to manage operations that were too distant for London to control directly. 

SOE's operations in the Middle East and [[Balkans]] were controlled from a headquarters in [[Cairo]], which became notorious for poor security, infighting and conflicts with other agencies.{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=40–41}} It was eventually named, in April 1944, "Special Operations (Mediterranean)," or SO(M). Shortly after the [[Allied landings in North Africa]], a station code named "Massingham" was established near [[Algiers]] in late 1942, which operated into [[Southern France]]. Following the [[Allied invasion of Italy]], personnel from Massingham established forward stations in [[Brindisi]] and near [[Naples]].{{Sfn|Stafford|2011|pp=45–51}} A subsidiary headquarters, initially known as "Force 133," was later set up in [[Bari]] in [[Southern Italy]], under the Cairo headquarters, to control operations in the Balkans, including [[Axis occupation of Greece|Greece]],{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=40–41}} and [[Northern Italy]].

An SOE station, first called the "India Mission," and subsequently known as "GS I(k)," was set up in [[British India|India]] late in 1940. It subsequently moved to [[Sri Lanka|Ceylon]] so as to be closer to the headquarters of the Allied [[South East Asia Command]] and became known as "[[Force 136]]." 

A "Singapore Mission" was set up at the same time as the India Mission but was unable to overcome official opposition to its attempts to form resistance movements in [[British Malaya|Malaya]] before the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Japanese]] overran [[Battle of Singapore|Singapore]]. Force 136 took over its surviving staff and operations.

[[New York City]] also had a branch office, formally titled "[[British Security Coordination]]," and headed by Canadian businessman Sir [[William Stephenson]]. Their office, located at Room 3603, 630 [[Fifth Avenue]], [[Rockefeller Center]], coordinated the work of SOE, SIS, and MI5 with the American [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] and the [[Office of Strategic Services]].

===Aims===
As with its leadership and organisation, the aims and objectives of SOE changed throughout the war, although they revolved around sabotaging and subverting the Axis war machines through indirect methods. SOE occasionally carried out operations with direct military objectives, such as [[Operation Harling]], originally designed to cut one of the Axis supply lines to their troops fighting in North Africa.{{Sfn|Hastings|2015|pp=260, 267}} They also carried out some high-profile operations aimed mainly at the morale both of the Axis and occupied nations, such as [[Operation Anthropoid]], the assassination in Prague of [[Reinhard Heydrich]]. In general also, SOE's objectives were to foment mutual hatred between the population of Axis-occupied countries and the occupiers, and to force the Axis to expend manpower and resources on maintaining their control of subjugated populations.{{Sfn|Hastings|2015|p=260}}

Dalton's initial statement about outline of methods to be used by SOE's was "industrial and military sabotage, labor agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist attacks against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots."<ref name="Foot">{{cite journal |last1=Foot |first1=Michael R. D. |title=Was SOE any Good? |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |date=January 1981 |volume=16 |issue=1 |page=169 |doi=10.1177/002200948101600110 |jstor=260622 |s2cid=161440851 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/260622}}</ref> Dalton's early enthusiasm for fomenting widespread strikes, civil disobedience and sabotage in Axis-occupied areas{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=80}} had to be curbed. Thereafter, there were two main aims, often mutually incompatible; sabotage of the Axis war effort, and the creation of secret armies which would rise up to assist the liberation of their countries when Allied troops arrived or were about to do so. It was recognised that acts of sabotage would bring about reprisals and increased Axis security measures which would hamper the creation of underground armies. As the tide of war turned in the Allies' favour, these underground armies became more important.{{sfn|Hastings|2015|p=279}}

===Relationships===
At the government level, SOE's relationships with the [[Foreign Office]] were often difficult. On several occasions, various governments in exile protested at operations taking place without their knowledge or approval, provoking Axis [[reprisal]]s against civilian populations, or complained about SOE's support for movements opposed to the exiled governments. SOE's activities also threatened relationships with neutral countries. SOE nevertheless generally adhered to the rule, ''"No bangs without Foreign Office approval."''{{Sfn|Foot|2004|pp=35–36}}

Early attempts at bureaucratic control of Jefferis's MIR(c) by the [[Ministry of Supply]] were eventually foiled by Churchill's intervention.{{sfn|Milton|2016|pp=38,80,83}} Thereafter, the Ministry co-operated, though at arm's length, with Dudley Newitt's various supply and development departments.{{Sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|pp=233,238}} The [[HM Treasury|Treasury]] were accommodating from the start{{sfn|Foot|2004|p=26}} and were often prepared to turn a blind eye to some of SOE's questionable activities.{{sfn|Foot|2004|p=243}}

With other military headquarters and commands, SOE cooperated fairly well with [[Combined Operations Headquarters]] during the middle years of the war, usually on technical matters as SOE's equipment was readily adopted by commandos and other raiders.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=98}} This support was lost when [[Vice Admiral]] [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Mountbatten]] left Combined Operations, though by this time SOE had its own transport and had no need to rely on Combined Operations for resources. On the other hand, the [[British Admiralty|Admiralty]] objected to SOE developing its own underwater vessels, and the duplication of effort this involved.{{Sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|pp=129–158}} The Royal Air Force, and in particular [[RAF Bomber Command]] under [[Arthur Harris|"Bomber" Harris]] were usually reluctant to allocate aircraft to SOE.

Towards the end of the war, as Allied forces began to liberate territories occupied by the Axis and in which SOE had established resistance forces, SOE also liaised with and to some extent came under the control of the Allied theatre commands. Relationships with [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]] in north-west Europe (whose commander was General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]) and [[South East Asia Command]] (whose commander was Admiral Louis Mountbatten, already well known to SOE) were generally excellent.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|pp=141–145, 191–195}} However, there were difficulties with the Commanders in Chief in the Mediterranean, partly because of the complaints over impropriety at SOE's Cairo headquarters during 1941{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|pp=90–91}} and partly because both the supreme command in the Mediterranean and SOE's establishments were split in 1942 and 1943, leading to divisions of responsibility and authority.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|pp=138–141}}

There was tension between SOE and SIS, which the Foreign Office controlled. [[Stewart Menzies]], the chief of SIS, was aggrieved to lose control of Section D.{{sfn|Smith|2019|p=24}} Where SIS preferred placid conditions in which it could gather intelligence and work through influential persons or authorities, SOE was intended to create unrest and turbulence,{{sfn|Hastings|2015|pp=264-266}} and often backed anti-establishment organisations, such as the [[Communist]]s, in several countries. At one stage, SIS actively hindered SOE's attempts to infiltrate agents into [[German occupation of France during World War II|enemy-occupied France]].{{Sfn|Foot|2004|p=87}}

Even before the United States joined the war, the head of the newly formed Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), [[William J. Donovan]], had received technical information from SOE and had arranged for some members of his organisation to undergo training at a [[Camp X|camp]] run by SOE in Oshawa in Canada.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=95}} In early 1942, Donovan's organisation became the [[Office of Strategic Services]]. SOE and OSS worked out respective areas of operation: OSS's exclusive sphere included China (including [[Manchuria]]), [[Korea]] and Australia, the Atlantic islands and Finland. SOE retained India, the Middle East and East Africa, and the Balkans. While the two services both worked in Western Europe, it was expected that SOE would be the leading partner.{{Sfn|Wallace|Melton|2010|p=7}}

In the middle of the war, the relations between SOE and OSS were not often smooth. They established a joint headquarters in [[Algiers]] but the officers of the two organisations working there refused to share information with each other.{{Sfn|Hastings|2015|p=292}} In the Balkans, and [[Yugoslavia]] especially, SOE and OSS several times worked at cross-purposes, reflecting their governments' differing (and changing) attitudes to the [[Yugoslav Partisans|Partisans]] and [[Chetniks]]. However, in 1944 SOE and OSS successfully pooled their personnel and resources to mount [[Operation Jedburgh]], providing large scale support to the French Resistance following the [[Normandy landings]].{{sfn|Boyce|Everett|2003|p=205}}

SOE had some nominal contact with the Soviet [[NKVD]], but this was limited to a single liaison officer at each other's headquarters.{{Sfn|Wilkinson|Astley|2010|p=95}}